Double jeopardy bar applies only when offences are legally identical, not merely factually similar

Article explains that the constitutional and statutory bar against double punishment applies only where the later prosecution is for the same offence. The Court compared the ingredients of criminal breach of trust with the Insurance Act offence and held that the former requires entrustment or dominion over property and dishonest misappropriation or conversion, while the latter turns on wrongful obtaining, withholding or wilful application of property by specified officers without requiring entrustment or dishonest intention. Because the legal ingredients differ, the offences are distinct and the second prosecution is not barred by Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 26 of the General Clauses Act.

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Issues: Whether the second prosecution under the Insurance Act was barred by Article 20(2) of the Constitution and Section 26 of the General Clauses Act on the ground that the accused had already been convicted for criminal breach of trust under the Penal Code.

Analysis: The bar under Article 20(2) applies only where the later prosecution is for the same offence. The Court compared the ingredients of the two offences and found that criminal breach of trust requires entrustment or dominion over property and dishonest misappropriation, conversion, or use in violation of law or contract, whereas the offence under the Insurance Act is attracted by wrongful obtaining, withholding, or wilful application of property by specified officers and does not require entrustment or dishonest intention. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act was read in the same manner, the emphasis being on whether the offences are the same and not merely whether the factual allegations overlap.

Conclusion: The two offences are distinct, and the second prosecution is not barred by Article 20(2) or Section 26.

Ratio Decidendi: The constitutional and statutory bar against double punishment operates only when both prosecutions are for the same offence, to be determined by the identity of the legal ingredients of the offences and not merely by similarity of facts.

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