TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1952 (10) TMI 46
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.... tenancy of the second non-applicant at the end of the five years for which the tenancy stood, on the ground that the land was seeded by him for his business of a coal-dealer. The second non-applicant expressed a desire, to continue the lease on the same terms and conditions as before (as per Clause 13(i)(b) of the Control Order) and also contested that the Petitioner needed the premises to start a bona tide or genuine business. The contentions of the second non-applicant were accepted by the Rent Controller & on appeal by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, the application was dismissed. It was in these circumstances that this petition was filed. 4. This matter was originally before the Chief Justice and Mudholkar J. but it was referred to this Full Bench because a doubt appears to have arisen about the. extent of the powers of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. In - Sagatmal v. Additional Deputy Commr., Nagpur ILR (1951) Nag 769 : 1951 Nag LJ 566, to which I was a party, it was laid down that the power to issue a writ, of certiorari is not equal to an appeal and that all that this Court can do under Article 226 is to quash the order and return the case ....
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....es 226 and 227 is tantamount to an appellate or revisional jurisdiction and that, in addition to the process of certiorari, this Court has the power to issue a mandamus, as also orders or directions and that in the exercise of this power this Court may not only quash orders but make the orders itself. 8. We are concerned in this case with a tribunal which is constituted under a special law to deal with the letting of houses and the control of rents. The order of that tribunal is subject to but one appeal, namely to the Deputy Commissioner; and but for this appeal, the decision of the tribunal is final and no further appeal or revision lies. We are not concerned here with the enforcement of fundamental rights, nor are we concerned with any administrative action of Government or Public Authority. These important facts have to be borne in mind as no distinction was apparently made on this score by the Counsel for the Petitioner. 9. Now the claim which has been made by Shri Phadke is very far reaching. It seeks to invest this Court with unparalleled powers and if Article 226 can be read to mean what it is contended it does, there is hardly anything which this Court cannot do. Whe....
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....e any order or direction it thinks fit and the petitions to this Court have usually been disposed of by issuing a bare notice and an order or direction without any reference to the writs named in the Article. There have been but three cases in which some limits were indicated. I was a party to all three. In - Sheoshankar v. The State ILR (1951) Nag. 646 (FB) I indicated certain Unfits which did not need the approval of the majority (vide page 703). In - Badami Bai v. P.A. Tobin 1952 Nag LJ 426 Choudhuri J. and I approved of the decision in - Sagatmal's case and following it, passed merely an order quashing the lower Court's order without substituting our own though the decision could only be one way after our decision. 13. Now, the first point to establish in this case is whether the Rent Controller and on appeal the Deputy Commissioner exercise judicial or ministerial functions. The distinction between these two functions is sometimes exceedingly fine, but in most cases it is clear. The term 'judicial' has not been successfully defined. Sometimes it is contrasted with 'administrative' per Vaughan Williams L.J. in - Rex v. Woodhouse (1906) 2 KB 501 at p. ....
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....o jurisdiction to hear appeals from the determination either upon law or upon fact. But if the Court is satisfied either that the Board have not acted judicially in the way I have described, or have not determined the question which they are required by the Act to determine, then there is a remedy by mandamus and certiorari. 15. From this quotation it is clear that the I term 'judicial' embraces even the acts of special tribunals which though administrative in character perform functions resembling those oGBP 'Courts. Such tribunals may be subject to certiorari and mandamus, but appeals against their decisions cannot be taken to a Court without that right being expressly given. 16. Again, Hamilton L.J. (later Lord Sumner) in the - 'Arlidge's case (1915) AC 120 when that case was before the Court of Appeal observed: The Local Government Board here is a statutory tribunal, anomalous as compared with Common Law Courts, created by the Legislature for a special class of appeals and endowed by it with the power of formulating its own procedure. We must assume that a department which the legislature has entrusted will be worthy of the trust. The judgment....
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....s of law, but...a judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority, upon consideration of facts and circumstances, imposing liability and affecting the rights of others.... 18. It may be pointed out that the liability is imposed 'by the determination itself' and not 'by any fact determined.' 19. In - Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. (1908) 211 US 210 at p. 226 it was laid down that: A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end. See also the leading case of - Rex v. Electricity Commissioners (1924) 1 KB 171 and also - In re Clifford and O'Sullivan (1921) 2 AC 570. 20. Applying these tests to the Rent Controller and the Deputy Commissioner acting under the Order, the inference is irresistible that they exercise judicial functions and the Rent Controller is a legal tribunal and not merely an executive Officer. An examination of their powers and duties clearly establishes this. 21. The Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 (XI of 1946) has been passed to provide for regulating the let....
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....ourt over all Courts or tribunals like the Supreme Court. The right of appeal from one Court to another has been described by the highest authority as a substantive right which can only come into being by express legislation. See - Minakshi Naidu v. Subramanya Sastri 11 Mad 26 (PC), - Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor 1939 FCR 159 at p. 165 and - Sevak Jeranchod Bhogilal v. Dakore Temple Committee AIR 1925 PC 155. The nature of an appeal has been examined before by me in - Radhakisan v. Shridhar ILR (1950) Nag 532 at p. 553 (FB). It is "in effect a limitation of the jurisdiction of one Court & an extension of the jurisdiction of another": See - Attorney General v. Sillem (1864) 10 HLC 704. But the essential characteristic of the appellate jurisdiction is that it reviews and corrects the proceedings in a cause decided by an inferior Court or tribunal, and, unless otherwise provided by law, "has the same jurisdiction over the cause as the inferior Court or tribunal." Sometimes analogous powers are given to a Court not of appeal but of revision, but in both cases that power must be granted by statute before the appellate or revisional Court can give its decision on the whole of the cause. ....
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....gh Court. 27. If then the power under Article 226 cannot be equivalent to an appellate (or even revisional) jurisdiction, what is the extent of the power? I do not propose to lay down affirmatively all that is included in that power but only to deal with the narrow question arising in this case. Article 226 gives a power to the High Court to issue 'directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of 'habeas corpus', 'mandamus', 'prohibition', 'quo warranto' and 'certiorari'. What this power includes is a large question but it is easier to say what it does not include. 28. I begin first with the named writs. They are all prerogative writs. Of these habeas corpus, prohibition and quo warranto are not apposite to the present purpose but certiorari and mandamus are. I propose first to deal with the question: what can be done under the process of these two writs? The article says that the High Court can issue writs 'in the nature of certiorari and mandamus. The employment of the words 'in the nature of can have but two meanings. First, that archaic language is sought to be avoided. By the statutory enactment of 1938 (Ad....
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....ich shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and Consuls to all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and a citizen of another State, between citizen of different States, between the citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State or the citizen thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects. Section (3): In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. 31. It is obvious from this that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to issue a writ of certiorari must of necessity be a part of its appellate jurisdiction. Indeed the Supreme Court has been granted a special power to review cases from the Courts of appeals by a writ of certiora....
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....substitute for appellate power. The observations of Lord Sumner in - Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd. (1922) 2 AC 128 at p. 156 Its jurisdiction is to see that the inferior Court has not exceeded its own, and for that very reason it is bound not to interfere in what has been done within that jurisdiction, for, in so doing, it would itself, in turn, transgress the limits within which its own jurisdiction of supervision, not of review, is confined. That supervision goes to two points: one is the area of the inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of the law in the course of its exercise. must be borne in mind. Though I have found cases of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, they are easily explained on the footing of the powers erected there and I do not propose to examine them for the same reason. 34. Now, if certiorari is only to quash, the question is whether the High Court can utilize the other prerogative writ, namely, mandamus to dictate to the inferior Court the decision It should give. Here the argument was two-fold. It was contended that we can either issue a mandamus per se or add a mandamu....
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....ut saying, what sentence See Stat. 12 Geo 3 Ch. 21, S. 1 and See - R. v. Bishop of Litchfield 7 (sic) 217; whereas in the case of a, ministerial officer, the writ would, in terms specifically command the performance of the particular act or acts, as to swear in A.B. as church warden &c. Again at page 230 the learned author says: It is the ordinary practice of the Court of B.R. to grant the writ of mandamus to command magistrates or the Quarter Sessions to hear and determineor give judgment in cases within their jurisdiction where they have refused altogether to exercise it, but no instance can be cited in which the Court of B.R. has granted a mandamus to compel them to do a specific act, as to come to any particular decision - R. v. Suffolk (J) 5 N & M 144. 37. I am aware that the writ has been described as one to ampliate justice, and in - Rex v. Barker (1762) 3 Burr 1265 at p. 1267 Lord Mansfield laid down that: A mandamus is a prerogative writ; to the aid of which the subject is entitled, upon a proper case previously shown, to the satisfaction of the Court. The original nature of the writ, and the end for which it was framed, direct upon what occas....
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....9; is considerably shaken. A perusal of the case and of - 'Rex v. Howard' would establish this. Rex v. Dodds (1905) 2 KB 40, also suggests that the kind of mandamus which. Shri Phadke seeks may issue but that case should be read in conjunction with the cases cited and it will easily be seen that it is really an authority to the contrary. It is true that the opinion in - Queen v. Sharman (1898) 1 QB 578, based on - Boulter v. Kent (J) (1897) AC 556 was not accepted later on by the Court of Appeal but the decisions in - Reg. v. Bowman (1898) 1 QB 663 and - Reg. v. Cotham (1898) 1 QB 802 do not go as far as is contended for in this case. The case of - Rex v. Dodds, was concerned with a license-granted by the Justices to which a condition; was attached. The question was whether an appeal lay or a mandamus could issue. In view of the fact that there was no refusal to renew the license, the mandamus was to deliver the license without the condition. The condition being in excess of the jurisdiction of the magistrates was deleted and the license was already ordered to be delivered by the magistrates. 40. The view of mandamus which I hold finds support in the Colonies and America....
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.... a duty is cast how and in what manner they are to perform their duty. They simply direct them to perform their duty. Channel J. '(ibid)'. 43. In America the law is the same. In - Ex parte Nebraska (1908) 209 US 436, Fuller C.J. laid down: The application to this Court is for the issue of the writ of mandamus directing the Circuit Court to reverse its decision, although in its nature a judicial act and within the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion. But mandamus cannot be issued to compel the Court below to decide a matter before it in a particular way or to review its judicial actions had in the exercise of legitimate jurisdiction. Nor can the writ be used to perform the office of an appeal or writ of error. See also - In re Lewis (1893) 150 US 150, and the cases cited by Fuller C.J., - In re Elisha T. Loring; Ex parte (1877) 94 US 418, and - In re Flippin (1877) 94 US 348; among a host of others. 44. The above observations Show the essential nature of the process of certiorari and mandamus, which nature the Constitution requires us ever to bear in mind. After all, when the Constitution mentions the writs of certiorari and mandamus it means something....
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.... of a Court of appeal, and the power to retry a question which the Judge was competent to try. The learned Judge then remarks: The grant of the writ being discretional - Zink v. Langton (1781) 2 Doug. 749, and - Rex v. Bass (1793) 5 TR 251 - it will be refused on such a ground as that the party seeking to get an inquisition into compensation quashed has allowed the time to expire within which he could have got an award set aside under the same (Lands' Clauses Consolidation) Act - The Queen v. Sheward (1880) 5 QBD 179 at p. 182. In India, as in England, the grant of a rule under the extraordinary jurisdiction is discretional, and the power should be used only to sustain, and not further to disturb, the regular course of judicial administration; to prevent distortions, or sham applications of the law, but not to promote uncertainty and restlessness, by an over-nice scrutiny of proceedings that aim at promptness rather than refinement. The above passage is quoted with approval in - W.R. Pandit v. 2nd Additional District Judge, Nagpur ILR (1951) Nag 94 at p. 97, though, if I may point out respectfully, there it is erroneously assumed that these remarks ap....
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....f the Constitution that the sole object of the Article is the enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. A proceeding under this Article cannot really have any affinity to what is known as a declaratory suit. The first prayer made in the petition seeks a relief in the shape of a declaration, that the Act is invalid and is apparently inappropriate to an application under Article 32; while the second purports to be framed for a relief by way of injunction consequent upon the first. As regards the third prayer it has been contended by Mr. Joshi, the learned Counsel for one of the Respondents, that having regard to the nature of the case and the allegations made by the Petitioner himself, the prayer for a writ of mandamus in. the form in which it has been made, is not tenable. What is argued is that a writ of mandamus can be prayed for, for enforcement of statutory duties or to compel a person holding a public office to do or forbear from doing something which is incumbent upon him to do or forbear from doing under the provisions of any law. Assuming that the Respondents in the present case are public servants, it is said that the statutory duties which it is inc....
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....een used in the sense of a document under the seal of the Court issued to a person, or authority including Government in appropriate cases commanding them or any of them to do or forbear from doing some act. In this sense the words "orders, directions or writs" overlap considerably. The word 'direction' in this context may mean that the person to whom it is issued is not commanded peremptorily to a particular act or to forbear from doing it, but is merely guided in the matter of the doing of that duty or forbearance from it. It is obvious that even in the matter of prerogative writs sometimes a command, sometimes a direction is needed. Thus a Court may order the release of a detenu; it may issue a writ quashing a proceeding or it may direct that an election be held within a particular time. In cases which are referred to the High Court on a case stated, it may be necessary to give a direction even to the inferior Court or an authority how to proceed in the matter, as for example, a reference under the Municipal Law or a reference by a Small Cause Court Judge on a question of law or usage having the force of law, or some questions as to the construction of a document which c....
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....e power given to this Court under this provision (Article 32) is a large one, but it has to be exercised in accordance with well established principles. The writs to which reference has been made must obviously be correlated to one or more of fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and can be made only for the enforcement of such rights. These remarks also apply to the High Court. 55. In - B. Venkataramana v. State of Madras AIR 1951 SC 229, an application under Article 32 complaining of the infringement of the Petitioner's Fundamental Right to employment in the State service was made. A direction was issued to the State Government to consider and dispose of the Petitioner's application for the post after taking it on file on its merits and without applying the rule of communal rotation. The Supreme Court did not lay down in that case a universal rule applicable also to judicial tribunals. 56. It was argued that Article 226 is wider in its ambit than Article 32 of the Constitution; that Article 32 is meant only to be used when there is an encroachment on fundamental rights, whereas Article 226 can be invoked for any other purpose. It is a....
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....f the High Court are prescribed by Statutes; but beyond those there is no provision in the Constitution itself. 58. This brings me to the latest case of the Supreme Court. In - Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. 1952 SCJ 261 the Supreme Court, while dealing with a case under the Motor Vehicles Act, had occasion to discuss the ambit of Article 226 and observed as follows: It is unnecessary for the disposal of this appeal to consider and decide on the exact scope and extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. Whether, the writs it can issue must be analogous to the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari specified therein and the power is subject to all the limitations, or restrictions imposed on the exercise of this jurisdiction, or whether the High Court is at liberty to issue any suitable directions or orders or writs untramelled by any conditions whenever the interests of justice so require, is a large and somewhat difficult problem which does not arise for solution now.... Such writs as are referred to in Article 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subo....
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....t being; there, all that the High Court can do is to act under the second part, The addition of a direction that the controversy be decided in a particular manner is doing indirectly what this Court cannot do directly. Further, once the order is quashed, the cause or controversy is; once again open. There is a special machinery and jurisdiction for the regulation of the letting, of houses and the control of rents. In that jurisdiction the Civil Courts (including the High Court) have no say. Once the quashing order is passed, the matter must be decided 'within the jurisdiction created by law.' The High Court is not the Rent Controller, the Industrial Tribunal, the Revenue Board etc. by turns. If it cannot interfere by appeal, it cannot decide the cause nor ask the Court to give a particular decision. The High Court has jurisdiction only to interfere: Where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles, of natural justice or refuse to exercise jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission or excess has resulted in mani....
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....is sort. 64. When this Court decides the controversy and dictates the order to the Rent Controller, it decides the matter itself. That has not only the effect of creating a jurisdiction not existing in this Court, but also of repealing Section 7 of the Act and Clause 21 of the Order. It has also the effect of giving a finality to the order of this Court, whereas the final order should really be that of the Rent Controller or on appeal of the Deputy Commissioner. 65. The third reason is this. I have already stated that Article 226 must be taken to have given some concrete and definite powers. The attempt has been to attribute to the High Court plenary powers without check; and the argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the High Court has got a power, unlimited in its extent, to question the orders of any Court, tribunal, person, authority and, even in, suitable cases, Government, and. to substitute its own decisions for the decisions-of the appropriate body or bodies. Such an amorphous power, I do not think, it was ever intended the High Court should possess. The power which has been granted must be exercised in accordance with well established principles. ....
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....nnar C.J. and Venkatarama Ayyar J. observed as follows: The question which now arises on an application taken out for a writ of mandamus by the party who was successful before the Government on the prior occasion is whether after the quashing of their order, the Government should take up the application filed before them under Section 64-A, Motor Vehicles Act and rehear the same. We have no doubt whatever in the matter that when an order of the inferior tribunal on an application properly made to them is quashed by this Court by a writ of certiorari on any ground which does not deal with the merits of the case, it is not only permissible, but it is also incumbent on the inferior tribunal to take up the application and to rehear the same. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the State very properly admitted this position and stated that the Government was prepared to deal with the application before them in the light of the judgment of this Court. In these circumstances, it is not necessary to grant a mandamus as pointed out by Lord Goddard, C.J., in the recent judgment in - Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal 1951-1 KB 711 at p. 724. The learned Chief ....
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....th to light". The argument seeks to make Article 226 a source of such amorphous power. The High Court undoubtedly has been given vast powers, but those powers are to be exercised in accordance with well-established principles and not at haphazard. If I may use a tag for a different purpose: "Omnis Innovatio Plus Novitate Perturbat Quam Utilitate Prodest." 72. For these reasons my opinion is that the decision in - Sagatmal's case ILR (1951) Nag 769 is correct. On the merits I express no opinion as no argument was addressed to the Full Bench. Hemeon J. 73. The Petitioner Bhailal, who is an importer of coal at Akola, was using an open site belonging to the Maratha Boarding House for the storage of coal, but he was required to vacate it because it was required by the Maratha Boarding House. He was the holder of nazul plots Nos. 24 and 25; and on 10-1-1945, he leased an area of about 60 feet x 40 feet in those plots, at a monthly rent of Rs. 35-0-0, to Ramlal Balgovind for a period of 5 years under a registered deed. The coal business, which was not thriving at the time of the lease to Ramlal Balgovind, subsequently expanded, and the Petitioner found that the land in the pl....
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...., Deputy Commissioner, Yeotmal 1951 Nag LJ 346, a Division Bench of this Court made the following observations at page 349: ...We are clear that apart from the power to issue writs specifically named in Article 226, the High Court has been expressly empowered to issue any "directions, orders or writs" for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. It is difficult to appreciate Shri Naik's argument that 'directions, orders or writs' can issue only in the circumstances in which the writs named specifically can issue because that argument, if accepted, would so restrict the meaning of the words 'directions, orders or writs' as to render them otiose. It is commonplace that effect must be given to every provision of a statute and that no word should be regarded as a surplusage unless that would lead to an absurdity. No absurdity results because of the construction we place on this Article. Again, the power conferred by Article 226 on High Courts is discretionary. It would, therefore, not, in our opinion, be right to read limitations in the wide powers conferred by the general words used therein merely be ca....
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....eferred to above, have not made any reference to any precedent for the kind of order passed by them. It is for the tribunal which has been entrusted with the exercise of jurisdiction under the statute to exercise is powers and not for this. Court. The function of this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution must be confined to pointing out the true legal position and either quashing the orders or letting those orders stand, as the case may be. It is not for this Court to exercise such powers as are ordinarily exercisable in its appellate or revisional jurisdiction. The Court, while entertaining an application for a writ like the present does not act either under its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction. 79. There has thus been a conflict of decisions in this Court; and now proceed to survey the views of other Courts in the matter. In Brajnandan Sharma v. State of Bihar AIR 1950 Pat 322 Meredith C.J. said I think Article 226, when it says that the High. Court shall have power to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of 'habeas corpu....
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.... 82. Bose J. in - Shyamapada v. Abani Mohan AIR 1951 Cal 420 pointed out that under Article 226 the power of the Court is not confined to the power to issue writs in the nature of 'mandamus' and of the other writs-mentioned therein and that the Court has wider powers. A Division Bench in - R.K. Bose v. Gauhati University AIR 1951 Assam 163, followed the view of Chagla C.J. in - Jashingbai v. District Magistrate, Ahmedabad ILR (1950) Bom 539 cit. sup. 83. Article 226 is, as Das Gupta J. remarked in - Elbridge Watson v. R.K. Das AIR 1951 Cal 430, not made subject to any existing law or to any restrictions imposed by the law. The contention that the High Court had no power if interference if there was suitable provision in the Income Tax Act was not accepted, although Das Gupta J. indicated that interference under Article 226 was not proper if that Statute furnished an adequate legal remedy which was not less convenient, beneficial and effective. 84. Sayeedah Khatoon v. State of Bihar 30 Pat 21 related to a case in which an appeal was pending but the Division Bench acted under Article 226; and in - Soorajmull v. Assistant Controller of Customs AIR 1952 Cal 103, Bose J. m....
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....ower to issue the writ of Certiorari asked for. 84a. I now turn to some rulings of their Lordships of the Supreme Court of India. In - Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana 1950 SCR 566, in which the, scope of Article 32 of the Constitution of India was under consideration, it was submitted that as the Petitioner had at adequate remedy by way of appeal, the Court should not grant any writ in the nature of the prerogative writ of mandamus or certiorari. Their Lordships repelled this contention in the following words: There can be no question that the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs, but the powers given to this Court under Article 32 are much wider and are not confined to issuing prerogative writs only. Their Lordships also issued specific directions to the Respondent Municipal Board not to prohibit the Petitioner from carrying on his trade and to withdraw his pending prosecution. 85. In - G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. AIR 1952 SC 192 the Madras High Court was moved for a writ of 'certiorari' for quashing the orders and the proceedings of the Regional Trans....
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....mmissioner. This, obviously it cannot do...no 'certiorari' is available to quash a decision passed with jurisdiction by an inferior tribunal on the mere ground that such decision is erroneous. 88. Although the question in issue here was not the exact question canvassed in the cases reported above, it is clear that the bulk of High Court opinion is in favour of the view taken in - Manohar v. G.G. Desai, Deputy Commissioner, Yeotmal 1951 Nag LJ 346 supra and against that taken in - Sagatmal v. M.V. Deo Addl. Deputy Commr., Nagpur I.L.R. 1951 Nag 769 'supra'. This majority, view received support from the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court of India in - Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana 1950 SCR 566, in which specific directions were issued to the Municipal Board not to prohibit the Petitioner from carrying on his trade and to withdraw his pending prosecution. That was a case under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, but Clause (2) of that Article and Clause (1) of Article 226 are in many respects similar; and in fact the powers of the Supreme Court are at present more restricted than those of a High Court, as Article 32 relates to the enfor....
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....rections or orders whenever the interests of justice so require. 91. It seems to me, therefore, and I say so with respect, that the view taken in - Sagatmal v. M.V. Deo Additional Deputy Commissioner, Nagpur ILR (1951) Nag 769 was too restrictive and that the powers of a High Court under Article 226 are wider than those envisaged in that decision. In interpreting a constitution or organic statute, as their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy. Council pointed out in - British Coal Corporation v. The King AIR 1935 PC 158, that construction most beneficial to the widest possible amplitude of its powers must be adopted. This does not connote that High Courts are given unlimited power to do anything by their writs or orders under Article 226 and a Full Bench held in - Emperor v. Jasingbhai 52 Bom LR 544 (FB) that some limitation must be placed by them on their own powers. At the same time, the power conferred by Article 226 is ample and wider than the power of issuing English prerogative writs. That being so it would not, in my opinion, be correct to limit that power to the Indian law which preceded the Constitution or to the English common law. Article 372 provides that....
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....ry on his business on the site at present in his occupation ' by constructing a structure thereon. It may be mentioned that the Rent Controller also found that the site which the Petitioner was occupying before he shifted to his own plot was roughly double in area of the plot in question. The order of the Rent Controller was interpreted by the Additional Deputy Commissioner to mean that the Petitioner did not really need the plot in question. On this ground he dismissed the Petitioner's appeal. 95-96. The Petitioner thereupon moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. His petition came up before a Division Bench of this Court consisting of my Lord the Chief Justice and myself. We were of the opinion that having found that the need of the Petitioner was a genuine one, neither the Rent Controller nor the Additional Deputy Commissioner was justified in withholding permission to the Petitioner to give notice to Respondent 2 to terminate his tenancy. We were also of the opinion that it was not open to the Rent Controller to say that the Petitioner would be able to meet his requirement by constructing a go-down on the site in his possession because there is no pro....
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....#39;, prohibition, 'quo warranto' and 'certiorari', or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred on a High Court by Clause (1) shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by Clause (2) of Article 32. 99. In - Manohar's case 1951 Nag LJ 346 it was contended that writs of 'certiorari' and prohibition cannot issue unless the impugned order is judicial or a quasi-judicial one and that an order requisitioning property does not fall in either category. It was also contended that a writ of 'mandamus' was not available for quashing an order of that kind and that the petition must be dismissed. The argument that the petition should be dismissed was repelled and it was observed: ...we are clear that apart from the power to issue writs specifically named in Article 226, the High Court has been expressly empowered to issue any 'directions, orders or writs' for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part III and for any other purpose. It is difficult to appreciate Shri Naik's argument that 'directions,....
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....1951 (Nag). I was a party to holding that after quashing an order of an inferior tribunal this Court was competent to make a direction or substitute its own order. Another Division Bench of this Court also held likewise in - Hiralal v. State of Madhya Pradesh Mis. Petn. No. 30 of 1950 (Nag). As against these decisions there is the decision in - Sagatmal's case ILR (1951) Nag 769, to which I have already adverted. There the learned Judges held: ...when exercising its extraordinary powers under a writ of 'certiorari' the proper order for this Court to pass is to quash the orders and to leave the authorities to pass the right orders and not for this Court to substitute its own orders, because this Court does not exercise the jurisdiction of an appellate Court which has always the authority of substituting its own operative orders for those of the lower Court. Their Lordships of this Court, who decided the previous case referred to above, have not made any reference to any precedent for the kind of order passed by them. It is for the tribunal which has been entrusted with exercise of jurisdiction under the statute to exercise its powers and not for this Court. The ....
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....ribunal by a 'certiorari' usually does no more than quash the proceedings. Instances, however, are not wanting of cases in which the King's Bench had after quashing the proceedings thought it proper to issue a direction of a consequential or incidental nature. What is being proposed to be done in the present case is something of that kind and, therefore, I am of opinion that even the English decisions do not stand in our way. 104. It would appear that in Sagatmal's case it was regarded that making a direction to an inferior tribunal or granting the permission to terminate the tenancy is not permissible because the power exercisable in proceedings for issue of a writ of 'certiorari' is not an appellate power. I would accept for the purpose of this discussion that the powers of this Court under Article 226 are not appellate powers in the strict sense of the word and that they might be regarded as supervisory powers. Even then, I am of opinion that making a direction to the inferior tribunal or substituting the order of this Court for that of the order of the inferior tribunal is permissible under the article when such an order is of a consequential nature. ....
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....of a case and to ensure the observance of the requirements of natural justice. The writ of prohibition, on the other hand, issued before, anything had taken place before an inferior tribunal or official. This writ issued usually only out of the Court of King's Bench, being the King's prerogative writ, but, for the furtherance of justice, it could also be issued in some cases out of the Court of Chancery, Common Pleas or' Exchequer. Under these writs, commands were issued to the Judges and parties to a suit in any inferior Court requiring them to cease from the prosecution thereof, upon a suggestion that either the cause originally, or some collateral matter arising therein, does not belong to that jurisdiction. The writ of 'mandamus' was a command issuing in the King's name and from the Court of King's Bench, and directed to any person, corporation, or inferior Court of jurisdiction, within the King's dominions, requiring them to do some particular thing specified therein, which appertained to their office and duty. This writ was thus used to compel the admission or restoration of any person to a public office, or to compel the holding of a Cou....
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....eaper and quicker procedure: in short, of one more suited to modern needs. The report was, nevertheless, exceedingly superficial on the subject of judicial review and touched very lightly, if at all, on the main problems arising in this sphere. 108. It was evidently as a result of the criticism of the committee of the procedure by way of writs that they were abolished by Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1938, and replaced by a system of orders. The relevant provisions of that Act are as follows: 7. (1) The prerogative writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari shall no longer be issued by the High Court. (2) In any case where the High Court would, but for the provisions of the last foregoing sub-section, have had jurisdiction to order the issue of a writ of mandamus requiring any act to be done, or a writ of prohibition prohibiting any proceedings or matter, or a writ of certiorari removing any proceedings or matter into the High Court or any division thereof for any purpose, the Court may make an order requiring the act to be done, or prohibiting or removing the proceedings or matter, as the case may be. (3) The said orders....
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....e duty of protection of the fundamental rights and other legal rights of citizens could be performed efficiently and adequately. When so high a duty is cast on a High Court, it cannot be supposed that it was within the contemplation of Constituent Assembly that the due and adequate discharge of the duty should be liable to be thwarted by obstacles in the shape of technicalities. On the other hand, the presumption must be that all the power requisite for the performance of the duty was intended to be conferred. The Constituent Assembly having adopted a provision couched in the widest possible terms must, therefore, be deemed to have conferred plenary powers on the High Court for doing justice as occasion demanded. 110. What are next to be considered are certain decisions of the Supreme Court. The first of these is - Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi AIR 1950 SC 188. In that case their Lordships stated that a writ of 'certiorari' is of a limited character and that beyond quashing an order of an inferior tribunal it could direct nothing. I may, however, point out that their Lordships were there dealing with an appeal from an order passed by the....
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....eal before them to consider and decide on the exact scope and extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. Later they, however, observed: However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made. This means that the jurisdiction of the High Court is supervisory and not that it has no power to make a direction or an order after quashing the decision of an inferior tribunal. Indeed, this point was not before their Lordships at all. It seems to me, therefore, that the decision does not preclude us from holding that a direction can be issued to an inferior tribunal or an order of its own substituted by the High Court for that of the inferior tribunal. 114. Parry's case 1952 SCJ 275 is a decision of three Judges of the Supreme Court. All of them were parties to the decision in Rashid Ahmed's case AIR 1950 SC 163, but made no reference to it in their decision in this case. While holding that the High Court ....
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....nt with the provisions of Part III, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. Part III deals with fundamental rights. Therefore, all existing laws must be deemed to be subject to the provisions of Part III and if any provision in an existing law is inconsistent with the fundamental rights, that provision has become void. It follows from this that where a law makes a provision which is inconsistent with the fundamental rights of citizens or abridges any other legal right and also provides that the decision as to that right arrived at by a tribunal created by that law to be final the, provision regarding finality will be deemed to be void. Further, Article 226 of the Constitution which confers constitutional remedies is over and above the ordinary law because it is contained in the supreme law of the land. No Act of the Parliament or of a State Legislature can limit or fetter the power conferred by Article 226. The position is different in England, because the British Parliament, being supreme, can give finality to the decision of a tribunal and take away the powers of the High Court to issue orders in the nature of 'mandamus, certiorari' or prohibition. Even then ....
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.... to grant permission to the Petitioner; either we ourselves grant that permission to the Petitioner, or we send back the case to the Rent Controller and require him to accord that permission to him. There is no point in sending back the case to the Rent Controller for according permission to the Petitioner because granting the permission being merely consequential we can do that ourselves. I would, therefore, accord the requisite permission to the Petitioner to serve notice on Respondent 2 to terminate his tenancy. I would also order that the costs of this petition and those incurred in the tribunal below be borne by Respondent 2. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-. Deo, J. 120. This petition came up for hearing before the Chief Justice and Mudholkar J. They agreed that the order of the Rent Controller refusing to grant permission to the landlord to determine the tenancy and the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner affirming it must be quashed and that on the finding of fact reached by the Rent Controller he was bound to grant the permission. They agreed that these decisions are of judicial tribunals. They, however, differed as to the, form of the final order to be passed. As....
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...., quashed and the authority was directed to restore the permits of the Petitioner. If the Full Bench had rested content with merely quashing the order of the Authority, the order would have been of little assistance to the Petitioner. In order that he should immediately be restored to the right to which he was entitled, it was necessary to make a direction to restore permits to him. Cases have occurred subsequently in which me Regional Transport Authorities have not passed appropriate orders consequent on the decisions of this Court quashing their orders; and the aggrieved parties had again to move this Court for necessary orders and directions. In dealing with, the powers of the High Court under Article 226 the Full Bench stated: The power of this Court to issue a writ in the nature of 'mandamus' is included in the power to issue directions, orders, or writs which power cannot by any means be said to be limited to the issue of only the well-known prerogative writs under common law. The primary object of Article 22(1) is to afford effective protection to the rights of the subject where recourse to ordinary law may prove inadequate for the purpose. If the ends of ju....
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....oller to forth with grant the permission. The Division Bench (Hidayatullah and Rao JJ.) allowed this application and issued directions for immediate disposal of the matter. Sagatmal v. Rent Controller, Nagpur Mis. Petn. No. 1626 of 1951 (Nag). The learned Judges did not issue a direction to the Rent Controller to grant permission apparently in view of the earlier pronouncement. In my view the jurisdiction under Article 226 is not advisory, i.e., to advise authorities on the correct interpretation of law and its powers, but to pass such orders as the justice of the case may demand. Justice delayed is justice denied. This is what happened in Sagatmal's case. It was eminently desirable in that case to grant the permission or at any rate to direct the Rent Controller to grant the permission. In - Rashid Ahmad v. Municipal Board, Kairana AIR 1950 SC 163, their Lordships did not stop with merely pointing out the true legal position but issued directions' to the Respondent to withdraw the prosecution pending' against the Petitioner and not to prohibit him from carrying on his trade. Without these directions the decision of the Supreme Court would have been of little help to th....
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.... permission on the ground that the facts necessary to attract Clause 13(3)(vi)(c) were not established. It appears from the report that no evidence was adduced by the landlords before the Rent Controller. Holding that the landlord clearly made out a case under Clause 13(3)(vi)(c), House Rent Control Order, the learned judges quashed the orders and directed the Rent Controller to grant the permission. They evidently relied on the affidavits filed in this Court, though the order does not expressly say so. 127. In - Shamrao v. Municipal Committee, Nagpur Misc. Petn. No. 102 of 1950 (Nag) the order of the office-in-charge which was confirmed in second appeal by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Nagpur, was quashed and the Municipal Committee was directed to reinstate the Petitioner. In - New Motor Transport Co. Drug v. Regional Transport Authority, Raipur ILR (1952) Nag 69, decided by Rao J. and me the order of the Regional Transport Authority was quashed as it was contrary to the decision of the appellate authority, and directions were issued to effectuate the decision of the appellate authority by cancelling the permits granted to the Respondent with a further direction not to g....
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....to pass the consequential order granting permission to the landlord to determine the tenancy or to give direction to the Rent Controller to grant the necessary permission or whether the jurisdiction ends with quashing the order and advising the tribunal by pointing out the correct legal position. I do not, therefore, propose to enlarge the scope of the reference by examining whether the Rent Controller and the Additional Deputy Commissioner are judicial tribunals and whether their orders are liable to be quashed by writs of 'certiorari'. It is also not necessary TO discuss the scope of Article 227 as reliance was no placed by the Petitioner on that Article. 132. We have to interpret the Constitution As stated by Gwyer C.J. in - In re C.P. & Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 AIR 1939 FC 1 at p. 5, a constitution is a "living and organic thing". Our Constitution is the expression of the will of the people to secure to all the citizens justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. We have, therefore, to interpret the Constitution so as to give effect to this will of the people. 133. The object or purpose of construction or interpretation is to as....
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....rd v. Attorney General for Canada (1930) AC 124 at p. 136 their Lordships of the Privy Council stated: Their Lordships do not conceive it to be the duty of the Board...to cut down the provisions of the Act by a narrow and technical construction. 136. Article 225 of the Constitution preserves all the powers possessed by the High Courts at the date of the commencement of the Constitution until affected by any law passed by a competent legislature. Such legislative power is to be found in Entries 79, 95 of List I, 65 of List II and 46 of List III. The Article does not confer on the High Court any power or, jurisdiction which it did not possess on that date. The extraordinary power or jurisdiction, i.e. a power or jurisdiction in addition to that exercised before the Constitutionals conferred by Articles 226 and partly by 227. As already, stated, it is not necessary to examine fort the purpose of this case the scope of Article 227. What we have to consider is whether the High Court would exceed its jurisdiction under Article 226 in passing consequential orders or giving directions to effectuate its decisions under that Article. 137. Under Article 32(2) the Supreme Court ....
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....s without a meaning. "To reject words as insensible is the 'ultima ratio' when an absurdity would follow from giving effect to the words of an enactment as they stand": - R. v. St. John Westgate, Burial Board (1862) 2 B & S 703 at p. 706. As stated in Craies Statute Law, 5th edition, at page 99 when the legislature enacts a particular phrase, the presumption is that it is saying something which has not been said immediately before." It is, therefore, not permissible to omit the added words unless reading them in the Article would lead to absurdity. 140. As stated by Lord Watson, in - Dilworth v. New-Zealand Commissioner of Stamps (1899) AC 99 at pp. 105-106: The word 'include' is very generally used in interpretation Clause in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things, as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation Clause declares that they shall include. The word "includes" has an extending force and does not limit the meaning of the term: Nasibun v.....
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....not be used to control its decision that can be done by a writ of error in the final order if passed. This was followed in - Ex Parte Nebraska (1908) 209 US 436 where it was held that the mandamus cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or writ of error to correct the error, if any, committed by Federal Circuit Court in denying a motion to remand the case. It will be noticed that in all these cases an appeal was tenable against the final decision. 142. In Canada the Supreme Court of Alberta declined to quash a proceeding of an appellate Court, who heard a criminal appeal without notice to the prosecutor and, acquitted the accused and refused to issue a mandamus to hear the appeal according to law on the ground that "it would in effect be a direction as to the manner or particular method in which he should conduct the trial." Evidently a further appeal was not provided against the order of the appellate Court. Rex v. Wong Tun. The Queen v. Adamson (1875) 1 QBD 201 was relied on. It was there stated that "in the absence of express statutory provision the Queen's Bench had no appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of magistrates who have once heard a case and decide....
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....ver debarred the Court from granting certiorari if it was a question of jurisdiction.... The taking away of certiorari by statute no doubt prevented the Court from inquiring into what I may call the merits of the determination, but it did not prevent the Court from inquiring whether or not the inferior Court had any jurisdiction to make the order. (p. 273). The decision of the tribunal was a speaking order. They had given their findings of fact and their view of the law. The Divisional Court found the view of law to be erroneous. 'Racecourse Betting Control Board v. Secretary of State for Air (1944) 1 All ER 60 taking the restrictive view that the tribunal having acted with jurisdiction the writ of certiorari cannot issue to correct error of law, was overruled. The learned Chief Justice observed: I think that the decision to which we are now coming will be very beneficial because so many tribunals are now set up, all of whom, I am certain, desire to do their duty in the best possible way, but they are often given very difficult sets of regulations and statutes to construe. It must be for their benefit and I have no doubt they will welcome it, that this Court s....
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....cept to the limited extent indicated by their Lordships in. - Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Robert, Willan (1874) LR 5 PC 417 (cit. infra): In India the Parliament is not supreme. The powers of the Parliament and the State Legislatures are limited by the previsions of Article 245(1) of the Constitution. These Legislatures have no power to abridge the power conferred on a High Court under Article 226. Even if a right of appeal is taken away by an Act of Parliament or of a State Legislature, a suitor is not without remedy. He can invoke the extraordinary powers of the High Court under Article 226 or of the Supreme Court when his fundamental rights are affected. This power is in addition to the power of a civil Court to examine the decisions of these tribunals as stated by their Lordships of the Privy Council in - Secy. of State v. Mask and Co. AIR 1940 PC 105. 147. Before the Constitution the administrative tribunals which had to act judicially or quasi-judicially were not amenable to the supervision of the High Courts. The jurisdiction of the High Courts to question any judgment of an inferior Court, subject to its appellate jurisdiction, otherwise than by way of appeal or revi....
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....cedure. The powers as defined in that Section can be exercised under Article 227 of the Constitution in the case of tribunals to which Section 115 does not apply. West J. has referred to a number of English decisions to show that the exercise of the power of certiorari has not been quite uniform. 150. Extensive resort to controls during the war, the large powers which were delegated by recent legislations to the judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals, administrative bodies and the Executive, frequently resulted in denial of justice to the citizens, in the absence of a power of judicial superintendence by the High Courts. Their rights to freedom, property, business etc. were at the mercy of these tribunals and bodies which did not frequently discharge their duties in accordance with law and quite often abused the power vested in them. Judicial decisions were frequently influenced by the Executive. This condition of the country continued after the Independence. Graphic description is to be found in an article on 'Judicial Control of Administrative Act in India' by Shri Harkose of the Faculty of Law, Lucknow University, published at page 9 of the January issue of the Supreme....
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....ose cases where there is an appeal. There should be a Superior Court, which is able, not only to see that the new tribunals keep within their jurisdiction, but also to review their decisions on points of law and in proper cases, on questions of fact. (P. 95) He further observed: Wide discretion there must be in all administrative activity, but it should be discretion defined in terms which can be measured by legal standards lest cases of manifest injustice go unheeded and unpunished. He summed up the position in England in these words: It should be clearly understood that, although the High Court has some degree of control over the tribunals, it is not such as to enable it to correct many of the faults or injustice which may arise, unless the Statute gives an appeal. The High Court proceeds on the footing that if Parliament has thought fit to entrust jurisdiction on all these new matters to new tribunals without any appeal from them, then, so long as the tribunals do not exceed or abuse their jurisdiction, the High Court should not interfere with them. If a tribunal should come to a wrong conclusion on the facts, or, indeed, if there is no evidence on which ....
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....ay demand particularly because the powers of tribunals are generally exercised in this country by persons who are not trained in the interpretation of legal provisions and whose decisions are usually moulded by the policy and directives of the Executive? Our Constitution has secured the citizens fundamental rights and a rule of law. These rights cannot be adequately safeguarded without vesting somewhat undefined powers in the superior Courts of this country. The legislative purpose is thus to confer as wide powers as possible on the Supreme Court and the High Courts. 153. Although the powers conferred by Article 226 are thus expressed in very wide terms, the English forms and procedure and limitations of prerogative writs continue to dominate judicial ideas in this country, even though in England itself these forms and procedure have been abolished by the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1938 (Geo VI ch 63) and although the original view of the scope of the prerogative writs has undergone a radical change. In the absence of uniformity in the scope of the writs of certiorari in the several countries it would be incorrect to contend that the power conferre....
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....High Court cannot substitute its own discretion in its place. In my view, these submissions are without any substance. On the facts found by the Rent Controller in the instant case, he was bound to grant permission to the landlord in view of the mandatory provision of Clause 13. There is no discretion left if the facts attracting Clause 13 are established. This is, therefore, not a case of interfering with the discretion of the Rent Controller. 155. It was not the submission of Shri Phadke for the Petitioner that a person aggrieved by an order of the person or authority mentioned in Article 226 has a right of appeal to the High Court, His submission, as I understood him, was that though the suitor has no such right, the High Court has power in suitable cases to correct errors of law as well as of fact, and its power is not confined to correct only errors of jurisdiction as contended by the other side. As stated by their Lordships of' the Supreme Court in - Ebrahirri Aboobakar v. Custodian General AIR 1952 SC 319 at pp. 332-333. Ordinarily, a court of appeal has not only jurisdiction to determine the soundness of the decision of the inferior Court as a Court of error, but ....
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.... the Article does not place any limitation but it is the High Court who may place limitations on that, power for its efficient exercise. 157. It is argued that in no circumstances can the High Court interfere with the finding of fact of the tribunal even though there is no evidence in support of it or it has misdirected itself in considering it. Reliance was placed on - King v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd. (1922) 2 AC 128. Let us take the case where the Rent Controller believes a witness because he is, say, a Congressman and disbelieves another because he is a Communist though the evidence of the latter accords with the documentary evidence and the circumstances of the case while that of the former does not, and the Additional Deputy Commissioner confirmed this finding. It is evidently a miscarriage of justice. There is no other remedy available to the aggrieved suitor except under Article 226. Are we going to exercise the power under Article 226 or are we going to be helpless spectators of this miscarriage of justice by a tribunal within our territorial jurisdiction? Must we put limitations on our power to prevent us from remedying this travesty of justice merely because of the real o....
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.... to the High Court and has power to issue a 'mandamus' requiring an act to be done, but no return can be made to any such order. The order is final subject to the right to appeal therefrom. Thus the old jurisdiction continued though the forms and procedure were modified. 160. It will thus be seen that there is no accepted practice or fixed scope of the writ of 'certiorari' or mandamus in the jurisprudence of those countries where the writs styled 'certiorari' or 'mandamus' obtain. There is a gradual tendency to enlarge the power of the King's Bench to interfere by these writs. Denning L.J. has advocated the necessity of interference on facts in suitable cases. The observations of this great jurist and Judge cannot be dismissed as the outburst of a lecturer. The views expressed in Hamlyn Lectures are also to be found in his judicial pronouncements. We have not yet settled the principles of the exercise of this extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 though we have been freely referring to the English precedents in trying to formulate these principles. The English and American precedents may afford us valuable guidance in settling these pri....
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....al. 164. In - Rex v. Dodds (1905) 2 KB 40 the Justices had directed renewal of a licence but subject to certain conditions which they had no jurisdiction to impose. Imposing of such conditions amounted to refusal to renew the licence. The order imposing conditions was held to be without jurisdiction. As nothing further remained for the Justices to do but to renew the licence, the Court of Appeal directed them to hand over the renewed license to the Petitioner. The action of the Justices in renewing licence was held to be judicial. In similar circumstances Lord Coleridge, C.J. stated in - Queen v. Licensing Justices of Merthyr Tydvil (1894) 14 QB 584- It is immaterial whether the mandamus directs the Justices to hear and determine afresh the application for a renewal of the licence or directs them in terms to grant a renewal of the licence, because when the matter comes before the Justices again they can only deal with it according to the provisions of the statute; and if no objection was made to the renewal at the first general annual licensing meeting, the Justices may find that they had no jurisdiction to adjourn the hearing of the application but were bound to grant a rene....
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....ed the Petitioner shall be at liberty to provide substitutes within such times as may be prescribed by the authorities. (c) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the High Court fell into error in its construction of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the law regarding the rights of parties in such matters. Their Lordships indicated the several requirements of law for the grant of permits, which permits are, to a certain extent, in the discretion of the authorities, who are entrusted with the power to grant them; and pointed out that R to whom the High Court had ordered the issue of permits did not, fulfil, those requirements. R. did not; hold permits from the French authorities which were indispensable to run the bus service in question. (d) Assuming for a moment that the order dated 3-1-1950 was bad in law, all that the High Court at that stage could do was to quash the order and leave the Regional Transport Authority to hear together and decide the applications dated 14-10-1949 and 18-11-1949 on merits, on following the procedure prescribed by the Motor Vehicles Act. Not only the parties before the High Court but other operators who would choo....
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....inciples to ascertain facts but by considerations of policy also though they have to act judicially or quasi-judicially in their enquiry. If the High Court quashes the orders of such authorities, the directions to them would be to decide the controversy in conformity with the provisions of the Act. 'Veerappa's' case is thus distinguishable and inapplicable to the present controversy. 167. Parry and Co. v. Commercial Employees Association, Madras AIR 1952 SC 179 is not an authority for the proposition that a High Court cannot exercise "appellate powers" under Article 226. Their Lordships were not deciding a case under that Article and were riot defining its scope. It was conceded before them that the prerogative writ of 'certiorari' is not available to quash a decision passed with jurisdiction, on the mere ground that such decision is erroneous, and that it can issue only on the ground of either a manifest defect of jurisdiction in the tribunal that made the order or of a manifest fraud in procuring it. The question whether the statute has taken away certiorari was not examined. The concession was made apparently in view of the decision in - Colonial Bank of A....