TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2011 (4) TMI 1488
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....5740 of 2008, filed in Civil Suit No. 1167 of 2008, refusing to grant four reliefs sought, namely, (1) to grant mandatory temporary injunction directing the Respondent No. 1 herein to act under Clause 32(ii) of Memorandum and Rules and Regulations ("Regulations" for short) of the Respondent No. 1 by appointing a Commissioner to make preliminary inquiry against the Respondent No. 2 pending disposal of Civil Suit No. 930 of 2008, (2) to suspend the amendment to Clause 6.2.4 in the Regulations for players, team officials, managers, umpires and administrators and Board of Control for Cricket in India (for short "BCCI") Code 2008, which permits an administrator to have directly or indirectly commercial interest in the matches or events like Indian Premier League ("IPL" for short) or Champions League Twenty 20, (3) to grant temporary injunction restraining the Respondent No. 2 from functioning as Secretary of BCCI and (4) to grant mandatory temporary injunction directing BCCI not to permit the Respondent No. 2 to contest any of the posts of office bearers in future for a reasonable number of years as the Court thinks fit, is upheld. 3. In order to understand the controversy raised in ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....e of IPL and IPL being an event of BCCI, the Respondent No. 2 had thereby acquired commercial interest and violated the terms of Clause 6.2.4 of the Regulations. The Appellant wrote another letter on September 19, 2008 to the President of BCCI reiterating his grievance against the Respondent No. 2 and urged the then President of BCCI to take action against the Respondent No. 2. Since no action was taken by the President of the BCCI on the complaints submitted by the Appellant, the Appellant has filed Civil Suit No. 930 of 2008 in the High Court of Madras at Chennai seeking a permanent injunction to restrain BCCI from permitting the Respondent No. 2 to participate in the General Body Meeting scheduled in Mumbai on September 27, 2008 or on any other subsequent date, which would be convened in relation to election of new office bearers. The Appellant has also sought permanent mandatory injunction directing BCCI to initiate inquiry under Clause 32(ii) of the Regulations, by appointing a Commissioner to make a preliminary inquiry against the Respondent No. 2. Another relief claimed by the Appellant in the said suit is for mandatory injunction directing the Respondent No. 1 to exercise h....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ing events like IPL or Champions League Twenty 20. Aggrieved by the amendment carried out in the Regulations of the Respondent No. 1, the Appellant has filed another suit in the High Court, i.e., Civil Suit No. 1167 of 2008 alleging that the amendment in Clause 6.2.4 of the Regulations was made to protect the interest of the Respondent No. 2. The main prayer made in the said suit is to: (1) declare that Clause 6.2.4 of the Regulations insofar as it excludes the IPL and Champions League Twenty 20 is illegal and opposed to public policy (2) For permanent injunction restraining the Respondent No. 2 from functioning as Secretary of BCCI and (3) For mandatory injunction directing BCCI not to permit the Respondent No. 2 from contesting any of the posts of the office bearers. 7. The Appellant also filed three other interim applications for reliefs pending the above numbered suits. The Appellant filed OA No. 1299 of 2008 in Civil Suit No. 1167 of 2008 with a prayer to suspend operation of the amendment made in Clause 6.2.4 of the Regulations. OA No. 1300 of 2008 was also filed in the said suit claiming temporary injunction to restrain the Respondent No. 2 from functioning as Secretar....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... of grant or refusal of the injunction orders claimed only a prima facie consideration was required. Thus, considering the matter prima facie, the High Court found that neither in the two complaints made by the Appellant nor in the para relating to cause of action in the plaint of Civil Suit No. 930 of 2008, the Appellant had stated that he was filing the suit in the capacity of an administrator and, therefore, both the suits were filed by the Appellant in his individual capacity and not in the capacity of an administrator. The High Court noticed that the application by the Appellant, i.e., O.A. No. 1041 of 2008, praying for an injunction to restrain BCCI from permitting the Respondent No. 2, to participate in the General Body Meeting etc, was rejected by the High Court vide order dated September 26, 2008, the said order was not challenged by the Appellant. The High Court was also of the view that on mere allegations, an injunction could not be ordered against the Respondent No. 2 from participating in the General Body Meeting convened, to elect the office bearers, as those allegations were yet to be substantiated at the time of the trial. The contention of the Appellant that the p....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....t on 5.9.2008 in the capacity of the former administrator and second complaint dated 12.92008 by which jurisdiction of BCCI was invoked by the Appellant in the capacity of former President of BCCI but is contrary to what is averred in para 4 of the plaint and the same deserves to be set aside. According to the learned Counsel for the Appellant, the power of a Civil Court under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is plenary, unrestricted and extremely wide, subject only to specific statutory curtailment thereof and, therefore, implied circumscribing of the power of Civil Courts should not have been readily assumed or casually inferred as was done by the High Court in the impugned judgment. The learned Counsel emphasized that in the present case there is no statutory curtailment of the power of Civil Court to grant interim or injunctive relief and those who feel aggrieved are not intended to be rendered remedy less by the Rules and Regulations of BCCI. 12. As against this Mr. G.E. Vahanvati, learned Attorney General for the Respondent No. 1 and Mr. R.F. Nariman, learned Senior counsel for the Respondent No. 2 argued that the contention of the Appellant based on the definition....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....st the Respondent No. 2 by huge margin which would have destroyed the public interest element and thus even if he would not have disclosed as was not done in the present proceedings also, the Respondent would have pointed out relevant facts to the Court. Another reason which had weighed with the Appellant in not filing the writ petition as public interest litigation was that in all probability the petition would have been summarily dismissed on the ground that it involved determination of highly disputed question of facts. The learned Counsel asserted that good grounds have been recorded by the High Court for coming to the conclusion that civil suits of the nature filed by the Appellant were not maintainable and, therefore, the judgment impugned should be upheld by this Court. 13. This Court has heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and in great detail. This Court has also considered the documents forming part of the appeals and the relevant Regulations framed by the BCCI. 14. In view of the rival contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the parties, this Court will have to consider the question whether the Appellant can be regarded as administrator within ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... (iii) (a) Immediately on receipt of a Report as contained in Clause 32 (ii) above, the committee would call for all particulars and unless it decides, that there is no prima facie case and be accordingly dropped, commence hearing the subject case and complete the same as expeditiously as possible and decide the subject issues by providing reasonable opportunity to the parties of being heard. None of the parties shall be entitled to be represented by any lawyer. If, despite due notice, any party fails to submit any cause or submits insufficient cause, the Committee shall after providing reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned, take appropriate action. In the event any party refuses and or fails to appear despite notice, the Committee shall be at liberty to proceed ex-parte on the basis of the available records and evidence. The Place of hearing shall be decided by the Committee from time to time. The Committee shall have the power to impose penalties as provided in the Regulations for players, Team officials managers and Umpires of the Board. (b) The decision of the Committee shall be final and binding and shall come into force forthwith on....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....cation. However, the adjudication should be completed within six months. This becomes evident from the definition itself that it speaks of any person being nominated to any of the subcommittees of the BCCI. A past president may be nominated on any of the sub-committees of BCCI and only then he would be deemed to be an administrator and not otherwise. Having regard to the well settled principles of interpretation, this Court is of the opinion that purposive interpretation of the term "Administrator" will have to be adopted and only such an interpretation would lead to a harmonious construction of various clauses of the Regulations. In terms of Clause 32(v), any administrator found guilty can be expelled by the Board and in future such an administrator would not be entitled to hold any position or office or be entitled to be admitted in any committee or would be entitled to be a member or an associate member or affiliate member of the Board. A bare reading of Clause 32(v) of the Regulations makes it more than clear that it includes only those past office bearers who are included in any committees or sub-committees of the Board. Regulation 6.2.1 provides for debarring a guilty admi....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ct provides that an injunction claimed should be refused when the Plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter. Averments made in paragraph 18 of the rejoinder do not make the provisions of the Specific Relief Act applicable to the facts pleaded by Appellant in the two suits. 17. An attempt was made to argue that the Appellant is entitled to maintain the two suits because what is claimed by the Appellant is that he is the past president of BCCI and, therefore, both the suits instituted to declare that the Respondent No. 2, i.e., Mr. Srinivasan has no right to hold any position in BCCI due to conflict of interest relates to right to property. However, on going through the averments made in the plaints, this Court finds that no right is claimed under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. The record does not indicate that any personal right of the Appellant is infringed. Prima facie the Appellant, who is claiming declaratory decrees against the Respondents, would not be entitled to the same because no personal right of the Appellant is infringed. 18. The averments made in the two plaints would show that the Appellant is not claiming any legal character in the BCCI nor is he....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ty has been fully explained in the decision of this Court in State of A.P. v. G.V. Suryanarana AIR 1965 SC 11. The record of the case doe not indicate that the Appellant had filed any application seeking permission of the court under Order I Rule 8 Sub-rule (1) Code of Civil Procedure nor the averments made in the plaints of two suits indicate that the suits are purportedly filed in a representative capacity. A careful scrutiny of the averments made in the plaints of the two suits prima facie indicates that the Appellant has filed the suits in his individual capacity. All that the Appellant has stated in the plaints is that he is the past President of BCCI and, therefore, he is interested in the promotion of the game of cricket in India and in maintaining the purity of administration of BCCI. The paragraph which deals with cause of action inter alia mentions that the Appellant has filed the suits in the capacity of an Administrator. The averments made in the plaints prima facie indicate that what is asserted by the Appellant is that that he had questioned the conduct of Mr. N. Srinivasan by sending two complaints dated September 5, 2008 and September 19, 2008 to BCCI and that no ac....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....s, would have dismissed the writ petition summarily. The reasons as to why the Appellant did not file writ petition of Public Interest Litigation nature, can be stated only by him but it is not in dispute that such a writ petition was not filed by the Appellant. 22. The result of above discussion may be summarized as follows: The Appellant is not a member of the Respondent No. 1 society. It is not his case that he is either full member of associate member or an affiliate member of the Respondent No. 1 society. His claim that he is an administrator of the BCCI and has filed two suits in that capacity is rightly not accepted by the High Court. The suits claiming declarations are neither filed under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act nor the suits are filed in a representative capacity under Order I Rule 8 nor the Appellant has filed public interest suits as contemplated by Section 91 of Code of Civil Procedure. 23. In the light of above discussion, the question arises as to whether the two suits filed by the Appellant, who is not a member of the Respondent No. 1 Society, are maintainable. There is no manner of doubt that BCCI is a private autonomous Society register....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... case this Court held that the provisions contained in the bye-laws putting restriction on the freedom of members to part with the property to any one outside the Parsi community was not against the public policy as it did not militate against the provisions or the Act or rules made there under. What was held by the Court in paragraph 22 of the reported decision while judging validity of a bye-law, the interest of the society is paramount and that interest would prevail so long as there is nothing in the Act or the rules prohibiting the promotion of such interest. This Court further observed that going by Chheoki Employees' Cooperative Society Ltd. case, neither the member, Respondent No. 2, nor the aspirant to membership, Respondent No. 3, had the competence to challenge the validity of the bye-laws of the society or to claim a right to membership in the society. The reference to the case of Chheoki Employees' Cooperative Society Ltd. made by this Court in the above mentioned paragraph refers to the decision of this Court in State of U.P. and Anr. v. Chheoki Employees' Cooperative Society Ltd. (1997) 3 SCC 681. In the said case what is laid down is that a member of a s....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....at the Respondent No. 1 enjoys a monopoly status as it controls the sport of cricket and lays down the law thereof as well as enjoys benefits by way of tax exemption etc, while exercising enormous public functions and, therefore, it must be judged on a higher pedestal like an instrumentality of State. 26. In support of above mentioned plea the Appellant has relied on the decision in the case of BCCI v. Netaji Cricket Club (2005) 4 SCC 741. Placing reliance on the observations made in para 80 at page 762 of the reported decision, it was argued that as BCCI's control over the sport of cricket is deep, pervasive and complete, the suits would be maintainable. According to the Appellant, as a member of ICC, the BCCI represents the country in the international fora and it has the authority to select players, umpires and officials to represent the country in the international fora, it is an instrumentality of the State and the suits are maintainable against it. Paras 80 and 81 of Netaji Cricket Club case (supra) are as under: 80. The Board is a society registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act. It enjoys a monopoly status as regards regulation of the sport....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....tions. A glance at paragraphs 25 and 31 would indicate that the Court assumed for the purpose of argument that some functions might partake of the nature of public duties but categorically held that the exercise of such functions are in a very limited area of the activities of the Respondent No. 1 BCCI. In para 29 of the said judgment this Court proceeded on an assumption that some functions of the Respondent No. 1 like the selection of a team to represent India in international matches, may amount to public duties but in the end held that this is not sufficient to hold that the Respondent No. 1 is a State for the purposes of Article 12 of the Constitution. The categorical findings in paragraphs 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 34 of the Zee Telefilm Ltd. Case are as under: 23. The facts established in this case show the following: 1. The Board is not created by a statute. 2. No part of the share capital of the Board is held by the Government. 3. Practically no financial assistance is given by the Government to meet the whole or entire expenditure of the Board. 4. The Board does enjoy a monopoly status in the field of cricket but such stat....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....undamental right of the citizen under Article 19(1)(g), is a State within the meaning of Article 12 is to put the cart before the horse. If such logic were to be applied every employer who regulates the manner in which his employee works would also have to be treated as State. The pre-requisite for invoking the enforcement of a fundamental right under Article 32 is that the violator of that right should be a State first. Therefore, if the argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is to be accepted then the Petitioner will have to first establish that the Board is a State under Article 12 and it is violating the fundamental rights of the Petitioner. Unless this is done the Petitioner cannot allege that the Board violates fundamental rights and is therefore State within Article 12. In this petition under Article 32 we have already held that the Petitioner has failed to establish that the Board is State within the meaning of Article 12. Therefore assuming there is violation of any fundamental right by the Board that will not make the Board a "State" for the purpose of Article 12. 29. It was then argued that the Board discharges public duties which are in the nature o....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... constitutional or statutory obligation or rights of other citizens, the aggrieved party may not have a relief by way of a petition under Article 32. But that does not mean that the violator of such right would go scot-free merely because it or he is not a State. Under the Indian jurisprudence there is always a just remedy for violation of a right of a citizen. Though the remedy under Article 32 is not available, an aggrieved party can always seek a remedy under the ordinary course of law or by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution which is much wider than Article 32. 33. Thus, it is clear that when a private body exercises its public functions even if it is not a State, the aggrieved person has a remedy not only under the ordinary law but also under the Constitution, by way of a writ petition under Article 226. Therefore, merely because a nongovernmental body exercises some public duty that by itself would not suffice to make such body a State for the purpose of Article 12. In the instant case the activities of the Board do not come under the guidelines laid down by this Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas case (supra), hence there is force in the content....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....Judges of the two Judge Bench, which decided Netaji Cricket Club case, was also one of the learned Judges of the Constitution Bench, which decided the Zee Telefilms case. In fact the decision in Zee Telefilms case was delivered by the Constitution Bench of this Court, about three weeks after the judgment was delivered by two Judge Bench in Netaji Cricket Club case. The judgment delivered by the Constitution Bench makes it clear that the judgment of the two Judge Bench, delivered in case of Netaji Cricket Club, was specifically cited before the Constitution Bench and was considered by the Constitution Bench. Further, the judgment in Zee Telefilms case was first prepared by the learned Judges, who had written the judgment in Netaji Cricket Club case and this is evident from the fact that the learned Judges, who had delivered majority judgment in Zee Telefilms case, have recorded that they had read the opinion of the learned Judge but did not agree with the conclusions recorded therein. In view of the healthy traditions established by the legendary Judges of this Court, the learned Judges, who constituted majority in Zee Telefilms case, have refrained from using the expression that la....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....t failed to point out factual and palpable conflict of interest, more particularly, when the purpose of IPL or Champions League T20 events was to maximize outreach of the game and exploit its commercial potential as well. 32. On behalf of the Respondent No. 2 it was contended that no specific allegations against Members of the BCCI or directors of the India Cement Limited have been leveled against the Respondent No. 2 and, therefore, the plea based on conflict of interest was rightly negatived by the High Court. It was maintained before this Court that India Cement Limited is a Company, which is managed through a Board of Directors of which Respondent No. 2 is the Vice Chairman and Managing Director, but his holding of shares is only 0.05% and, therefore, it is wrong to say that the Respondent No. 2 takes decision without approval of the Board of Directors of the Company. What was pleaded was that India Cement Limited has thousands of share holders and the Company has an independent legal existence from its share holders whereas all the decisions regarding management and administration of BCCI are taken by its Managing Committee consisting of nine members of whom the Respondent ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... which at least one of the teams comprises Players selected from the squad of players chosen to represent a Member Association. Domestic Matches: All tournaments any/or matches conducted under the aegis of BCCI. To argue that purposive interpretation of unamended Players Regulations would include events like ODI Match, Twenty 20, etc. is to ignore the hard ground realities and completely brush aside the definitions of those terms mentioned earlier. 35. The expression matches or events in the unamended Clause 6.2.4 of the Rules and Regulations cannot be construed to include the events like T20 cricket as those events were introduced after the year 2000. Therefore, the contention of the Appellant that the Respondent No. 2 violated the unamended Players Regulations and injunctions as prayed for should have been granted, cannot be accepted and is hereby rejected. 36. The next question which falls for consideration is whether the Players Regulations were properly amended or the amendments made are illegal as pleaded by the Appellant. 37. The argument that Clause 6.2.4 of the Players' Regulations was not properly amended and, therefore, the same should be regarde....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... ordinary principles governing the meetings. One of the essentials of a valid notice is that the time between the service of notice and the date of the meeting should be at least 21 days and that it is absurd to suggest that this notice must also contain the particulars of items which would be taken up by the members under the heading "any other business". It is implicit in the concept of special business to be taken up for discussion at the behest of the Chairman that no particular mention is required of other business which is to be conducted at the meeting. When a member gets his notice, he is deemed to have knowledge of the Regulations of the body concerned and, therefore, of the agenda items. In any event only members could have objected to the process for amending the Players' Regulations. The record shows that not a single member objected to the proposed amendment. On the contrary the record unerringly shows that the resolution relating to the impugned amendment was passed unanimously by the members. The Rules and Regulations, which are the organic and constitutional documents of the association, are framed under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975. A plain r....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....es was found thin and decreasing day by day. Even ODI matches were not attracting huge crowds. As against this, football was found to be a fast paced, action packed game and it did not last for more than two hours. Therefore, it was considered necessary to have a new format, which was not conducted on lines of international cricket, but was conducted purely on commercial lines. If maximum boost was to be given to the cricket, it was through organizing T20 matches on a commercial basis. Thus it stands to reason that any person who is interested in the game should be able to participate in the commercial aspect of T20. For this purpose, a tender process had to be used. The attempt was to maximize interest and participation in T20 by way of acquisition and funding of teams. This could be done if there was a widest possible participation both by franchisees and stakeholders including the spectators. The process of bidding by the franchisees for the various participating teams establishes the commercial nature of IPL and Champions League T20 cricket. Therefore, it is difficult to uphold the contention of the Appellant regarding conflict of interest in an IPL since the purpose of this ne....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....owever, there is absolutely no allegation against any of the persons who are part of the various committees of BCCI. There is no specific allegation against any of the members of the General Body being actuated by mala fides in favour of the Respondent No. 2. Prima facie it appears that in the absence of any specific allegation of mala fides in the plaints of both the suits, the Appellant, who is Plaintiff in the suits, would not be entitled to any of the main reliefs claimed in the two suits and reliefs claimed in interlocutory applications. The assertion made by the Appellant that the amendment in Clause 6.2.4 of the Rules and Regulations was carried out at the behest of the Respondent No. 2 would in turn suggest that the Respondent No. 2 exercised undue influence over the other members of the Managing Committee and General Body of BCCI and the various other persons constituting various committees. When such allegations of undue influence are pleaded by any party to a suit, it is the requirement under Order VI Rule 4 Code of Civil Procedure that particulars must be given in detail. However, the pleadings do not even remotely satisfy the requirements of Order VI Rule 4 Code of Civ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....alance of convenience is also in favour of the Respondent No. 2 because even if the suits are decreed, no personal relief would accrue for the benefit of the Appellant. As noticed earlier, the Appellant had lost to the Respondent No. 2 in the elections of the Tamil Nadu Cricket Association. Moreover, the two suits were filed in the year 2008 and no interim relief/reliefs has/have been granted by the learned Single Judge of the High Court as well as by the Division Bench of the High Court. This Court is of the opinion that after passage of over two years, it would not be in the fitness of things to grant mandatory temporary injunction as prayed for. What is relevant to notice is that if the injunctions as prayed for are granted the suits would stand decreed without adjudicating the claims raised by the Respondents, on merits. Such a relief is not called for in the facts of the case. Therefore, the Appellant is not entitled to the injunctions claimed by him in different interlocutory applications which were filed before the High Court. 45. The Appellant has filed an application seeking permission of the Court to permit him to produce additional documents in the present appeals. It....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... the Governing Council of IPL and later on ratified by all the Governing Council Members and the same was approved by General Body of BCCI. Thus, the first document does not indicate any conflict of interest so far as Respondent No. 2 is concerned. 47. The next document sought to be relied upon is Minutes of Meeting of the Governing Council of the IPL dated August 11, 2009. This document reflects the deliberations between the various members of the Governing Council on the issue of transfer of players from one IPL franchise to the other at the end of three years. Nine members including eminent cricketers who are members of the Governing Council participated in the meeting and the Respondent No. 2 had also expressed his views on the issue of transfer of players. The record shows that ultimately, the views expressed by the Respondent No. 2 were not accepted. This document proves that the Governing Council is not influenced by the views of one person and the Respondent No. 2 is not in a position to exercise undue influence over the other members of the Governing Council, as alleged. 48. As noticed earlier the learned Single Judge of the High Court before whom the suits were inst....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....roduced before this Court when they are brought on the record of the case. Here, in this case, the documents sought to be brought on record by the Interlocutory Application are not on the record of the trial court. The Interlocutory Application filed by the Appellant is absolutely vague and not in terms of Order XVI Rule 4(1)(d)(ii) of the Supreme Court Rules because it does not give particulars of (a) how the Appellant came to be in possession of those documents, (b) at what point of time he acquired possession of documents, (c) the source from which the documents were secured and (d) what prevented the Appellant from placing the documents on record of the trial court. Though the Appellant has filed quite lengthy rejoinder, these questions have not been addressed by him in the rejoinder. The contention that the Respondents have failed to respond to the merits of the Interlocutory Application and, therefore, those documents should be considered, cannot be accepted, more particularly, when no ground is made out for granting permission to the Appellant to produce the documents sought to be produced along with the said Interlocutory Application. 50. The upshot of the above discussi....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....r assailing the amendment introduced in the BCCI Regulation, also arose for determination in the event of which only, the challenge could be sustained at his instance. While the suits are still pending in the High Court of Madras, the applications for injunction have been rejected against which these appeals 85 arise wherein extensive arguments have been advanced by learned Counsel for the contesting parties in support of their respective pleas. 52. Having deliberated and meticulously considered the same in the light of the background, facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals as also having the benefit of the views expressed in the judgment and order of my learned Brother Panchal, J., I find it hard to subscribe to the view expressed therein and hence record reasons respectfully dissenting from the view on the issues raised in these appeals. For this purpose as also to test the relative strength and weaknesses of the arguments advanced and to have an overall view of the controversy involved, I deem it essential to relate the genesis and background of the matter under which these appeals arise. 53. The 1st Respondent in these appeals which is the Board of Control f....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....N. Srinivasan who being the Chairman and M.D. of India Cements Limited should not have been allowed to participate in the auction held for owning Indian Premier League ('IPL' for short - a separate sub-committee unit of BCCI) in which he was declared a successful bidder and thus owned Chennai Super King. The Complainant/Appellant therefore sought action against him as he brought to the notice of the BCCI-President that the second Respondent - Sri N. Srinivasan being an office bearer of the BCCI who is also heading a company named 'India Cements' had commercial interest giving rise to a "conflict of interest" with the Indian Premier League (for short 'IPL') Tournament for which an auction was conducted by the BCCI, in so far as he was in substantial control of the India Cements Ltd. which became the successful franchisee of the Chennai Super King and at the same time is also in the governing council of the IPL Tournament which disqualified him to participate in the bid for owning Chennai Super King. 56. The Appellant's complaint did not meet with any response whatsoever from the BCCI which prompted him to file a suit in the Madras High Court on 24.9.20....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....persons and corporates to own and operate a team for IPL matches wherein Respondent No. 2 - Sri N. Srinivasan who is the Vice-Chairman and Managing Director of a company known as India Cements Ltd., became the successful bidder for the Chennai Super King in the IPL auction which according to the case of Appellant, could not have been permitted in view of Clause 6.2.4 as it stood prior to the amendment. But in order to obviate the bar imposed by Clause 6.2.4 which came in the way of Respondent No. 2 from participating in the auction for IPL, an amendment was hurriedly and most expeditiously introduced in Clause 6.2.4 in order to permit second Respondent-Sri N. Srinivasan to participate in the bid in which he was a successful bidder and consequently owned Chennai Super King in spite of the bar of Clause 6.2.4 which was operating against him prior to its amendment and was introduced subsequent to the auction which was held for owning Chennai Super King, in absence of which he would have been ineligible to participate in the bid and hence disqualified. The Appellant, therefore, filed two applications for injunction and in the first application bearing No. 1041/2008 he had sought a temp....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....and Respondent No. 2 since he indulged in promoting his commercial interest while functioning as an office bearer/Administrator of the BCCI who participated and succeeded in the auction for owning IPL Chennai Super King. To clarify it further, it may be reiterated that if the Petitioner/Appellant can be held to be having the competence or locus to file a suit against the BCCI, then whether the suit can be held to be maintainable at his instance so as to enter into further question whether the alleged amendment introduced in Clause 6.2.4 can be held to be having any conflict of interest with the interest of BCCI as in that event it would permit Respondent No. 2 to hold the field by functioning as office bearer of the BCCI and thus participate in all its policy decisions as well as deliberations, while continuing also as Vice Chairman/ Managing Director of his firm India Cements Ltd. and simultaneously also own Chennai Super King as successful bidder in the IPL auction. 61. The preliminary question on which the entire edifice of the case rests which will have the effect of making the entire case stand or crumble down, is the question as to whether the Plaintiff/Appellant has the l....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....s down as to who will be the competent persons as member of the sub committee to deal with misconduct. But to hold that in spite of the definition of an 'Administrator' given out in Clause 1 (n) of the Regulation which specifically includes President and past President of the BCCI, the same would not include an Administrator unless he is a member of the sub committee of the disciplinary committee which is constituted for dealing with the misconduct of any office bearer including all its constituents as envisaged under Clause 32, would be a far fetched interpretation so as to hold that unless an Administrator is appointed on a sub committee for the purpose of constituting a disciplinary committee under Clause 32 of the Regulation, he cannot be treated as an 'Administrator' within the meaning of Clause 1(n) of the Regulation and that it would not clothe him with any legal right to maintain an action in law against the BCCI even for challenging the arbitrary amendment, is difficult to agree and accept. 63. On the contrary, I find sufficient force and substance in the contention of the counsel for the Appellant that the suits were filed by the Appellant in the capaci....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....or, it would be difficult to hold that such Administrator also has to be a member of a sub committee which is constituted for dealing with misconduct in order to challenge the amendment introduced in the Regulation completely missing that the power to challenge amendment of BCCI is altogether different from dealing with cases of misconduct against players, umpires or administrator. 65. A plain and literal interpretation of the Rule clearly indicates that the past presidents also have been unequivocally included within the meaning of 'Administrator' and while an Administrator can also be included as a Member of the Sub-Committee for the Disciplinary Committee, it cannot be interpreted so as to infer that former president stands excluded from the definition of Administrator until and unless he is a member of the Sub-Committee for disciplinary proceedings. It is difficult to accept that this would be so in order to give it a purposive interpretation as no purpose in my opinion can possibly be inferred from this, on the contrary, the purpose is writ large that it amounts to grant exemption to Respondent No. 2 from getting trapped into the bar imposed by Clause 6.2.4 of the R....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ent could have been introduced by the BCCI in Clause 6.2.4 ignoring and overlooking the fact that the existing office bearer of the BCCI cannot be allowed to participate in the auction for owning IPL or Twenty 20 matches as it would clash and conflict with the interest of the BCCI. 69. We have to remind ourselves the well-settled principle of interpretation that when the language in a statute is plain and admits of one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise, as in the instant matter, where the definition of 'Administrator' has been clearly given out in the Regulation of the BCCI. But in order to oust the past President and his competence to challenge the action of BCCI from questioning the speedy and hurried amendment introduced by the BCCI in order to assist Respondent No. 2 from participating in the bidding process for owning Chennai Super King and then to interpret the definition of 'Administrator' so as to hold that he was not competent to file a suit, can hardly be held to be giving effect to a purposive and meaningful interpretation to the expression 'Administrator' as the purpose or object to serve some just cause is totall....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....r construction. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must give effect to it and it has no right to extend its operation in order to carry out the real or supposed intention of the Legislature/Law maker. When the language is not only plain but admits of just one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. What is not included by the Legislature (law maker), the same cannot be undone by the court by principle of purposive interpretation. This was the view expressed by this Court also in the matter of Dental Council of India and Anr. v. Hari Parkash and Ors. (2001) 8 SCC 61 wherein it was held that it cannot ignore the obvious (provision) and object and the intention of the Legislature apparent from the context and so interpret and construe it, so as to enlarge the scope of its application by imparting into it, meaning by implication, which do not necessarily arise. 72. Taking into consideration the aforesaid salutary principles of interpretation, I am clearly of the view that the definition of the term 'Administrator' does not exclude the past president from the meaning of Administrator so as to hold that the action taken by....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....on that the Appellant had not moved the High Court for enforcement of his fundamental right under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution nor a writ petition in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution has been filed alleging infringement of his fundamental right, but has moved the High Court by taking recourse to the civil remedy of filing civil suits in the capacity as former president of the BCCI merely to ensure suspension of the amendment by way of seeking injunction which was introduced as the same was not in the interest of the BCCI, since it gave rise to direct or indirect commercial interest of Respondent No. 2 with the events of BCCI and is barred under Regulation 6.2.4 which is sought to be diluted by introducing the amendment in the same. 75. It may be reiterated that this appeal by special leave is not a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution but is an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution arising out of an order passed in a civil suit refusing to grant injunction which was filed in two regular civil suits. I, therefore, find it difficult to accept the contention of the counsel for the Respondents and accepted by brother Panchal, J. that merely....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... In fact, it may be relevant by way of assistance to mention regarding one latest order dated 31.1.2011 of the Supreme Court passed in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 10107 of 2010 wherein a coordinate Bench of this Court upheld the judgment and order of the Kerala High Court whereby it was held that the elected honorary office bearers of the Kerala Cricket Association and others like players, coaches, managers, members of various committees etc. are public servants within the meaning of Section 2(C) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the High Court of Kerala had reversed the judgment of the Special Court at Kerala which had held that they are not public servants. To elaborate it slightly, it may be stated that Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 10107/2010 titled T.C. Mathew v. K. Balaji Iyengar and Ors. was filed challenging the judgment of the Kerala High Court wherein the substantial question of law which was raised before the Supreme Court in the aforesaid special leave petition was whether the elected office bearers of Kerala Cricket Association could be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act alleging offences under Section 13(1)(c) and (d) read with Sec....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....tion is clearly irrelevant for the purpose of the controversy raised in this petition. 78. The next question that needs to be addressed in this appeal is whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the application for injunction at least to the extent of keeping the amendment introduced in Clause 6.2.4 of the Regulation of the BCCI in abeyance specially when the Appellant succeeded in making out a prima facie case to the effect that participation of Respondent No. 2 in the bid held for IPL matches and thus own Chennai Super King directly or indirectly came in conflict with the interest of BCCI as Respondent No. 2 during and after bidding process for the IPL Team admittedly held positions in four capacities which are as follows: (c) Treasurer of BCCI; (d) Vice-Chairman and Managing Director of India Cements Ltd. (e) Chairman, Managing Committee, Chennai Super King; and (f) Ex-officio Member of the Governing Council of IPL. Additionally, with effect from September 2008, Respondent No. 2 became the Secretary of BCCI and, therefore, the Ex-officio Chief Executive of BCCI and also Convener of the Meetings of the Committees of BCCI includin....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....as introduced in this clause making IPL Champions League and Twenty -20 the international matches an exception to the same. Thus although anyone might not have indulged in creating actual loss to the BCCI by any of his actions, the fact remains that by virtue of his position as a Chairman of a company which participated in the bid to own IPL tournament and at the same time holding the position of an office bearer of the BCCI, is clearly bound to result into conflict of interest of the BCCI. It is altogether a different matter that the Appellant has also tried to cite example that the Respondent No. 2 as franchise holder for Chennai Super King was compensated approximately for Rs. 47 crores by Respondent No. 2 on account of cancellation of a match. However, this is not the stage to rely on this part of the allegation even if it is by way of an example as the suit is still pending before the High Court, but the fact remains that the Respondent No. 2 by virtue of his position as Vice-Chairman and Managing Director of India Cements Ltd. and ex-officio Member of the Governing Council of IPL clearly came in his way to participate in the auction held by the BCCI for IPL matches and it is ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....auction and own Chennai Super King while continuing as Treasurer and thereafter as Secretary of the BCCI and hence an Administrator and thus the Appellant in my considered opinion, succeeded in establishing his plea that the amendment introduced by the BCCI in Clause 6.2.4 was an abuse of the amending power exercised by the BCCI in so far as the power of amendment was introduced not to promote the game of cricket but to promote the interest of the 2nd Respondent as it is more than clear that without the amendment, Respondent No. 2 would not have been entitled to participate in the bid as he was a Treasurer of the BCCI and hence without the amendment he was not eligible even to participate in the bid and enjoy dual status of that of an office bearer of the BCCI as Treasurer and also own Chennai Super King. 80. The Plaintiff/Appellant in my view and perception based on consideration of the concept of conflict of interest and its implication surely succeeded in making out a prima facie case that this resulted in serving commercial interest of Respondent No. 2 which gave rise to conflict of interest with the activities of the BCCI since Respondent No. 2 as Administrator/office beare....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ent was introduced in the BCCI Regulation and the amendment was fit to be suspended, the Respondent No. 2, in my opinion, will have to exercise his option whether he wishes to continue owning IPL and operate Chennai Super King or is more interested in managing the affairs of BCCI as an Administrator with fairness, probity and rectitude by divesting himself from commercial interest which directly or indirectly results in conflict of interest with the activities of the BCCI which was clearly barred under Regulation 6.2.4 but has been diluted by introducing an amendment after the IPL auction had already been held when Respondent No. 2 was ineligible even to participate in the auction. Hence, the impugned amendment dated 27.9.2008 was fit to be suspended by granting injunction against the same. This is clearly so as it would be difficult to overlook that multiple loyalties can create commercial interest with the activities of BCCI thus resulting in conflict of interest since the financial or personal interest of the Board would clearly be inconsistent with the commercial and personal interest of the Administrator of the Board. In addition, the rule of equity and fairness provides that ....