TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2023 (4) TMI 1464
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....oor of premises No.8, Old Court House Street, Kolkata, 700001, now known as 28, Hemant Basu Sarani, Kolkata, 700001 (hereinafter referred to as the "suit property") in the year 1972 by one M/s Bharat Chamber of Commerce. In the year 2003, M/s Bharat Chamber of Commerce preferred an ejectment suit bearing No. 2 of 2003 against the appellant before the City Civil Court, Calcutta. 3.2 During the pendency of the aforesaid ejectment suit, the respondent - M/s Frontline Corporation Ltd. purchased the suit property from M/s Bharat Chamber of Commerce, vide sale deed dated 17th February 2005. Thereafter, the respondent availed various credit facilities from the appellant to the tune of Rs.42.74 crore by mortgaging, inter alia, the suit property as collateral. 3.3 Subsequently, in furtherance of the terms of a purported settlement agreement, dated 29th November 2010, filed in the aforementioned ejectment suit before the City Civil Court, Calcutta, a lease deed dated 11th February 2011 was executed between the parties, thereby demising the suit property in favour of the appellant for a period of 21 years. It is pertinent to note that no consent decree was actually passed by....
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.... dismissed and that the purported settlement agreement had not fructified into a consent decree, the appellant filed an application being G.A. No. 2352 of 2014 for vacating the aforesaid interim order. The Single Judge, vide order dated 2 nd November 2016, set aside the interim order dated 15th July 2013, noting therein that the appellant, being a secured creditor, could not be restrained from taking appropriate steps qua the secured suit property, especially in light of the express bar on the jurisdiction of the civil court, as provided under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. Cost of Rs.5,00,000/- was also imposed on the respondent. 3.8 Being aggrieved thereby, the respondent challenged the aforesaid order before the learned Division Bench of the High Court, in A.P.O.T. No. 411 of 2016, along with an application for stay being G.A. No. 3535 of 2016. 3.9 It is pertinent to note that, in the securitization application preferred by the respondent, the DRT, vide order dated 7th August 2013, refused to proceed further on account of the pendency of the civil suit before the High Court. 3.10 Vide the impugned judgment dated 30th January 2017, the learned Division....
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....- 700001." 8. It could thus be seen that a blanket injunction restraining the respondent, i.e. the appellant herein in any manner dealing with and/or disposing of and/or encumbering any part or portion of the suit property has been sought. 9. By an ad-interim order dated 15th July 2013, the Single Judge, though permitted the steps to be taken for selling the premises in question, directed that the final orders of sale could not be passed for a period of 6 weeks. The said ad-interim order came to be continued from time to time. As such, the appellant was constrained to file G.A. No. 2352 of 2014 for vacating the said interim order. The same was ultimately vacated by the Single Judge vide order dated 2nd November 2016. 10. It would be relevant to note that the Single Judge has specifically referred to Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act while vacating the interim relief granted to the respondent. 11. The Division Bench, vide the impugned judgment observed that, since the Bank has taken steps in terms of the purported settlement, it could not repudiate its obligations under the settlement. The Division Bench relied on the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel for finding it necessary....
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....dulent or his claim may be so absurd and untenable which may not require any probe whatsoever or to say precisely to the extent the scope is permissible to bring an action in the civil court in the cases of English mortgages. We find such a scope having been recognized in the two decisions of the Madras High Court which have been relied upon heavily by the learned Attorney General as well appearing for the Union of India, namely, V. Narasimhachariar [AIR 1955 Mad 135], AIR at pp. 141 and 144, a judgment of the learned Single Judge where it is observed as follows in para 22: (AIR p. 143) "22. The remedies of a mortgagor against the mortgagee who is acting in violation of the rights, duties and obligations are twofold in character. The mortgagor can come to the court before sale with an injunction for staying the sale if there are materials to show that the power of sale is being exercised in a fraudulent or improper manner contrary to the terms of the mortgage. But the pleadings in an action for restraining a sale by mortgagee must clearly disclose a fraud or irregularity on the basis of which relief is sought: Adams v. Scott [(1859) 7 WR 213, 249] . I need not point out th....
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....ised by the Division Bench was analogous to the one exercised under Order XLIII Rule 1 of the CPC. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of Wander Ltd. and Another v. Antox India P. Ltd. [1990 (Supp) SCC 727] : "14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matt....