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E-Way Bill Reuse Allegations Require Independent Proof Beyond Toll Records to Sustain GST Detention and Penalties
Detention and penalty under the GST framework for alleged reuse of invoices and e-way bills require a demonstrated contravention relating to the movement of goods. Where goods are accompanied by invoices and a valid e-way bill with no discrepancy in description, quantity, value, or ownership, toll-plaza photographs and vehicle-movement data alone do not prove that the same goods were previously delivered and re-transported. Independent, cogent evidence is required, including verification of explanations and documents concerning prior transport. Suspicion or presumed intent to evade tax cannot replace proof; unsupported detention and penalty proceedings are unsustainable.
Bail in CGST prosecutions may follow prolonged custody, completed investigation, documentary evidence, and low trial-risk factors.
Bail in CGST prosecutions engages Article 21's requirement that pre-conviction detention follow a just, fair and reasonable procedure and not operate punitively. Release may be justified where custody is prolonged, the accused has no criminal antecedents, similarly situated co-accused have received bail, investigation is complete, charges remain unframed, and no material indicates flight risk, witness intimidation, or evidence tampering. The absence of assessment proceedings under the CGST Act may bear on criminal prosecution. Documentary evidence, Magistrate-triable offences, limited maximum punishment, and an unlikely timely trial further support bail.
Voluntary tax payment under fraud proceedings does not remove statutory interest and penalty liability after allegations remain unchallenged.
Voluntary payment of tax demanded for fraudulent transactions under Section 74 does not remove consequential liability for interest and penalty where the taxpayer neither disputes the original notice nor challenges the basis for invoking Section 74. Acceptance of the tax demand without objection amounts to acquiescence in the notice's allegations and findings, so no further determination of fraud is required. Subsequent proceedings limited to computing and recovering interest and penalty remain valid. Tax payment alone does not establish non-compliance with Section 74(5) or defeat interest and penalty leviable under Section 74(9).
Successive writ petitions fail when withdrawal without liberty abandons the remedy and statutory GST appeal remains unpursued.
Successive writ petitions challenging the same adjudication order are not maintainable where an earlier petition was withdrawn without liberty to file afresh. The public-policy principle underlying withdrawal of proceedings treats such withdrawal as abandonment of the Article 226 remedy for that cause of action; altered grounds cannot support identical relief. Availability of the statutory GST appellate remedy also weighs against exercise of writ jurisdiction, particularly where it was not pursued promptly and the delay in approaching the court is unexplained. These principles preclude a later writ petition against the same adjudication order.
Natural justice requires fresh merits adjudication when an overlooked portal notice and absent hearing prevent an effective response.
Natural justice requires an effective opportunity to respond where a show-cause notice is uploaded on an additional notices portal and no personal hearing is notified. A notice that could genuinely be overlooked, together with a hearing marked not applicable and an order issued without considering a response or supporting documents, requires fresh adjudication on merits. Limitation should not be used to reject the affected parties' contentions in these circumstances; they should be permitted to file their response and supporting material.
Withdrawal of a writ petition without liberty to file afresh abandons the Article 226 remedy for the same cause of action, although it does not create res judicata. Applying the public-policy principle underlying Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC to writ proceedings, the High Court treated a later GST challenge seeking substantially identical relief against the same adjudication order as non-maintainable. Altering the grounds did not create a fresh basis for relief. The unavailed statutory appellate remedy and unexplained delay in invoking writ jurisdiction further supported dismissal; pending interlocutory applications were disposed of.
Voluntary payment of tax demanded under an unchallenged show-cause notice alleging fraudulent transactions amounts to acquiescence in the notice and admission of its allegations. Once tax is paid without objection to the invocation of section 74, no separate finding of fraud is required for consequential interest and penalty. Payment does not permit the taxpayer to later deny that liability, and the procedure does not breach section 74(5). The interest and penalty demand therefore remains enforceable.
Pre-trial detention in CGST prosecutions is non-punitive and serves to secure the accused's attendance at trial, subject to the presumption of innocence and the right to a speedy trial. Bail may be appropriate where investigation is complete, a complaint has been filed, no criminal antecedents or risks of absconding, witness intimidation or evidence tampering are shown, and trial completion is unlikely within a reasonable time. Parity with co-accused already released on bail may also support release. Bail conditions should secure attendance and preserve trial integrity.
Alleged re-use of an e-way bill and intent to evade tax require cogent evidence; toll-plaza movement records, photographs, and suspicion cannot replace proof. Where accompanying invoices, e-invoices, and e-way bills show no discrepancy in the goods' description, quantity, value, or ownership, and no independent evidence proves an earlier completed journey or delivery, the contravention remains unproved. Failure to verify material showing that a prior trip carried different goods further undermines the allegation. Detention-based tax and penalty were set aside, with refund of deposited amounts in accordance with law.
Clean-slate resolution plans extinguish excluded pre-resolution MVAT dues, barring recovery and requiring refund of statutory appeal pre-deposits.
Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code makes an approved clean-slate resolution plan binding on governmental authorities and extinguishes pre-approval statutory claims excluded from the plan. Accordingly, appellate confirmation of MVAT assessments and recovery proceedings for extinguished pre-resolution tax dues cannot continue. A statutory MVAT appeal pre-deposit forming part of the settled tax demand must be refunded with applicable interest where its retention exceeds the tax department's allocation under the plan.
Free recipient-supplied materials do not increase taxable service value or justify denial of construction-service abatement.
For service-tax valuation, the gross amount charged by a service provider excludes steel, cement, and other materials supplied free of cost by the recipient unless legislation expressly requires their inclusion. Such free supplies are not consideration charged for the taxable service. Their value therefore cannot be added to the taxable service value or used as a basis to deny the applicable 67% abatement.
Composite works contracts using materials cannot be taxed as commercial construction services; GTA liability remains but penalty is waived.
Composite construction contracts involving both materials and services constitute works contracts, not Commercial or Industrial Construction Service, which applies only to services simpliciter. Such contracts were not taxable before 1 June 2007 and could thereafter be taxed only as Works Contract Service where the applicable definition was met. The construction-service demand, consequential interest and penalties were set aside. Goods Transport Agency service-tax liability under reverse charge remained uncontested, but the related penalty for non-payment was set aside through application of the reasonable-cause relief under Section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.
Prospective application of FEMA seizure powers permits scrutiny of post-commencement payments, while unreasoned NOC refusals require reconsideration.
Section 37A of FEMA operates prospectively: completed pre-commencement transactions cannot be seized under it, but post-commencement payments forming part of an alleged connected arrangement may support preliminary action. A closed-loop pattern of foreign borrowing, NCD subscription, onward fund transfers, acquisition, amalgamation and repayment can supply jurisdictional facts for examining a possible Section 4 contravention, notwithstanding formal regulatory compliance or separate tax treatment. Recorded reasons based on that pattern may sustain seizure pending statutory confirmation, without later material creating a new basis. Rule 10 requires a reasoned NOC refusal with a demonstrable nexus to the investigation; an unexplained refusal requires fresh consideration and cannot be retrospectively justified by a later seizure.
Post-admission insolvency settlements require Section 12A withdrawal and cannot directly overturn admission orders through Rule 11.
Section 12A provides the statutory route for withdrawing an admitted insolvency application through an application by the resolution professional, subject to its prescribed conditions and restrictions. A post-admission settlement, including one reached before constitution of the Committee of Creditors and accepted by the operational creditor, does not itself nullify the admission order. Rule 11 cannot be used to bypass Section 12A by directly setting aside that order. The interim resolution professional may place the settlement before the Adjudicating Authority through an appropriate Section 12A application for consideration under law.
Pre-admission interim moratorium ends for qualifying pending personal-guarantor insolvency applications, preventing restraint of creditor enforcement measures.
Section 96(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code applies from 26 May 2026 to qualifying personal-guarantor insolvency applications pending on that date, ending the pre-admission interim moratorium because it is a transitory procedural protection rather than a vested right. The ceased moratorium cannot restrain recovery, auction, appellate, or possession-enforcement proceedings. Interim orders restoring possession of secured assets or stopping receipt of auction consideration and issuance of sale certificates require recorded reasons addressing prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. Such orders must also hear affected auction purchasers; otherwise, they are procedurally unsupported and inconsistent with natural justice.
Exhaustion of alternative remedies makes direct challenges to interim status quo orders premature before winding-up adjudication.
Exhaustion of alternative remedies requires a party challenging an interim protective order to first seek its vacation or modification before the issuing forum. Direct appellate recourse is therefore premature where that remedy has not been pursued. Status quo relief may continue during a winding-up petition where disputes over share transfers and ownership require preservation of the subject matter pending adjudication. Placing idle funds in an interest-bearing fixed deposit may likewise protect the parties' interests while the underlying petition is determined expeditiously.
Restoration costs must reflect actual regulatory expense, so an unsupported penalty for prolonged filing defaults was reduced.
Rule 87A(4)(c) permits recovery of Registrar of Companies' costs arising from an application or appeal for restoration of a company's name, unless otherwise directed. Because such costs have penal consequences, the amount must bear a rational relationship to actual costs incurred and be supported by a recorded computation or determination. Prolonged non-filing of financial statements, annual returns and income-tax returns remains a serious statutory default that cannot be excused by ignorance or oversight. However, an unsupported quantified restoration cost was found disproportionate and reduced.
Conditional redemption fines cannot accompany re-export-only clearance of prohibited goods; false transactional information remains separately penalised.
Section 125 of the Customs Act does not permit conditional redemption requiring re-export. Accordingly, prohibited goods that cannot be cleared for home consumption and are allowed only for re-export should not attract redemption fine. An admitted misdeclaration supports penalty under Section 112(a)(i), although the value of the offending goods and denial of redemption may justify a reduced penalty. Section 114AA applies to false or incorrect information furnished in any business transaction and is not limited to fraudulent export transactions; penalty may therefore arise on that basis.
Approved Resolution Plans Bar Post-Approval Customs Demands and Recovery Against Corporate Debtors Under the Insolvency Framework
Approval of a resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 governs the corporate debtor's claims and liabilities. Once the NCLT approves the plan, a customs demand or recovery cannot be sustained against the corporate debtor. The approved plan accordingly has binding effect on customs claims and precludes post-approval recovery.
Co-operative society interest deduction remains available despite belated returns where investment income arises from a co-operative bank.
Section 80P(2)(d) deduction for interest received by a co-operative housing society from investments with a co-operative bank remains available for the relevant assessment years despite belated returns. During that period, the timely-return condition for Chapter VI-A deductions did not cover section 80P; a processing adjustment denying the deduction solely for late filing was therefore a mistake apparent from the record and capable of rectification. A co-operative bank holding an RBI licence remains a co-operative society registered under applicable co-operative societies law. Its exclusion from claiming its own deduction does not prevent the investing society from claiming deduction on interest received from it.