2005 (10) TMI 543 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court rules against Bangalore Development Authority in land re-conveyance case

The Supreme Court held that the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) could not re-convey land acquired for a development scheme, as once land is acquired ... Whether the appellant directed to pay the amount of compensation which was determined by the Land Acquisition Officer along with enhanced compensation which may have been granted by the High Court in any of the reference filed either by the 1st respondent or any other land owner inclusive of statutory benefits with interest @ 9% per annum with effect from the date on which it became due till its payment? Whether 1st respondent would be entitled to re-claim the amount of compensation along with interest? Issues Involved:1. Re-conveyance of acquired land.2. Application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.3. Authority of BDA and CITB regarding re-conveyance.4. Validity and applicability of Section 38-C and Section 9 of the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) Act.5. Directions issued by the Chief Minister under Section 65 of the BDA Act.Detailed Analysis:1. Re-conveyance of Acquired Land:The core issue was whether the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) could re-convey land that had been acquired for a development scheme. The Supreme Court held that once land is acquired and possession is taken, it vests in the government, and the BDA cannot re-convey it. The Court referenced several precedents, including Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh vs. Sri Avinash Sharma, which held that the government cannot withdraw from acquisition once the land vests in it.2. Application of the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel:The respondent argued that the BDA was barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel from not acting upon the resolution to re-convey the land. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that promissory estoppel cannot compel the government to perform an act prohibited by law. The Court cited several judgments, including M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, to emphasize that promissory estoppel cannot be used against statutory provisions.3. Authority of BDA and CITB Regarding Re-conveyance:The Court examined the powers of the BDA and its predecessor, the City Improvement Trust Board (CITB), under the relevant statutes. It concluded that neither the BDA Act nor the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945, provided the authority to re-convey land acquired for development schemes. The Court noted that the rules framed under these Acts did not include provisions for re-conveyance.4. Validity and Applicability of Section 38-C and Section 9 of the BDA Act:The Supreme Court analyzed Section 38-C and Section 9 of the BDA Act, which were introduced by the Bangalore Development Authorities (3rd Amendment) Act, 1993. Section 38-C allows the BDA to allot sites in certain cases but does not authorize re-conveyance of land. Section 9 validates certain allotments made between 1973 and 1986 but does not apply to the resolution in question, which was passed in 1972. The Court held that these provisions did not support the re-conveyance of the land in question.5. Directions Issued by the Chief Minister under Section 65 of the BDA Act:The Court addressed the directions issued by the Chief Minister to re-convey the land, which were based on the impugned judgment. The Supreme Court held that such directions must be for carrying out the purposes of the Act and cannot be contrary to its provisions. The Court found that the Chief Minister's directions were not binding on the BDA and were contrary to the statutory purpose of the BDA Act.Conclusion:The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and the directions issued by the Chief Minister. The Court restored the judgment of the Single Judge, dismissing the writ petition except for directing the BDA to pay the respondent the compensation amount with interest. The Court emphasized that the BDA could not re-convey the land as it was against the statutory provisions and the doctrine of promissory estoppel did not apply in this case.