Complaint-based wildlife prosecution survives despite parallel police probe, prima facie allegations, and no double jeopardy bar.

Cognizance of offences under the Wild Life (Protection) Act is restricted to complaint-based prosecution by the specified authority, so a parallel police investigation does not attract Section 210 CrPC. The complaint alleging killing of a scheduled wild animal and removal of tusks disclosed a prima facie offence, and the High Court could not quash it under Section 482 by assessing evidence prematurely. Prosecution under the Act was also not barred by Section 429 IPC or double jeopardy, because the two offences have distinct statutory ingredients and are not identical in law. The quashing orders were therefore set aside and cognizance restored.

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Issues: (i) whether Section 210(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applied so as to bar or suspend cognizance on a complaint under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 when a police investigation was also in progress; (ii) whether the complaint disclosed the ingredients of an offence under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 so as to justify interference under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; and (iii) whether prosecution under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 was barred because the same facts could also attract Section 429 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the rule against double jeopardy.

Issue (i): whether Section 210(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applied so as to bar or suspend cognizance on a complaint under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 when a police investigation was also in progress.

Analysis: Cognizance of an offence under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 could be taken only on a complaint by the Chief Wild Life Warden or an authorised officer under Section 55. The statutory scheme made complaint-based cognizance the exclusive mode for such offences. In that setting, a parallel police investigation did not attract Section 210(1), which is designed to avoid duplication where the same offence may be taken cognizance of in more than one way. Where cognizance is legally possible only through one specified channel, there is no scope for invoking Section 210(1) on the ground of a concurrent police investigation.

Conclusion: Section 210(1) was inapplicable and the High Court was wrong to quash the proceedings on that ground.

Issue (ii): whether the complaint disclosed the ingredients of an offence under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 so as to justify interference under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The complaint alleged that an elephant, a scheduled wild animal, had been killed and its tusks removed, and it asserted authorisation to lodge the complaint. At the stage of taking cognizance, the court was required to see whether the allegations, taken at face value, constituted an offence. The inherent power under Section 482 was to be used sparingly and not as a means of weighing evidence or testing the likely proof of the allegations. The complaint, on its face, set out factual assertions capable of constituting offences under the Act, and the High Court exceeded the proper limits of quashing jurisdiction by evaluating the merits prematurely.

Conclusion: The complaint disclosed a prima facie offence and quashing under Section 482 was unwarranted.

Issue (iii): whether prosecution under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 was barred because the same facts could also attract Section 429 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the rule against double jeopardy.

Analysis: The relevant test was not whether the factual allegations were similar, but whether the statutory ingredients of the two offences were identical. The offence of hunting a wild animal under Section 9(1) read with Section 2(16) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 was distinct from mischief by killing animals under Section 429 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Section 56 of the Act also preserved prosecution under other laws while prohibiting double punishment for the same offence. Constitutional and statutory protections against double jeopardy, including Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, were attracted only where the offences were the same in law, not merely because the facts overlapped. The two offences here had different ingredients and the bar was therefore not made out.

Conclusion: The prosecution under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 was not barred by Section 429 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or by the rule against double jeopardy.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's quashing orders could not stand, and the Magistrate's cognizance order was restored for continuation of the criminal case in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute permits cognizance only on a complaint by a specified authority, a parallel police investigation does not invoke Section 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; and quashing at the threshold is permissible only when the complaint, taken at face value, discloses no offence, while the bar against double jeopardy applies only when the offences are identical in law and not merely factually overlapping.

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