Double jeopardy applies only to the same offence, and delay alone will not quash serious criminal proceedings.

A subsequent prosecution is barred only where the later case is for the same offence, or for offences sharing identical essential ingredients; where the earlier case concerned misappropriation and corruption and the later case arose from distinct customs and gold-control violations based on different facts, the plea under Article 20(2) and Section 403 failed. Delay and alleged prejudice did not justify quashing serious economic and customs-related proceedings, because lapse of time alone is not enough to invoke inherent powers absent a stronger legal infirmity. The challenge to the second prosecution therefore failed, and the convictions and sentences remained undisturbed.

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Issues: (i) whether the subsequent prosecution was barred by double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and (ii) whether the criminal proceedings were liable to be quashed on account of delay and alleged prejudice.

Issue (i): whether the subsequent prosecution was barred by double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

Analysis: The bar against a second trial applies only where the later prosecution is for the same offence, or where the offences are not merely based on the same facts but share the same essential ingredients. The earlier trial related to misappropriation and entrustment under Section 409 IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act, whereas the later prosecution concerned offences under the Customs Act and the Gold Control Act arising from a different factual and legal enquiry into smuggled gold and retention of foreign-origin gold bars. The two proceedings were therefore based on distinct offences and distinct factual foundations.

Conclusion: The subsequent prosecution was not barred, and the plea under Article 20(2) and Section 403 failed.

Issue (ii): whether the criminal proceedings were liable to be quashed on account of delay and alleged prejudice.

Analysis: Mere lapse of time, even where the accused may have suffered inconvenience, does not by itself justify quashing a prosecution for serious economic and customs-related offences. The Court found no sufficient legal basis to invoke the inherent power to terminate the trial merely on the ground of delay, especially where the prosecution was for serious offences and the proceedings were otherwise maintainable.

Conclusion: The proceedings were not liable to be quashed on the ground of delay.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the second prosecution failed in full, and the convictions and sentences were left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: A subsequent prosecution is barred only when it is for the same offence or one whose essential ingredients are identical, and delay alone does not warrant quashing of a serious criminal prosecution absent a stronger legal infirmity.

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