Sanction for prosecution under Prevention of Corruption Act invalidated due to subordinate authority grant; proceedings terminated.

Sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act was held jurisdictionally invalid because the sanctioning officer was subordinate to the appointing authority; the statutory requirement that sanction be granted by the authority competent to remove the public servant was held to embody the constitutional protection against removal, rendering a subordinate-granted sanction void ab initio and depriving the Special Court of jurisdiction to proceed, with departmental circulars unable to cure the defect. The curative principle for fresh sanction was held inapplicable due to withdrawal of general consent under the relevant service protection regime, and the discharge order and termination of criminal proceedings were affirmed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the sanction for prosecution granted by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority is valid. (ii) Whether, in the event the original sanction is invalid, the prosecution is entitled to liberty to obtain a fresh sanction after the State has withdrawn general consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act.

Issue (i): Whether a sanction granted by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority is valid.

Analysis: Section 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 requires that sanction for prosecution be granted by the authority "competent to remove" the public servant; this statutory requirement is anchored in Article 311(1) of the Constitution. A subordinate authority does not satisfy the statutory and constitutional competence requirement. Departmental notifications or circulars cannot cure or override the constitutional mandate. A sanction issued by a subordinate authority therefore suffers from a fundamental jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The sanction granted by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority is invalid; conclusion is in favour of the Respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the prosecution may be permitted to obtain a fresh sanction after the original sanction is held invalid, where the State has withdrawn general consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act.

Analysis: The curative principle permitting fresh sanction (as recognised in Nanjappa) applies generally where statutory or jurisdictional impediments are not operative. Obtaining a fresh sanction requires a new substantive exercise of jurisdiction by a competent authority. The withdrawal of general consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act imposes a statutory bar on the agency undertaking any new exercise of jurisdiction within the State's territory for concluded matters. The withdrawal therefore prevents issuance of a fresh sanction and renders the defect incurable in the present circumstances.

Conclusion: The prosecution is not entitled to liberty to obtain a fresh sanction after the State's withdrawal of general consent; conclusion is in favour of the Respondent.

Final Conclusion: The revisional petition is dismissed, the order discharging the accused is upheld, and the criminal proceedings stand terminated; the overall effect is protective of the Respondent's position established by the invalid sanction and the subsequent statutory bar.

Ratio Decidendi: A sanction for prosecution must be granted by the authority statutorily competent to remove the public servant; a sanction granted by a subordinate authority is void ab initio, and where the State has lawfully withdrawn general consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, a fresh sanction cannot be lawfully obtained, making the jurisdictional defect incurable.

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