Prospective withdrawal of consent cannot halt investigations already lawfully begun under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act.

Withdrawal of consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 operates only prospectively, even if rescission is treated as permissible under the General Clauses Act. It cannot invalidate steps already taken under a valid consent or interrupt investigations already commenced before the withdrawal notification. Pending corruption investigations may therefore continue, and the investigating agency remains competent to complete the inquiry and file its report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Objections based on legislative competence, laches, and abuse of process were rejected on the basis of existing authority, public interest, and the prima facie nature of the allegations.

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Issues: (i) Whether the State Government could withdraw consent earlier given under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. (ii) Whether such withdrawal could affect investigations already pending on the date of withdrawal. (iii) Whether the writ petition was liable to be rejected on the grounds of legislative incompetence, laches, or abuse of process.

Issue (i): Whether the State Government could withdraw consent earlier given under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946.

Analysis: The consent under Section 6 enabled the Central agency to exercise powers and jurisdiction in the State. The Court proceeded on the basis that, even if the power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 were applicable to such consent, a rescinding order could not operate retrospectively. The impugned withdrawal therefore could not undo steps already taken under a validly existing consent.

Conclusion: The withdrawal was held to be effective only prospectively.

Issue (ii): Whether such withdrawal could affect investigations already pending on the date of withdrawal.

Analysis: The investigation in the registered corruption cases had commenced before the withdrawal notification. A revocation of consent could not stall proceedings already set in motion, because the power to rescind did not extend to completed or pending investigative action already lawfully initiated. The agency remained competent to complete the investigation and submit its report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Conclusion: The pending investigations were not affected, and the investigating agency was entitled to complete them and file the report in court.

Issue (iii): Whether the writ petition was liable to be rejected on the grounds of legislative incompetence, laches, or abuse of process.

Analysis: The challenge to parliamentary competence stood concluded by earlier authority. The delay in approaching the Court was not treated as fatal in view of the seriousness of the corruption allegations and the public interest in judicial determination. The plea of abuse of process was also rejected because the material showed that the investigations had disclosed a prima facie case and the petition raised a matter of public importance.

Conclusion: The objections based on legislative incompetence, laches, and abuse of process were rejected.

Final Conclusion: The notification withdrawing consent was held not to defeat investigations already pending, and the writ petition succeeded with the consequential declaration in favour of continuation of the investigation.

Ratio Decidendi: A rescinding order under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, even if permissible under the General Clauses Act, operates only prospectively and cannot invalidate or interrupt investigations lawfully initiated before its issuance.

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