Workplace fraud rarely comes from the person under suspicion. It usually comes from the person nobody has checked in years.
When a forensic engagement ends, the client's first reaction is rarely about the money. It is disbelief: "Not him. He was practically family." "She never missed a day." "He was the one person I never worried about."
That last remark is often the most revealing. Fraud needs access, knowledge and trust - and the longer someone has been trusted, the more of all three they usually have.
For auditors, the lesson is uncomfortable but practical: risk sits where review has stopped.
Where the theory came from
In the late 1940s an American criminologist, Donald Cressey, began interviewing prisoners convicted of one particular offence: embezzlement. They weren't career criminals. Most had been trusted employees - bookkeepers, managers, bank officers - who had betrayed that trust.
Cressey published his findings in 1953 as Other People's Money. His conclusion became a cornerstone of fraud prevention: trusted people tend to commit fraud when three things converge - a pressure they feel unable to share, an opportunity to resolve it secretly and a story that lets them justify it to themselves.
Seventy years on, auditors still call it the fraud triangle.
What the latest research shows
The ACFE's Occupational Fraud 2026: A Report to the Nations reviewed 2,402 cases in 143 countries and territories. Among its findings and long-standing patterns:
- Tips uncovered 43% of cases - the most common detection method - and over half of those tips came from employees.
- A typical scheme lasted about 12 months before discovery.
- The median loss was US$104,000, and roughly one case in five exceeded US$1 million.
- Organisations are estimated to lose around 5% of revenue to fraud each year.
- Asset misappropriation is the most frequent scheme; financial statement fraud is the rarest but costliest per case.
- Controls such as management review, surprise audits and proactive data monitoring go with smaller losses and quicker detection.
The three sides
Pressure
Debt, medical bills, addiction, lifestyle expectations, family obligations - or the pressure of hitting targets.
Opportunity
Weak controls, excessive authority, absent review, no segregation of duties and managers who never check.
Rationalisation
"I'm underpaid." "I'll put it back." "The company owes me." "Everybody does it." "Nobody will notice."
A business rarely sees the pressure and can barely influence the rationalisation.
Opportunity is the side it controls.
Most people are honest. Some are honest mainly because they've never had a real chance to be otherwise.
In a nutshell
Essence: nobody can read minds or fix every employee's pressures, but every business can shut the openings that turn pressure into fraud.
Lesson from history: the fish and the water
Kautilya's Arthashastra, written more than two thousand years ago, catalogues dozens of ways officials could siphon revenue - commonly summarised as "forty ways" - from delayed collections to doctored records. It also observes that knowing whether an official handling money is misappropriating it is as hard as knowing whether a fish swimming in water is drinking it.
Even then the conclusion was clear: fraud isn't spotted by studying faces. It's spotted by checking records.
Schemes common in SMEs and mid-market companies
- Fictitious vendors - payments to suppliers that don't exist or are linked to an employee.
- Altered bank details - diverting money meant for a genuine supplier.
- Ghost employees - salaries to people who don't work there.
- Expense claims - inflated, fabricated or personal.
- Cash skimming - sales recorded at lower values or not at all.
- Stock theft - goods removed and written off as damaged or lost.
- Kickbacks - inflated purchases approved in return for vendor payments.
- Fake refunds and credit notes - paid into accounts the employee controls.
- Misuse of company cards and digital payment access.
Behavioural red flags
No single sign proves anything, but ACFE research consistently finds most fraudsters show at least one behavioural warning sign. Look for patterns such as:
- Spending well beyond apparent income.
- Sudden financial strain or debts.
- Unusually close ties with particular vendors or customers.
- Refusing leave or resisting shared duties.
- Tight control of records and reluctance to let others see the work.
- Irritability or secrecy when questioned.
- Working odd hours without clear reason.
- Frequent manual corrections and journal entries.
For practitioners: tests worth running on every engagement
- Vendor-employee match. Compare vendor master bank accounts, PANs, phone numbers and addresses with employee records.
- Vendor master change log. Review all additions and bank-detail changes in the year and trace each to independent verification.
- Journal entry testing. Filter manual entries posted at unusual times, by unusual users, in round sums or just below approval limits.
- Price trend analysis. Compare purchase prices for key items with market rates and alternative quotes over several years.
- Leave and access review. Identify staff in sensitive roles who haven't taken consecutive leave and users holding incompatible system rights.
Closing the opportunity side
Reduce opportunity
- Separate authorisation, custody, recording and reconciliation.
- Independently approve new vendors and changes to bank details.
- Review payroll changes and verify headcount periodically.
- Restrict and monitor access to banking and accounting systems.
- Carry out surprise counts of cash and stock.
Increase the perceived chance of detection
- Make it known that reviews, audits and data analytics are routine.
- Run analytics for duplicate payments, vendors sharing addresses or accounts with employees, round-sum payments and weekend postings.
Provide a speak-up channel
- A confidential route for staff, vendors and customers to report concerns - tips find more fraud than any other method.
Enforce leave and rotation
- Staff in sensitive roles take consecutive leave while someone else performs their duties.
Ease pressure humanely
- Fair pay, employee assistance and a culture where people can ask for help weaken one side of the triangle.
Lead with integrity
- If owners bend rules, others will follow.
Illustration
A manufacturer's purchase manager of fifteen years is widely respected and never takes leave. A newly hired accountant runs a simple test: which suppliers' prices rose faster than the market? One stands out - 25% above comparable quotes for three years. A month later a tip reveals the supplier has been paying the manager commission.
What worked: data analysis (opportunity) and a speak-up channel (detection). What had failed: no competitive quotes, no rotation and no review of supplier pricing.
The uncomfortable reality
Owners often discover a fraud years later and realise the signs were there all along. They were overlooked because the person was trusted, confronting them felt awkward, or the owner simply didn't want to believe it.
The cost of not checking isn't only the money taken. It's years of decisions made on false numbers.
Indicators of success
- No single person controls a transaction from start to finish.
- Staff in sensitive roles actually take their mandatory leave.
- Exception reports - unusual payments, vendor changes, manual entries - are reviewed monthly.
- Concerns are raised through speak-up channels.
- Losses, when they occur, are detected sooner and are smaller.
Outlook: the coming decade
Analytics and AI can now examine every transaction rather than samples, making fraud patterns easier to find. Fraudsters are equally using technology - fake invoices, deepfakes and synthetic identities. Trusting people will remain essential; verifying systems will become non-negotiable.
Immediate actions by role
- Owner: name the three people with the most unchecked authority over money or stock.
- CFO: start a monthly review of vendor master changes and manual journals.
- HR: make annual leave compulsory for finance and procurement staff.
- Auditor: run a vendor-employee bank account match.
The objection we hear most - and our response
The objection: "If I start monitoring people, I'll create a culture of suspicion. Good employees will feel insulted and leave."
The answer: Controls that apply to everyone and are explained as protection insult no one - they reassure honest people that their work is visible and correct. What really damages culture is learning that a trusted colleague stole for years while everyone else was held to the rules. Fair, consistent controls are a form of respect for the honest majority.
When fraud is suspected
- Don't confront the person straight away or alert others unnecessarily.
- Preserve evidence - documents, emails, system logs.
- Bring in specialists - forensic accountants and lawyers.
- Follow due process under employment and criminal law.
- Check insurance - fidelity or crime cover may respond.
- Close the control gap so it can't recur.
Practitioners' FAQ
"Should existing staff be background-checked?"
Lawful, proportionate checks are common for new hires in sensitive roles. For existing staff, rely on controls and data analysis rather than personal investigation without cause.
"What if the person offers to repay quietly?"
Take legal advice. A quiet settlement may let the pattern repeat elsewhere and can affect insurance and legal remedies.
"Can a small business afford forensic analysis?"
Many basic tests - duplicates, vendor-employee matches, round sums - can be run in a spreadsheet.
Position as at October 2026: Figures in this article come from the ACFE's Occupational Fraud 2026 report. In India, auditors of certain companies must report suspected fraud above prescribed thresholds to the central government under the Companies Act, and companies covered by vigil-mechanism rules must provide channels for reporting concerns.
Pitfalls
- Equating loyalty with honesty.
- Letting one person run a full transaction cycle for years.
- Dismissing anonymous tips.
- Handling suspected fraud informally or emotionally.
- Allowing a fraudster to resign quietly with no action.
Terms explained
- Fraud triangle - the idea that fraud requires pressure, opportunity and rationalisation.
- Mandatory leave - required time off that lets others see a person's work.
- Red flag - a warning sign that merits investigation.
Half-hour action exercise
1. List everyone who has handled money, stock or vendor payments for over five years without a full week's leave.
2. For each, ask who else understands their work and who reviews it.
3. This week, compare vendor master bank accounts and addresses with employee records.
Every match, and every role without a reviewer, is an opportunity waiting to be closed.
Summary for busy professionals
- Occupational fraud is usually an insider's act - Cressey's 1953 research and the ACFE's 2026 study agree.
- Pressure, opportunity and rationalisation explain why; opportunity is the side a business can control.
- Tips detect 43% of frauds; a typical scheme lasts about a year; the median loss is around US$104,000.
- Watch the red flags and common schemes; shut opportunity with divided duties, verification, analytics, speak-up channels and enforced leave.
- When suspicion arises, preserve evidence, engage experts and fix the gap.
Trust the people, verify the transactions - the two were never in conflict.
References
- Donald R. Cressey, Other People's Money: A Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement (Free Press, 1953).
- Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Occupational Fraud 2026: A Report to the Nations. acfe.com/rttn
- Kautilya, Arthashastra, Book II, chapter 8-9; trans. R. Shamasastry (1915), public domain.
- Joseph T. Wells, Corporate Fraud Handbook: Prevention and Detection (Wiley; multiple editions).
- Companies Act, 2013 (India), section 143(12) on reporting of fraud by auditors.
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