Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: (i) Whether the appellant had locus standi and maintainable civil cause to challenge the amendment to the BCCI regulations; (ii) Whether the impugned amendment to the conflict-of-interest clause and the consequential interim injunction ought to be suspended pending suit.
Issue (i): Whether the appellant had locus standi and maintainable civil cause to challenge the amendment to the BCCI regulations.
Analysis: The majority construed the definition of "Administrator" purposively and held that a past president was an administrator only for purposes connected with committee participation and disciplinary machinery, not merely by reason of former office. On that view, the appellant had not sued as an administrator, was not a member of the society, and had not instituted a representative suit under the Code of Civil Procedure or a suit under the public nuisance provisions. The majority further held that the declaratory reliefs were not founded on any personal legal character or right within the Specific Relief Act, and that BCCI, being a private autonomous society, could not be treated as a State for this civil challenge.
Conclusion: The majority held that the suits were not maintainable at the instance of the appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether the impugned amendment to the conflict-of-interest clause and the consequential interim injunction ought to be suspended pending suit.
Analysis: The majority held that the unamended regulation did not cover IPL and Twenty20 events, that the amendment was validly introduced, and that no strong prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable injury was shown to justify interim interference. The dissent took the opposite view, holding that the express definition of "Administrator" included a past president, that the amendment diluted an existing conflict-of-interest prohibition, and that a prima facie case existed for suspending the amendment until final adjudication.
Conclusion: The majority held that no interim injunction could be granted and the appeals failed; the dissent would have allowed the appeals and suspended the amendment.