Distinct statutory offences permit Customs Act prosecution alongside Antiquities Act violations for antiquities export and false declaration conduct.

Section 30 of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972 was construed not to bar prosecution under Sections 132 and 135(1)(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 for export-related conduct involving antiquities, because Section 4 of the Antiquities Act expressly applies the Customs Act subject to limited inconsistency, and Section 30 was read as confined to cognate heritage laws. The offences were also treated as distinct: Section 25 of the Antiquities Act addresses export or attempted export in contravention of Section 3, while the Customs Act offences concern false declarations and fraudulent evasion. On that basis, prosecution under both enactments on the same transaction was held maintainable.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 30 of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972 bars prosecution under Sections 132 and 135(1)(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 in respect of export of antiquities or art treasures. (ii) Whether the offences under Sections 132 and 135(1)(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 are distinct from the offence under Section 25 read with Section 3 of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972, so as to permit prosecution under both enactments on the same transaction.

Issue (i): Whether Section 30 of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972 bars prosecution under Sections 132 and 135(1)(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 in respect of export of antiquities or art treasures.

Analysis: Section 4 of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972 expressly makes the Customs Act, 1962 applicable to antiquities and art treasures, except to the extent of inconsistency with the Antiquities Act and subject to the special modification regarding confiscation under Section 125. Section 25 of the Antiquities Act separately provides for penal consequences for export or attempted export in contravention of Section 3, while Section 26 regulates cognizance of offences under Section 25. Section 30, when read in context, was held to cover cognate laws dealing with antiquities and heritage-related matters, and not the Customs Act, because including the Customs Act would collide with the specific scheme already enacted in Sections 4 and 25. A harmonious and purposive construction was adopted, and ejusdem generis was applied to confine the general words to laws of the same genus as the specifically named enactments.

Conclusion: Section 30 does not bar prosecution under the Customs Act, but the Customs Act is not included within the expression "any other law for the time being in force" in Section 30.

Issue (ii): Whether the offences under Sections 132 and 135(1)(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 are distinct from the offence under Section 25 read with Section 3 of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972, so as to permit prosecution under both enactments on the same transaction.

Analysis: The ingredients of Section 25 of the Antiquities Act are exporting or attempting to export an antiquity or art treasure in contravention of Section 3. By contrast, Section 132 of the Customs Act concerns making, signing, or using a false declaration, statement, or document in customs business with knowledge of falsity, and Section 135(1)(a) concerns fraudulent evasion or attempted evasion of a prohibition imposed under the Customs Act or any other law. The Court held that the same facts may give rise to distinct offences if the ingredients differ, and that this does not offend the principle against double jeopardy. The complaint disclosed allegations of false declaration and fraudulent evasion, which brought the matter within the Customs Act offences independently of the Antiquities Act offence.

Conclusion: The offences are distinct, and prosecution under Sections 132 and 135(1)(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 is maintainable notwithstanding the Antiquities Act.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution for offences under the Customs Act was held to be legally sustainable in relation to export of antiquities, and the complaint was permitted to proceed in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where two statutes enacted by the same legislature create distinct offences with different ingredients, prosecution under both is maintainable unless the later enactment clearly excludes the earlier one; a general saving clause will not be construed to override a specific statutory scheme that already regulates the inter se operation of the enactments.

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