Vested urban land cannot be restored after possession, and belated revision power must be used within a reasonable time.

Surplus urban land that had vested in the State under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 could not be restored to the original owner once possession had been taken and the land had been assigned to another public use; vesting under Sections 10(1) and 10(3) was treated as absolute, and repeal of the Act did not revive the owner's claim. The Court also held that revisional power under Section 34, though not subject to an express limitation period, must be exercised within a reasonable time. A revision filed nearly two decades later was therefore too belated to unsettle concluded proceedings.

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Issues: (i) whether surplus urban land that had vested in the State under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 could be divested or restored to the original owner after possession had been taken and the land had been put to another public use; (ii) whether the State Government could exercise revisional power under Section 34 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 after an inordinate delay.

Issue (i): whether surplus urban land that had vested in the State under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 could be divested or restored to the original owner after possession had been taken and the land had been put to another public use.

Analysis: The statutory scheme provides for declaration of surplus land, acquisition by the State, and vesting of the land in the State Government free from all encumbrances upon publication of the notification under Section 10(1) and the deeming vesting under Section 10(3). Once such vesting takes place and possession is taken, the legal effect is absolute title in the State. The Court applied the settled principle that land once vested cannot be divested and that the original owner cannot claim restoration merely because the land is later used for a different public purpose. The repeal of the Act did not assist the appellant because possession had already been taken before repeal.

Conclusion: The land could not be restored to the appellant, and the change of user by the State did not invalidate the acquisition or vesting.

Issue (ii): whether the State Government could exercise revisional power under Section 34 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 after an inordinate delay.

Analysis: Although Section 34 does not prescribe an express period of limitation, the Court held that such revisional power cannot be treated as an endless or arbitrary power exercisable after decades. A statutory power of revision must be exercised within a reasonable time, to preserve finality of proceedings and avoid disturbing settled rights after long delay. On the facts, the revision was filed nearly two decades after acquisition and after the original proceedings had attained finality. The Court also noted that the earlier view relied upon by the appellant had since been overruled.

Conclusion: The revision was not maintainable at such a belated stage and could not support the appellant's challenge.

Final Conclusion: The acquisition had validly culminated in vesting of the land in the State, the appellant had not shown any legal basis for restoration, and the delayed revision could not unsettle the concluded proceedings; the appellant was therefore not entitled to any relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Where land has vested in the State free from all encumbrances and possession has been taken, the original owner cannot seek divestment or restoration on change of user or repeal of the statute, and revisional powers lacking an express limitation must still be exercised within a reasonable time.

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