TaxTMI Updates e-Newsletter
Jan 24,2026

Violation of principles of natural justice - impugned order came to be passed by the respondent without providing any opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner - petitioner was not aware of the notices/communications which were uploaded by the respondent in the GST common portal - HELD THAT:- In the case on hand, it is evident that the show cause notice was uploaded on the GST Portal Tab. According to the petitioner, he was not aware of the issuance of the said show cause notice issued through the GST Portal and the original of the said show cause notice was not furnished to them. In such circumstances, this Court is of the view that the impugned assessment order came to be passed without affording any opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner, confirming the proposals contained in the show cause notice.

No doubt, sending notice by uploading in portal is a sufficient service, but, the Officer who is sending the repeated reminders, inspite of the fact that no response from the petitioner to the show cause notices etc., the Officer should have applied his/her mind and explored the possibility of sending notices by way of other modes prescribed in Section 169 of the GST Act, which are also the valid mode of service under the Act, otherwise it will not be an effective service, rather, it would only fulfilling the empty formalities. Merely passing an ex parte order by fulfilling the empty formalities will not serve any useful purpose and the same will only pave way for multiplicity of litigations, not only wasting the time of the Officer concerned, but also the precious time of the Appellate Authority/Tribunal and this Court as well.

Thus, when there is no response from the tax payer to the notice sent through a particular mode, the Officer who is issuing notices should strictly explore the possibilities of sending notices through some other mode as prescribed in Section 169(1) of the Act, preferably by way of RPAD, which would ultimately achieve the object of the GST Act. Therefore, this Court finds that there is a lack of opportunities being provided to serve the notices/orders etc., effectively to the petitioner.

The impugned order dated 31.12.2024 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the respondent for fresh consideration on condition that the petitioner shall pay 25% of the disputed tax amount to the respondent within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The setting aside of the impugned order will take effect from the date of payment of the said amount - Petition disposed off by way of remand.

Vires of Article 14, 19(1)(g) and Section 300-A of Constitution of India - Section 16(2) of the said Act, 2017 would prevail over Section 16(4) of the CGST Act, 2017 or not - the time limit prescribed under Section 16(4) of the APGST / CGST Act, 2017 for claiming ITC - no mandate under Section 16(4) of the Central Goods & Service Tax Act, 2017 for availing ITC in the GSTR 3B within the time limit specified therein and due date of filing return u/s 39 of the said Act - amendment or substitution of Section 16(4) of the CGST Act, 2017 vide Section 100 of the Finance Act, 2022 - HELD THAT:- A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Vinod Udaipuri vs. Union of India & Others [2025 (9) TMI 1388 - JHARKHAND HIGH COURT] has taken cognizance of the subsequent amendment and based upon the same, set aside the order in original impugned in the said writ petition and remitted the matter to the appropriate authority to pass fresh order after considering the implication and impact of insertion of Section 16(5) in the CGST Act, 2017.

Therefore, by adopting the reasoning in Vinod Udaipuri and further upon taking cognizance of insertion of Section 16(5) of the CGST Act, 2017 and CBIC Circular dated 15.10.2024, the order in appeal dated 29.12.2023 is set aside and the matter remitted to the appellate authority for deciding the revenues appeal afresh and in accordance with law after considering the impact of insertion of Section 16(5) in the CGST Act, 2017 and CBIC Circular dated 15.10.2024.

The appellate authority must endeavour to dispose of the appeal within four months from the date of appearance of the parties before it and filing of an authenticated copy of this order - petition disposed off.

Seeking transfer back of amount which was erroneously transferred to wrong beneficiary account - applicability of Section 79(1)(c)(i) of the CGST/WBGST Act, 2017 - HELD THAT:- This Court considered the entire documents, the report submitted by the bank and the affidavit submitted by the added respondent as well as an order passed by the Ombudsman. This Court finds that the last four digit of the account of the beneficiary that is, M/s Mortex International is “8005” and the added respondent is “8025” - There was mistake on the part of the petitioner while transferring the amount in the account of M/s. Mortex International and inadvertently the amount has been transferred in the account of the added respondent.

This Court also found that the added respondent in whose account the amount has been transferred, has categorically stated that he has no business relationship with the petitioner and has also stated that he has no objection for transferring the said amount in the account of the petitioner.

The respondent no. 8, the Yes Bank Limited is directed to transfer the amount o in the account of the petitioner no. 1 within a period of one week from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.

Application disposed off.

Adjustment of tax liability against the input tax credit available in the credit ledger of the petitioner - requirement of payment of tax to be done, by way of deposit of cash, as the payment of tax, under the reverse charge mechanism - mistake or suppression of information - HELD THAT:- The scheme of Section 75(12) of the GST Act, would show that the liability to tax and the period within which such tax has to be paid, has to be declared by the registered person. In the event of any mistake or suppression of such information, the tax authorities are entitled to initiate proceedings by giving notices to the registered person setting out the discrepancies or deficiencies in the reporting of turnovers, the tax payable on such turnovers and the details of payment of such tax. The respondent authorities, after issuing such notices and after giving appropriate opportunity of hearing, as required under the provisions of the GST Act, are thereafter entitled to pass necessary orders quantifying the tax, late fee, penalty and interest payable on such tax. For this purpose, various provisions including Sections 56, 73 & 74 of the GST Act provide ample power to the authorities. It is only after such an adjudicatory process has been completed that coercive steps under Section 79 of the GST Act can be taken up. In the present case, no such adjudicatory process has been taken up.

Section 75(12) of the GST Act permits recovery even without an adjudicatory order where the liability is an admitted liability - the said provision would be available when the registered person files a declaration, in one form or the other, required under Section 39 of the GST Act, setting out the liability of the registered person. Thereafter, the authorities can recover the said tax or collect interest at the prescribed rate, from the date when the tax became due till it is paid. However, this provision would be applicable only when there is a clear cut admission, by the registered person, as to his tax liability - In the present case, the contention of the respondents is that the petitioner had mis-utilized the input tax credit available with the petitioner and had cleared its liability under the reverse charge mechanism by using input tax credit rather than paying the said amounts, by way of cash deposits. The learned Standing Counsel would specifically contend that the petitioner had availed the input tax credit without payment of tax in cash.

The contention of the respondents that the provisions of Section 75(12) of the GST Act can be pressed into service would have to be rejected. This is because, the said provision would be available only where the registered person has clearly disclosed a tax liability, in the returns filed under Section 39 of the GST Act, and such tax liability has not been cleared. Wrong usage of input tax credit or otherwise would only entitle the respondent authorities to initiate proceedings under Sections 73 & 74 of the GST Act and the coercive process under Section 75(12) of the GST Act, cannot be used in such situations.

This Writ Petition is allowed, setting aside the recovery process, initiated by the respondents, under Section 79(1)(c) of the GST Act, with a further direction to the respondent authorities to refund the interest payments recovered from the banker of the petitioner.

Levy of Goods and Services Tax on fees charged by electricity regulatory commissions - Regulatory and quasi-judicial functions of a Commission constituted under the Electricity Act, 2003 - Functions under Section 86 of the Electricity Act, 2003 - Exclusion of services rendered by a court or tribunal (Schedule III of the CGST Act) - Definition of "business" and "consideration" under the CGST Act (Section 2(17) and Section 2(31)) - Supply in the course or furtherance of business - Interpretation of "services" vis-à-vis Section 2(102) of the CGST Act - HELD THAT:- After considering the arguments on behalf of petitioner, stand of respondents in aforesaid matter and scrutinizing applicable provisions of law, it has been held by Delhi High Court that regulation of tariff, inter-State Transport transmission of Electricity or issuance of licence cannot be construed as activities undertaken or functions discharging furtherance of business but they are in extension of statutory obligation placed upon a Commission to regulate these subjects.

It is informed that this decision was challenged by the department by filing SLP (Civil) No. 19662 of 2025, which has been dismissed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court [2025 (7) TMI 1523 - SC ORDER] (Annexure P-27), thus matter has attained finality.

Respondents fairly states that the controversy involved in present writ petition is indeed identical and he is unable to draw out any distinction which would call for different dispensation in this matter.

Accordingly, present writ petition is allowed and show cause notice No. 79 dated 28.06.2024 is set aside.

Reversal of claim of ITC - petitioners have been directed to pay tax/penalty/interest - bar of time limitation - HELD THAT:- The impugned original order is quashed insofar as it relates to the claim made by the petitioner for ITC which is barred by limitation in terms of Section 16 (4) of the CGST Act, 2017 but, within the period prescribed in terms of Section 16 (5) of the said Act.

Therefore, the respondent-Department is restrained from initiating any proceedings against the petitioners by virtue of the impugned order based on the issue of limitation - Lliberty is granted to the petitioner to move a separate application for refund, if any, and the respondent-Department shall consider and decide the same on its own merits and in accordance with law.

The impugned order is quashed, the respondent-Department is directed to de-freezure of the concerned petitioner bank account, if any, which have been freezed in furtherance of the impugned order, by sending intimation to the concerned bankers - Petition allowed.

Permission to file a statutory appeal u/s 107 of the CGST Act, 2017 by condoning the delay of 478 days - petitioner failed to reply to assessment order, which preceded SCN - HELD THAT:- It is noticed that the time prescribed for filing an appeal under Section 107 of the respective GST enactments has expired. The Petitioner has not filed an appeal till date.

Following the consistent view taken by this Court under similar circumstances, the order dated 22.04.2024 is quashed and the case is remitted back to the Original Authority namely the 2nd Respondent to pass a fresh order on merits subject to the Petitioner depositing the entire tax amount confirmed vide order dated 22.04.2024 from the Petitioner's Electronic Cash Register within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

Petition disposed off by way of remand.

Rejection of application filed under Section 161 of the respective GST enactments - rejection as the Petitioner’s application for rectification has not been found satisfactory to rectify the order - HELD THAT:- Following the consistent view taken by this Court under similar circumstances, liberty is given to the Petitioner to work out the remedy before the Appellate Authority subject to the Petitioner depositing 50% of the disputed tax in cash from the Petitioner's Electronic Cash Register within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order - In case the Petitioner complies with the above stipulations, the Appellate Authority shall proceed to pass a final order in appeal on merits without further reference to limitation. Subject to the Petitioner complying with the above stipulations, the attachment of the bank account of the Petitioner shall also stand automatically vacated. All recovery proceedings shall be kept in abeyance.

The petition is disposed off.

Profiteering - benefit of input tax credit not passed on through commensurate reduction in price - contravention of Section 171 of the CGST Act, 2017 - HELD THAT:- Profiteering to the quantified extent of Rs. 1,00,67,677/- (comprising base amount Rs. 89,88,997/- plus GST Rs. 10,78,680/-) did arise from the Respondent's pricing structure in the post-GST period due to the increase in the ITC ratio of 0.43 percentage points.

The Respondent has voluntarily and unambiguously acknowledged the said profiteering and has explicitly agreed to pass on the benefit to the respective homebuyers as mentioned in the DGAP Report - The Respondent undertakes to pass on the said benefit to all eligible 340 home buyers in proportion to their respective unit areas, as detailed in the DGAP Report.

The Respondent shall pay interest on the profiteered amount in terms of Rule 133(3)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, as applicable to each eligible home buyer.

The investigation report dated 23.09.2025 submitted by the Director General of Anti-Profiteering is hereby accepted. The proceedings relating to the complaints of Shri Binod Kumar Gupta (Applicant No. 1) and Shri Achal Desai (Applicant No. 2) against Ms. Transcon Sheth Creators Pvt. Ltd. (Respondent) are hereby closed, with a finding that the Respondent has agreed to refund the profiteered amount to the applicant and promised to discharge the statutory mandate of Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 in respect of the sale of residential units in the Auris Serenity Tower-2 project, Malad West, Mumbai, through its acceptance of the DGAP's findings. Further, the Respondent agreed to comply with the DGAP’s report by refunding the profiteered amount to all 340 home buyers - The Respondent is hereby directed to refund the profiteered amount of Rs. 1,00,67,677/- along with applicable interest to all the eligible 340 home buyers in accordance with the buyer-wise calculations.

Application disposed off.

Non-grant of credit of Tax Deducted at Source by the Kingfisher Airlines -- liability where deductor fails to deposit TDS - refund of amounts recovered and interest u/s 244(1) and Section 244(1A) - maintainability of writ petition in High Court on territorial grounds -

Appeal maintainability on the ground of territorial jurisdiction - HELD THAT:- When the assessee had filed return for the Assessment Year (2012-13), admittedly, the petitioner's assessing authority was at Delhi.That apart the day when the petition came to be filed, the Assessing Authority of the petitioner was at Delhi. Merely because subsequently, it has changed to Bangalore, he cannot be non-suited on the ground of territorial jurisdiction.

Credit for Tax Deducted at Source by a third-party deductor - intimation under Section 143(1) disallowing TDS credit and consequent recovery from the assessee - We are of the view that the respondent could perhaps been justified in disallowing the amount of TDS which was collected by Kingfisher Airlines from the petitioner's salary, as the same was not deposited by said deductor but the petitioner cannot be blamed for that and deprived of his legitimate right, as has been held by this Court in its judgment Satwant Singh Sanghera [2024 (10) TMI 762 - DELHI HIGH COURT]

Writ petition allowed and quash and set aside the intimation dated 07.06.2013 to the extent it relates to the non-grant of credit of Tax Deducted at Source by the Kingfisher Airlines. The consequential demand notice and the recovery made from petitioner’s refund is also declared illegal. The respondent is directed to refund the amount recovered from the petitioner along with applicable interest under Section 244(1) and 244(1) (A) of the Act of 1961, within a period of three months from today. It shall be required of the respondent to ensure that the applicable amount is paid to the petitioner.

Validity of order passed u/s 144C - objection filed by the petitioner before the DRP ignored - HELD THAT:- We feel that the consequence of such breach on the part of the petitioner to comply with Section 144C(2)(b) has resulted in adverse consequence to it inasmuch as a demand has been raised without the objection filed by the petitioner before the DRP being considered.

The scheme of Section 144C of the Act of 1961 provides that once the draft order is prepared by the Faceless Assessment Officer (FAO), the petitioner has a right to file objection, which shall be considered by the DRP. The objection filed by the assessee are supposed to be considered by the DRP on the one hand and requires the FAO to keep the proceedings in abeyance and await the order of DRP.

The provision takes care of the natural justice aspect and provides automatic deferral of the assessment proceedings. But the manner in which the provision has been enacted, may give rise to a confusion in the mind of an assessee, more particularly in the era of e-filing, when the assessments are faceless assessments and in case of failure of the assessee to send copy of the objections, drawing of an inference by the FAO that the objections have not been filed. The consequence of not sending a copy to the Assessing Officer, who too is unknown (faceless) cannot and should not be so drastic.

Certificate u/s 197 - tax deduction at source u/s 195 - Permanent Establishment - Legality of the certificate directing deduction of tax at 10% under Section 197 and the duty of the competent officer - power of attorney has been given to a person residing in India

HELD THAT:- Dealing with the argument about the person filing the forms and signing the writ petition on petitioner’s behalf, we are of the view that simply because a power of attorney has been given to a person residing in India and because all the required formations are done by such person, a company incorporated in Ireland or in any other country outside India, cannot be held to be a company resident in India within the meaning of Section 6(3) of the Act of 1961. For such purpose, one has to see the statutory provisions and according to which, the mandatory requirement is, that entire business of such company should be managed/controlled in India. Neither any finding has been recorded by the competent officer nor does it emanate from the record produced before us, that the petitioner company is resident in India or is having a PE in India.

The mere fact that Form 13 and 10F have been filed by Mr. Himank Bhatia-a resident of India (admittedly having a Power of Attorney in his favour), makes hardly any difference to petitioner’s right to get a certificate of nil rate. The petitioner can neither be non-suited on such flimsy grounds nor can it be held as a company incorporated or situated in India.

The officer has failed to discharge his statutory duties, envisaged under Section 197 of the Act of 1961. Mere use of expression ‘may’ given under Section 197 of the Act or purported discretion, the competent officer cannot be allowed to take whatever view he wishes to take. “Not to follow the binding precedents of the High Court cannot be countenanced in any manner and such approach renders the order a nullity”.

The present authority and the authorities dealing with the application under Section 197 of the Act of 1961 are supposed to adopt a pragmatic and justice oriented approach-they should decide the applications in accordance with law, rather than being guided by the Revenue which they might generate, if the certificate(s) are issued at 10% rate or rate higher than ‘nil’ rate of tax.

Such approach of the authorities hit at the very root of the business environment and the very idea of providing ease of doing business. Such orders restrict, rather constrict free flow of trade within the country so also discourages foreign entities from doing business in India. It also creates environment unconducive to trade & industry and in turn hinders the economic growth of the country.

Thus, the impugned order dated 26.09.2025 is liable to be quashed and set aside which we hereby do. While doing so, we were thinking of imposing cost upon the author of the order, but refrained from doing so, as the order on ultimate analysis is found to be arbitrary but not malafide.

The petition is, therefore, allowed.

Revision u/s 263 - violation of the provisions of Section 144(C) of the IT Act of failure to pass the draft assessment order - PCIT has set aside the final Assessment Order passed u/s 143(3) r/w Section 144C and 144B by making specific observations by issuing a direction to the assessing Officer “to pass fresh assessment order, de novo, after taking into consideration the issue as may have been already considered together with the issue discussed hereinabove” - HELD THAT:- When the petitioner-company did not chose to file application with DRP a final Assessment Order was passed on 29.10.2021.Hence, the assessment which got crystalised on 29.10.2021, was resurrected in revisional proceedings under the provisions of Section 263.

Thus, the Final Assessment Order dated 29.10.2021, which emerged from the reference made by the TPO and passing of the draft Assessment Order u/s144C of the IT Act, gets encompassed in the order dated 24.03.2024 passed under the provisions of Section 263 in view of the specific directions issued by the PCIT, to pass a fresh Assessment Order de novo, while taking into consideration all the issues which already considered earlier with the issues discussed in the said order.

Thus, in our considered opinion the appropriate course which ought to have been adopted by the Assessing Officer was to fall back to the stage of the order dated 26.07.2021 passed by the TPO suggesting upward adjustment of Rs. 94,88,151/. The draft Assessment Order dated 20.09.2021 culminated into final Assessment Order passed on 29.10.2021, which was subject matter of revision. Hence, it was not open for the Assessing Officer to directly pass an order on 26.03.2025 under the provisions of Section 143, read with Section 263 read with Section 144B of the IT Act, while ignoring the provisions of Section 144C of the IT Act, more particularly, in wake of the draft assessment order on 20.09.2021 and final assessment order dated 29.10.2021.

Validity of reopening of assessment on period of limitation - Computation of six assessment years and ten assessment years u/s 153A -limitation for reopening assessment - Time limit for notice as per old regime - scope of new regime - as submitted that as per clause (b) to sub-section (1) of Section 149 the period of ten years, in a case where the escaped income is more than Rs. 50 lakhs, would begin after ten years have lapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year

HELD THAT:- Statute prescribes different modes of computation for six years and ten years. We reiterate that the provisions of Section 153A(1) (b) of the Act stipulate that the Assessing Officer shall assess or reassess the total income of six years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search is conducted.

Ten assessment year period, consequently, is to be reckoned from the end of the assessment year pertaining to the previous year in which the search was conducted, as distinct from the preceding year which is spoken of in the case of the six relevant assessment years. Thus, the contention with regard to the computation of six years as well as ten years under the provisions of Section 153A of the Act has already been gone into by the Delhi High Court as well as the Madras High Court, and we have no convincing reason to take a divergent view from the view expressed hereinabove. Applying the aforesaid computation to the facts of the present case, taking the date of the search as 09.05.2024 during the Financial Year 2024-25, the Assessment Year 2025-26 will become the first assessment year and, in the same manner, the Assessment Year 2016-17 will become the tenth assessment year.

Thus, the year under consideration, namely, Assessment Year 2015- 16, for which the impugned notice has been issued under Section 148 of the Act, would fall beyond the period of ten years prescribed under the statute as it stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021, and hence, on this count, the impugned notice can be said to be barred by limitation.

The impugned notice issued u/s 148 by the respondent – Department seeking to reopen the income-tax assessment of the petitioner for the respective assessment year is hereby quashed and set aside. Assessee appeal allowed.

International transaction- TP Adjustment - correct construction and application of section 92B(1) and 92B(2) - substance over form - whether the business transfer/divestment of India’s support services business by the assessee (a resident company) to Lionheart (also a resident company), both being domestic associated enterprises, can at all be brought within Chapter X by treating it as an “international transaction”, including as a “deemed international transaction” u/s 92B(2)? - HELD THAT:- In the present case, it is not even the Revenue’s case that the assessee entered into the Business Transfer Agreement with a third party (a “person other than an associated enterprise”). On the contrary, the DRP itself proceeds on the footing that the assessee and Lionheart are AEs, and the transaction is the divestment by the assessee to Lionheart.

Once the transaction is between two AEs, the statutory gateway of section 92B(2) is not crossed, as held in Reach Data [2019 (10) TMI 1547 - ITAT MUMBAI].

DRP holds that because of the group reorganization and the alleged prior agreement involving non-resident group entities, “Lionheart [is] effectively a “person other than an AE” in substance for 92B(2) purposes ”, and it invokes “substance over form”.

DRP states that Reach Data is distinguishable because there was “no evidence of prior non-resident AE influence” in that case. This distinction does not hold in law, because the decisive ratio in Reach Data is not founded on absence or presence of influence. It rests on the statutory prerequisite that section 92B(2) “presupposes a transaction… with a person other than an associated enterprise” and that where the transaction is “between two AEs”, the prerequisite is not satisfied. Hence, the DRP”s attempt to keep Reach Data out on facts does not address the governing legal test.

For the aforesaid reasons, section 92B(2) has no application to the present transaction. Consequently, the transaction between the assessee and Lionheart, being a transaction between two resident associated enterprises, cannot be deemed to be an international transaction. Appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.

Addition u/s 40A(3) - freight payment exceeding to ₹35,000/- to a single transporter in a single day - CIT (A) deleted the addition - HELD THAT:- We note that AO extracted the statement recorded u/s 131 of the Act in which it was accepted by the assessee that the freight charges were paid in cash at the factory premises and these were normally paid to the drivers. We have also examined the individual transporter account which are impounded during the course of survey and find that in none of the cases, the payment exceeding ₹35,000/- was made in cash to the single driver. We note that even the assessee has filed an affidavit of director of M/s PISM Logistic Pvt. Ltd. and is engaged in the business of facilitating the transportation services by getting consignments with the independent truck drivers and owners for the transportation of goods who affirmed on oath that his role is limited to co-ordinating and facilitating the truck drivers/ owners available for transportation of raw material to the premises of the assessee on payment basis. The said person stated that he did not receive any freight payment from the assessee instead the assessee made direct payments to the respective truck drivers.

AO has not appreciated the facts correctly on the basis of records available before him during the assessment proceedings, whereas the ld. CIT (A) has examined and correctly analyzed these papers/documents and recorded a very objective finding that payments to these truck drivers were not exceeding the limit as specified u/s 40A(3) - Decided in favour of assessee.

Cash transactions which were not recorded in the books of account - Addition made on the basis of messages retrieved from the mobile phone of the directors for which corresponding entries were not made in the books of account - CIT (A) deleted the addition - HELD THAT:- CIT (A) deleted the addition by noting that the cash payment for Pasta machine was based on unverified and unauthenticated media messages for which the ld. AO has not conduct any enquiry from the recipient even and no incriminating material was seized during the course of survey. CIT (A) also noted that the ld. AO has not rejected the books of accounts u/s 145(3) of the Act, nor any defect or deficiency was pointed out. In our opinion, the ld. CIT (A) has correctly deleted the addition as no addition can be made on the basis of statement when there was no corroboration of the same and the ld. AO has not conducted any further enquiry. Decided in favour of assessee.

Validity of proceedings u/s 153C - period of limitation - timing of handing over seized materials - materials in the form of soft copy of WhatsApp Chats were supplied by the Ld. AO of the searched person to the Ld. AO of the assessee - HELD THAT:- As perused the provisions of Section 153C(3) of the Act which provides that nothing contained in this section shall apply in relation to search initiated u/s 132 of the Act or books of account, other documents or any assets requisitioned u/s 132A of the Act on or after 1st April, 2021.

Therefore, the date of search on the assessee for the purpose of Section 153C of the Act is the date when the materials in the form of soft copy of WhatsApp Chats were supplied by the Ld. AO of the searched person to the Ld. AO of the assessee i.e. on 26.09.2022.

Therefore, the notice issued u/s 153C of the Act dated 13.12.2022, as well as the assessment framed u/s 153C of the Act dated 20.03.2023, are invalid and nullity. The case of the assessee find support from the decisions of Shalimar Town Planners (P.) Ltd. [2024 (3) TMI 1331 - SC ORDER] and in case of Jasjit Singh [2023 (10) TMI 572 - SUPREME COURT] - Similarly, in case of Harigovind [2025 (11) TMI 103 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] has decided the issue in favour of the assessee.

Thus we are inclined to quash the notice issued u/s 153C. Decided in favour of assessee.

Validity of reassessment proceedings - reasons to believe - additions u/s 68 (unsecured loans) and disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia)- As alleged reasons for which the reassessment proceedings have been initiated are on the issues which already stood examined by the AO during the course of first round of assessment proceedings u/s.143(3) of the Act and there being no new tangible material found against the assessee

HELD THAT:- Issue of unsecured loans was well taken up by the AO during the course of assessment proceedings u/s.143(3) of the Act and the same has been examined from each and every angle to which the assessee in order to explain the nature has furnished available details including PAN, Address, Confirmations, 7/12 extract and also bank details through which loans were received. Regarding genuineness of the transactions assessee stated that the alleged loans were mainly taken from the relatives. Now on due consideration of all these details ld. AO has accepted the submissions of the assessee and did not made any addition u/s. 68.

Now at the time of issuing notice u/s. 148 of AO had no new tangible material which has been independently procured or any other information which was not submitted by the assessee during the course of assessment proceedings along with return of income. It is a clear case of change of opinion and rather reviewing of its own order because the very same details have been again considered by the Assessing Officer for issuing notice u/s. 148 of the Act.

Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act the same pertains to interest paid to Tata Motors Finance Ltd. which is a Non Banking Financial institution for non deduction of tax at source on the vehicle loan interest of ₹1,36,378. This issue was also specifically raised by the Assessing Officer and the assessee furnished the details of TDS deducted by the assessee along with copies of TDS returns, proof of payment of challans, expenditure has been duly shown in the Tax Audit Report and also the assessee has made the total payment of interest to the registered NBFC which is also subjected to income tax provisions and the payment of interest made by the assessee is to the account of Tata Motors Finance Ltd.

Reassessment proceedings in question before us are merely based on change of opinion and no new tangible material available with the Assessing Officer and in such situation law does not permit the Assessing Officer to revisit the assessee with the reassessment proceedings on the issues which already stands examined. We therefore set aside the finding of CIT(A) and quash the reassessment order as untenable and bad in law.

Addition u/s 68 to be deleted as unsecured loans, it has been contended that the same has been taken from the relatives of the assessee who are having source of income from Agriculture and 7/12 extract of the lands owning agricultural land has been placed on record. Payments received through banking channel and that cash creditors have accepted that they have given the unsecured loans to the assessee and they are regularly assessed to tax, filed copy of PAN details and also furnished confirmation letters. All these evidences clearly indicate that the assessee has successfully explained the nature and source of the alleged sum and also discharged the primary onus casted upon her.

Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) interest has been paid by the assessee on the vehicle loan to Tata Motors Finance Ltd. which is an NBFC. Payments have been in the form of Easy Monthly Instalments and the assessee has to either give the post dated cheques or the instructions are given to the bank for debiting the EMI from payments and no possibility for the small assessee’s to deduct the tax at source from the NBFC having huge business. However, the assessee has already requested for Form No.27BA from the Tata Motor Finance Ltd. for the confirmation that the interest payment has been made by the assessee to Tata Motors Finance Ltd. and which has been included in the revenue of Tata Motors Finance Ltd. and income has been offered to tax. Therefore, the issue deserves to be restored to the file of ld. Jurisdictional Assessing Officer for necessary examination of this detail and the assessee shall furnish Form No.27BA.

Addition u/s 68 - unexplained cash credit - burden to establish identity, genuineness and creditworthiness - Sale of investments accepted in earlier assessment years - consistency in treatment of investments

HELD THAT:- Investments/ shares were held by the assessee company since earlier years and we note that the assessee company has purchased these shares during the F.Y. 2011-12 and these investments were duly reflected in the balance sheet as on 31.03.2012. The case of the assessee was selected for scrutiny assessment and these investments comprising 6700/- shares of Nihon Impex P. Ltd. and 9220/- shares of Sonali Suppliers P. Ltd. were accepted in the assessment framed u/s 143(3) of the Act.

Therefore, once the investments were accepted in the earlier years by the department how the same could be doubted during the year when these were sold. The case of the assessee is squarely covered in case of Tulsyan and Sons (P.) Ltd.[2025 (4) TMI 1696 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] - Decided in favour of assessee.

Assessee in default u/s 201(1) r.w.s 201(1A) - non deduction of TDS on rental expenses and legal and consultation fees - DR submitted that as per the provisions of section 194I and 194J assessee was required to deduct the TDS at the time of credit of the amount in the books of accounts or at the time of payment, whichever was earlier - HELD THAT:- No such evidence was brought on record by the assessee that the recipients of rent and legal and consultation fees had filed their return of income, had taken the amount received from the assessee in computation of their income and also paid tax thereon. The assessee has also not brought on record any declaration by the recipients of rental income and legal & consultation fees that their income was below the taxable limit and no TDS was required to be made by the assessee in this respect. The assessee being a bank and having advice of technical experts, can’t take a plea that it was unaware of the obligation under the Act to deduct TDS at the time of making provision. Since the conditions as stipulated in the proviso to section 201 of the Act was not found fulfilled in the present case, the TDS Assessing officer had rightly treated the assessee as “assessee in default”.

Rental expenses the assessee has admitted that the assessee had made only provision of expense and the amount was not credited to parties account due to disputes. The provision was made in the F.Y.2012-13 whereas the TDS AO had initiated the proceeding in the F.Y. 2018-19, still the assessee had not explained about the status of the provision or resolution of the dispute after six years. The rent must have been paid or provided as per agreement and nothing prevented the assessee to deduct the TDS on the provision for rent as made in the accounts. Therefore, the explanation of the assessee is not found satisfactory and we do not find any reason to interfere with the order of the TDS Assessing Officer in respect of default pertaining to non-deduction of TDS on rental income.

TDS on legal fee, as submitted that the total provision was Rs. 6,53,000/- out of which payment of Rs. 3,91,000/- was made on 24.08.2013, before due date of filing of return, on which TDS was duly deducted and only on balance amount of Rs. 2,62,000/- no TDS was made. We deem it proper to set aside the matter to the TDS AO with a direction to verify whether TDS was made on payment of provision of Rs. 3,91,000/- on 24.08.2013. If yes, then the assessee can’t be treated as “assessee in default” for the TDS liability on this amount and accordingly relief should be allowed to the assessee u/s 201(1)/201(1A) of the Act.

Appeal of the assessee is partly allowed for statistical purpose.

Jurisdiction to Transfer the Case - Validity of order u/s 127 - validity of order passed by the non jurisdictional income tax authority - HELD THAT:- Provisions of section 124(3) could not have applied in the case where the AO did not have jurisdiction over the cases of the assessee, therefore, there is no question in raising any objection before him. As further held that provision of section 124 would come into play only when there was a direction or order issued u/s.127(2) of the Act and AO has been vested with the jurisdiction over the assessee.

In the case before us since the PCIT-10, Delhi was holding charge of non corporate assessee lacked inherent jurisdiction to transfer a corporate assessee from one range to another range and in such circumstances the question of assessee objecting to the jurisdiction of the AO u/s 124(3) will not arise especially when the revenue failed to communicate the order passed u/s.127 of the Act to the assessee until the proceedings commenced before the Tribunal, and on direction of the Tribunal the said order u/s. 127 was communicated to the Assessee.

Thus, PCIT, Delhi-10 has no jurisdiction over the assessee who is a corporate entity to transfer the case of the assessee from one AO to another AO as the Ld. PCIT, Delhi-10 had lacked inherent jurisdiction making the order u/s.127 as bad in law, void ab initio and consequentially all other proceedings including the final assessment order dated 29.10.2024 passed u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 144C (13) pursuant to the order passed u/s.127 by the PCIT, Delhi-10 are without jurisdiction bad in law and are a nullity in the eyes of law and thus they are hereby quashed and the additional ground raised by the assessee is allowed.

Unexplained cash credit u/s 68 - cash gifts received from donors - as submitted said donor has sufficient resources as he was having manufacturing business as well acting as director/ partners in many firms and companies - CIT(A) deleted addition - HELD THAT:- CIT (A) concluded that the donors had made the gift of money which were out of explained sources as these were fully shown in their books of accounts. It was also noted that the donors were the persons of sufficient means.

CIT(A) while allowing the appeal of the assessee relied on the decisions of Sanjeev Jain [2023 (2) TMI 1373 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] and Sharon Agarwal [2023 (5) TMI 1478 - ITAT DELHI] and Sheela Yogi [2021 (2) TMI 221 - ITAT JAIPUR]. Finally, CIT(A) deleted the addition by recording a finding a fact that the gifts were corroborated by the sources of income in the hands of the donors and therefore, assessee has fully discharged the onus of proving the three limbs of section 68 of the Act i.e. identity, genuineness and creditworthiness of the donors.

CIT (A) noted that the gifts received from the relatives {as defined u/s 56(2)(vii) of the Act} are not taxable in the hands of the assessee u/s 56(2)(vii) of the Act and accordingly, deleted the addition. Appeal of the revenue is dismissed.

Penalty u/s 271AAA - assessee during the course of search admitted to undisclosed income and specified manner in which the income was derived and the assessee proved the manner in which the undisclosed income was derived and paid the taxes there on together with interest while filing the return of income - HELD THAT:- We have perused the documents furnished by the assessee in the paper book and find that the assessee has stated the manner of earning such income and the source from which the said income was earned and duly paid taxes thereon, which has been acknowledged by the ld. AO in the assessment order as well as by the ld. CIT (A) in the appellate order. Therefore, all the three criteria as envisaged u/s 271AAA(2) of the Act are satisfied and therefore, no penalty is imposable u/s 271AAA of the Act. The case of the assessee is squarely covered by the decision in case of SPS Steel & Power Ltd.[2015 (7) TMI 490 - ITAT KOLKATA].

Similarly, in the case of Pramod Kumar Jain [2012 (12) TMI 629 - ITAT CUTTACK] it has been held that where the disclosure made u/s 132(4) of the Act is included in the return of income and taxes are paid, penalty is not leviable u/s 271AAA of the Act. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.

Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - addition u/s 68 as unexplained cash credits - scope of expression “sought to be evaded” -concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars - HELD THAT:- If the addition made by the ld. AR for the second time u/s 68 of the Act is reduced from the total income then there was no difference between the returned income and assessed income and the tax sought to be evaded would be nil. Thus, the penalty is not leviable under section 271(1)(c) of the Act by virtue of Explanation 4 to Section 271(1)(c) of the Act. Besides, we have noted that the assessee has not furnished inaccurate particulars of income as the sales were fully disclosed in the audited books of account, which was not in dispute and therefore in such scenario no penalty is leviable as has been levied in the case of CIT vs. Reliance Petroproducts (P.) Ltd.[2010 (3) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT] - Decided in favour of assessee.

Provisional release of imported goods - modification of conditions for provisional release - onerous conditions - equality of treatment and precedent - security by bond instead of bank guarantee - cooperation with investigation by DRI and Customs - HELD THAT:- This Court had an occasion to deal with a similar matter involving an identical case. In that case as well, a provisional release order was challenged since the conditions imposed for provisional release were onerous in nature similar to the one passed in the impugned order. The order passed by this Court in the case of M/s. Shree Sai Impex vs. The Principal Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) and another [2025 (9) TMI 1172 - MADRAS HIGH COURT], involving an identical matter, has also been placed on record by the petitioner.

Accordingly, a similar order is passed in favour of the petitioner as well by modifying the impugned order, imposing the following conditions;

a) The petitioner is directed to remit the entire duty as declared by them.

b) The petitioner is directed to pay 50% of the differential duty for the total value arrived at by the Department.

c) The petitioner shall execute a bond for a sum of Rs. 71,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy One Lakhs only) and

d) The petitioner shall also execute a bond for a sum of Rs. 29,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Nine Lakhs only) instead of Bank Guarantee. On compliance, the goods shall be released by the respondents within a period of seven days from the date of compliance of the conditions.

On fulfilment of the aforesaid conditions by the petitioner, the respondents shall provisionally release the goods to the petitioner.

Liability to pay customs duty under Special Advance Authorization - differential duty based on Minimum Import Price - Non-speaking order - remand for fresh consideration with opportunity of personal hearing - Notification No.77/2023 - Customs Notification dated 01.04.2023 - Waiver of detention/demurrage - HELD THAT:- Being goods imported under Special Advance Authorization, necessarily, the contentions of the petitioner that they are not liable to pay customs duty ought to have been considered by the first respondent before passing the impugned order-in-original. The petitioner has also relied upon a Customs Notification before this Court to substantiate their claim that the petitioner is not liable to pay customs duty since the petitioner has obtained Special Advance Authorization and the said Notification is dated 01.04.2023.

Since the impugned order-in-original is not a speaking order, with regard to the contentions of the petitioner raised in this Writ Petition, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order-in-original has to be quashed and the matter be remanded back to the very same respondent for fresh consideration after providing an opportunity to the petitioner to submit their explanation once again to the respondents as raised in this Writ Petition that they are not liable to pay any customs duty in view of the fact that they have already obtained the Special Advance Authorization for the subject goods. Necessarily, the respondents will have to consider the said explanation on merits and in accordance with law after providing an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner as per the Notification issued by the Customs Department within a time frame to be fixed by this Court.

Considering the fact that the petitioner has been unable to seek release of the goods for a long period of time and in view of the categorical contention of the petitioner before this Court that they are not liable to pay customs duty for the subject goods, this Court deems it fit to direct the respondents to pass final orders within a period of four (4) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioner, on instructions, would submit that the petitioner would be satisfied if one opportunity of personal hearing alone is given by the respondents before passing final order.

For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order-in-original dated 30.10.2024, which is a non-speaking order, is hereby quashed and the matter is remanded to the very same respondent for fresh consideration on merits and in accordance with law.

In case the petitioner succeeds, the respondents shall also consider the request of the petitioner for waiver of the detention / demurrage charges, in accordance with law.

Writ Petition is disposed of.

Cancellation of anticipatory bail - large-scale gold smuggling - Exercise of judicial discretion - Quashing and remand for fresh hearing - Interference with order of Additional Sessions Judge - HELD THAT:- Considering the gravity of the offense and the allegations leveled against the respondent no. 1-accused, it deems fit to this Court to exercise discretion in favour of the applicant.

Consequentially, the present application is hereby allowed and the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in Criminal Misc. Application is hereby quashed and set aside. The learned Additional Sessions Judge is requested to hear the said bail application afresh by considering the objections filed by the applicant and also, after giving opportunity to either sides to make fresh and/or additional submissions, if required and if it deems fit, at the time of hearing of the bail application.

Thus, the matter is hereby remanded back in view of the above terms.

Validity Of Imposition of condition of “Minimum Import Price” for Black Pepper, Areca-nuts, Apples, in purported exercise of power under Section 3 of Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 ('FTDR' Act) - non-compliance of sub-section (3) to Section 19 - Laying of delegated legislation before Parliament - Substance over form in validity of subordinate legislation -Judicial review of subordinate legislation - Ministerial publication by DGFT and exercise of Central Government power - HELD THAT:- Importantly, Section 3 of FTDR Act expressly provides that the Central Government may make provision for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise regulating import or export of goods or services. Impugned notification even if assumed to prohibit Black Pepper with a Minimum Import Price of less than Rs. 500, power to impose/issue such prohibitory condition/restriction is traceable to subsection (2) to Section 3.

We see no reason why the principle laid therein that validity ought to be decided not on the basis of nomenclature but by looking to the substance and effect, would not apply while examining a challenge to the vires of the subordinate legislation. Applying the above reasoning it would be clear that the impugned instrument though titled “notification” is in substance, restriction imposed on import on the basis of Minimum Import Price, thus traceable to sub-section (2) to Section 3 of FTDR Act. We thus find challenge on the ground that nomenclature is not in conformity with sub-section (2) to section 3 of FTDR Act is devoid of merit.

It is evident that the laying clause in subsection (3) to section 19 of the FTDR Act is directory and not mandatory. The contention of the petitioners that non-compliance with the laying clause would prove fatal to its validity is thus, liable to be rejected.

The impugned notification / order issued by the Central Government are valid, notwithstanding failure to comply with the laying cause in terms of Section 19(3) of the FTDR Act. If the impugned notifications are still in vogue and if the laying clause has not been complied with till date, the Central Government shall now place the impugned notification before each House of Parliament the impugned order / notification at the earliest.

In view of the fact that the impugned notifications have been upheld, wherever, the challenge is to the notice, the petitioners are at liberty to file their objections within a period of two (2) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and if any such reply is filed, the same shall be considered and appropriate orders shall be passed in accordance with law, after affording the petitioners an opportunity of hearing.

Writ Petitions are disposed of on the above terms.

Transaction value between related persons - burden of proof on the importer - Contemporaneous import comparison -examination of the circumstances of the sale to determine influence of relationship - acceptance or rejection of declared invoice value - objective satisfaction of the authority based on material on record - HELD THAT:- The Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 156 of the Customs Act 1962 read with Section 22 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and in supersession of the Customs Valuation Rules, 1963 has made the Customs Valuation (Determination of Price of Imported Goods) Rules, 1988, (‘Valuation Rules’). The transaction value in the case of related persons at the relevant time was governed by Rule 4(3) of the Valuation Rules.

Hence the value of such goods for the purposes of assessment was deemed to be the price at which such or like goods are ordinarily sold, or offered for sale, for delivery at the time and place of importation or exportation, as the case may be, in the course or international trade. Hence for the purpose of taxation what was important was not the actual prices at which the goods were sold but the price at which the goods were ordinarily sold. If there was a difference between the actual price at which the goods were sold and the ordinary price of the goods the value needed to be determined in terms of the Rule for the purpose of charging Customs levies.

As per Rule 4(3) the transaction value between related parties shall be accepted provided that the examination of the circumstances of the sale of the imported goods indicate that the relationship did not influence the price. It was for the importer to demonstrate that the declared value of the goods being valued, closely approximates to one of the following values ascertained at or about the same time.

The appellant was not able to show that after giving 20% discount the supplier was able to recover the cost of the goods. It appeared to the First Appellate Authority that the discount is being given to the appellant only because of the relationship.

The presumption in law and a matter of common knowledge is that every businessman will arrange his affairs in his best interest and try to work out the best price for himself. If the declared price does not contain an element pf profit then, even if the test for reasonability is that of the "prudent man", the value cannot be said to be the price at which such or like goods are ordinarily sold.

As stated above, Rule 3(b) also incorporates a legal requirement that the importer demonstrates that the declared value satisfies the Rule. The burden of proof is hence on the importer, which he has not discharged.

Rule 3(b) of the Valuation Rules clearly puts the burden to prove the value on the importer. Hence the judgments cited by the appellant which deal with the burden of proof being on the department are distinguished. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in MAHAKALI SUJATHA [2024 (11) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT] cited above, lends clarity to the legal issue.

Thus, we uphold the impugned order and reject and dispose of the appeal accordingly.

Provisional release of goods u/s 110A of the Customs Act - imports “coriander seeds” - procuring the coriander seeds from the domestic market rather than processing the imported coriander seeds under Customs Notification No. 21/2023-Cus - violation of actual user condition - Advance Authorization Scheme - Circular No. 35/2017-Customs - fulfilment the export obligation - HELD THAT:- Appellant has submitted that imported coriander are always processed in his factory and never sold in market and violation of actual user condition is attracted only when imported inputs are sold in domestic market. Hon’ble High court has permitted use of imported inputs imported under notifications issued under Advance Authorisation Scheme for manufacturing of finished goods which are sold in domestic market in some decided cases.

The issue is directly dealt with in decision in case of Commissioner of Customs, ICD vs. Navshakti Industries Pvt. Ltd. [2011 (5) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT], wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court modified the Hon’ble High Court’s Order and directed the respondents to furnish bank guarantee of 30% of the differential duty to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Customs for the release of goods in question.

Thus agree with the submissions of appellant that impugned order has demanded an excessive and disproportionate amount of bank guarantee for the provisional release of goods which stands in contradiction with the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court.

Therefore, the impugned order for provisional release under section 110A is modified - Appeal is partly allowed in above terms and impugned order is modified to the above extent.

Classification Of goods - imported aluminium tubes, aluminium pipes and aluminium profiles are classifiable under Customs Tariff Headings 7604, 7608 and 7616 Or under Heading 8708 as parts and accessories of motor vehicles - Specific tariff entry prevailing over generic entry - recovery of customs duty with interest - Application of Chapter and Section Notes (Chapter 76 and Section XVII Explanatory Notes) - Rule 1 of General Interpretative Rules (GIR) -Extended period of limitation - Penalties under sections 114A and 114AA - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the goods as imported are raw inputs of aluminium which are subjected to various processes by the appellant before they can be used in manufacturing the ECM, charge air cooler or condensers. The goods are raw materials which have wide application for manufacturing various types of products and are not limited to manufacture of radiators, charge air coolers or ECM. Hence, they cannot be considered as suitable for use solely and principally with motor vehicles. The goods are also specifically covered under CTH 7604, CTH 7608 and CTH 7616. They can be classified under Section XVII only if they are not more specifically covered elsewhere. Merely because the appellant used the said pipes, tubes and profiles in manufacturing parts of automobiles, it cannot be conclude that the tubes, pipes and profiles are for sole or principal use with motor vehicles.

The appellant would, therefore, clearly be entitled to claim the benefit of Notifications dated 31.12.2009 and 01.06.2011. From a reading of the Exemption Notifications, it is clear that in order to avail the exemption benefits, an importer needs to prove that the goods are covered by the serial numbers of Exemption Notifications and that imported goods originated from the countries mentioned. The goods have been imported from the Republic of Korea, Thailand. The country-of-origin certificate filed by the appellant specifically mentions the goods by their name, part number and concerned invoice number. The appellant is, therefore, clearly entitled to the benefit of the Exemption Notifications.

The present dispute pertains to classification of the goods and not of mis-declaration. Mis-classification does not amount to mis-representation as it is an issue relating to interpretation.

This apart, the issue regarding classification is covered by the decision of this Tribunal in Visteon Climate Systems India [2014 (5) TMI 1057 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] in the own case of the appellant. The appellant had also informed the department right from the audit stage. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellant suppressed any facts. Further, the Commissioner in the impugned order has set aside the proposal for confiscation of the goods under sections 111(m) and (o) of the Customs Act holding that the appellant had not suppressed any facts about the end use of the goods while making the declarations in the Bill of Entry.

It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellant had suppressed any material facts from the department with an intent to evade payment of duty. The extended period of limitation, therefore, could not have been invoked in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Penalties, therefore, under section 114AA and section 114A could also not have been imposed upon the appellant nor interest could have been demanded.

Confiscation - redemption fine - penalty for violation of import regulations - rejection by FSSAI - logged in report - clearance under Bill of Entry - negligence of customs officials - due process and natural justice

Rejection by FSSAI - logged in report - clearance under Bill of Entry - confiscation - redemption fine - Validity of confiscation of the imported goods and imposition of redemption fine when the FSSAI rejection report was on record and the goods were cleared under a proper Bill of Entry. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found on the record that the FSSAI rejection report had been received by Customs by e-mail on 17.02.2020 and was reflected in the Bill of Entry as "[LG]" (logged in). Despite that, Customs allowed the consignment to be cleared on 21.02.2020 after filing of the Bill of Entry and payment of duty; there was no provisional clearance, no bond, and no material to show mis-declaration by the importer. The goods were no longer in Customs custody at the time the Show Cause Notice was issued and were sold in the market. In these circumstances the Tribunal held that confiscation and the consequent redemption fine could not be sustained, because the clearance had been regular on the record and the Department had failed to take timely action despite having the rejection report.

Confiscation and redemption fine set aside.

Penalty for violation of import regulations - negligence of customs officials - due process and natural justice - Sustainability of the penalty imposed on the importer in light of departmental conduct and the procedural history. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that the customs records show the FSSAI report was available before clearance and that Customs nevertheless permitted clearance and then delayed action for about nine months until repeated reminders from FSSAI. The Tribunal characterised this as a serious lapse and negligence on the part of Customs rather than any established connivance or concealment by the importer. Given that the goods were cleared after proper Bill of Entry and duty payment, and that the Department slept over the matter, the Tribunal found no specific role of the importer in the alleged contravention and no justification for imposing the penalty.

Penalty imposed on the importer set aside; appeal allowed.

Final Conclusion: Impugned order set aside and appeal allowed; confiscation, redemption fine and penalty imposed on the importer are quashed and the appellant is entitled to consequential relief as per law.

Classification of exported goods under the Export Tariff - inapplicability of SubHeading Notes of the First Schedule to the Second Schedule - exclusive jurisdiction of DGFT to cancel MEIS scrips and determine entitlement under MEIS - recovery of export benefits by Customs under Section 28(4)/28AAA - invocation of extended period of limitation based on suppression or wilful misstatement - confiscation, redemption fine and penalties consequent to postexport reclassification

Classification of exported goods under the Export Tariff - inapplicability of SubHeading Notes of the First Schedule to the Second Schedule - Correct classification of the exported insecticide consignments and validity of reclassification by Customs based on SubHeading Note 2 to Chapter 38 of the First Schedule. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that classification for exports must be determined by reference to the Second Schedule (Export Tariff) and that only the General Rules for interpretation of the First Schedule and the Section and Chapter Notes have been made applicable to the Second Schedule; SubHeading Notes of the First Schedule are not made applicable for interpreting the Second Schedule. The Commissioner's reclassification of exported goods on the basis of SubHeading Note 2 to Chapter 38 of the First Schedule was therefore legally incorrect. The Tribunal further examined the HSN amendments of 2017 and the concordance table and found that the subject goods (mixtures/insecticides at issue) did not fall within the scope of the newly created subheadings intended for specified substances (antimalarial products); accordingly the exporters' declared classification under subheading 3808.91 was correct and the reclassification to subheadings 3808.61/3808.62/3808.69 was unsustainable. [Paras 8]

Reclassification by the Commissioner based on SubHeading Note 2 to the First Schedule was set aside and the exporters' classification under SubHeading 3808.91 upheld.

Exclusive jurisdiction of DGFT to cancel MEIS scrips and determine entitlement under MEIS - recovery of export benefits by Customs under Section 28(4)/28AAA - Whether Customs could deny MEIS benefits and recover alleged wrongly availed scrips when DGFT had not cancelled or invalidated the MEIS scrips. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal applied settled principles that entitlement to MEIS is governed by the Foreign Trade Policy and the DGFT (licensing authority) and that DGFT alone has the power and procedure to suspend or cancel licences/scrips under the FTDR Act and the Foreign Trade (Regulation) Rules. It followed earlier tribunal and High Court decisions (and noted the Supreme Court's dismissal in the companion matter) holding that customs authorities cannot go behind a valid instrument issued by DGFT nor withdraw MEIS benefits absent DGFT action. The Tribunal observed that the Customs Department had not shown DGFT had cancelled or invalidated the scrips and that Customs cannot, in effect, assume the role of DGFT to deprive exporters of MEIS entitlement; recovery under Section 28(4)/28AAA directed to recover customs duty does not empower Customs to annul DGFT grants of MEIS unless DGFT acts. [Paras 9, 12, 13, 14, 15]

Customs could not lawfully deny MEIS benefits or recover them in the absence of cancellation/invalidity of the scrips by DGFT; the Customs action in that regard was set aside.

Invocation of extended period of limitation based on suppression or wilful misstatement - confiscation, redemption fine and penalties consequent to postexport reclassification - Sustainability of invoking the extended period of limitation, and of confiscation, redemption fine and penalties imposed for alleged wilful misclassification and fraudulent exportation. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the department itself had taken divergent views on classification in earlier proceedings, and when divergent or bona fide doubts exist, charges of suppression or wilful misstatement cannot be sustained to invoke the extended limitation. Reliance was placed on coordinate tribunal precedents and judicial authority that extended limitation is not available where there was bona fide doubt or divergent departmental views. The Tribunal held that postexport confiscation and punitive measures premised on the incorrect reclassification and on alleged fraudulent misdeclaration were therefore unsustainable. In consequence, the extended period was wrongly invoked and the confiscation, redemption fine and penalties confirmed by the Commissioner could not stand. [Paras 9, 11, 16]

Extended limitation, confiscation, redemption fine and penalties were not sustainable and were set aside.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order of the Commissioner confirming reclassification, denying MEIS benefits and imposing recovery, confiscation, redemption fine and penalties is set aside. The appeal is allowed in favour of the appellant with consequential reliefs as per law.

Imports raw materials such as forged body, springs, bearing, pad stud and other components under ‘Advance Authorisation’ scheme of the Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) - Advance Authorisation Licenses/Scrips issued by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) - pre-import condition - availing the import duty/IGST exemption benefit vide Notification No.18/2015-Customs dated 01.04.2015 as amended - fulfilment of export obligation and Export Obligation Discharge Certificate (EODC) - redemption / cancellation of bond by Customs - levy of integrated goods and services tax (IGST) on imports under Advance Authorisation - imposition of interest, redemption fine and penalty - interpretation of Foreign Trade Policy and Handbook of Procedures - revenue neutrality of IGST demand - HELD THAT:- On perusal of the documents placed in the appeal records, the SCN was issued on the ground that there is no one to one correlation between the import of raw materials and its use in the final products exported, and there is no authentic verification available that the quantity of imported raw material was incorporated in the finished product that was exported by the appellants and such views were also accepted by the learned Commissioner at paragraph 5.9.1 of the impugned order. Therefore, the demand was confirmed on the basis of the conclusion arrived at by the adjudicating authority in the absence of fulfilment of mandatory ‘pre-import’ condition.

We are unable to agree with the learned adjudicating authority, that the conditions of the notification No.18/2015-Customs dated 01.04.2015 as amended including the ‘pre-import condition’ have not been fulfilled by the appellants. Further, it is not the case of the Revenue that they had produced any iota of proof, or any evidence in the form of document to prove that the conditions of notification have not been fulfilled by the appellants. Therefore, we find that the impugned order does not stand the legal scrutiny.

From the above, it clearly transpires that the amended provisions of sub-section (12) of Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, which enable imposition of interest, penalties etc. on the IGST levied in terms of sub-section (7) of Section 3 ibid, shall come into force w.e.f. 16.08.2024 and shall not be applicable during the disputed period in the present case i.e., 13.10.2017 to 09.01.2019, which is prior to the above said amendment. Therefore, we are of the considered view that levy of interest, redemption fine and penalty on the appellants in the present case of demand of IGST is not legally sustainable. Thus, we are of the view, that the impugned order in totality is liable to be dismissed, as it does not stand the legal scrutiny.

Thus, we do not find any merits in the impugned order, insofar as it has confirmed the adjudged demands towards IGST, interest on IGST duty demands and imposed redemption fine and penalty on the appellants. Therefore, the impugned order is set a side and the appeal is allowed in favour of the appellants.

Relevancy and admissibility of statements recorded u/s 108 - trading of imported furniture and parts thereof in the domestic market -Right to cross-examination u/s 138B - Mandatory procedure for admission of recorded statements -Admissibility of computer printouts and electronic evidence u/s 138C - Adjudication procedure and evidentiary filtering in administrative proceedings - Applicability of section 138B and section 138C - HELD THAT:- In the instant case, there is nothing on record to establish that the documents were provided by the person during the course of statement made under section 108 of the Customs Act by taking printouts as the statement records that the printouts were provided by the department to the appellants during the course of recording of the statement under section 108 of the Customs Act. In T.N. Malhotra [2024 (6) TMI 202 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] relied upon by the department, the printout of the email was taken by the appellants therein after getting the OTP on his mobile phone.

This apart, it transpires from the order that the printout of the email was taken after getting the OTP on the mobile phone. In the present case, the appellants had not obtained the print outs since the print outs were shown merely to the appellants.

The impugned order admits that no certificate was obtained from the persons who obtained the documents from the two laptops or the external hard disks, but the objective of the certificates have been complied with in the two Panchnamas and, therefore, the provisions of section 138(2) and 138(4) of the Customs Act stand complied with. As noted, the Panchnamas do not mention about the print outs having been taken.

It is also not clear from the evidence on record whether the print outs were taken from the two external hard disks referred to in the Panchnamas or from the laptops because there is nothing on record to indicate as to how the print outs were taken. Even in the statement dated May 09, 2017, Sachin Soni only stated that he had been shown the print outs. It was absolutely necessary for the Department to have established the manner and procedure by which the print outs were taken and also in whose presence the print outs were taken. The order does not mention that Sachin Soni had taken out the print outs from the laptops during the course of making the statement under section 108 of the Customs Act. The statement, which has been reproduced, only recites that some print outs were shown to him.

As noted, the Panchnamas do not record the taking of the print outs. The statement of the appellants under section 108 of the Customs Act does not state that the print outs of the emails were taken by them. The appellants only stated that the print outs were shown to them.

The print outs could not have been considered for the purposes of reaching a conclusion regarding undervaluation. Thus, in the absence of any certificate, the print outs could not have been relied upon.

In this view of the matter, it is not possible to sustain the order dated December 18, 2023 passed by the Principal Commissioner that rejects the declared value of the goods under rule 12 of the 2007 Valuation Rules and re-determines it under rule 3. Nor is it possible to sustain confirmation of demand of differential customs duty or to sustain the imposition of penalties upon the appellants.

The impugned order dated December 18, 2023, insofar as it concerns these four appeals, is set aside and all the four appeals are allowed.

Levy of interest on customs duty - failed to fulfill the conditions relating to the imports made under EPCG Licenses - time extension to comply with the export obligation - Interest on CVD and SAD not leviable - Appropriate rate of interest after amendment - Effect of amendment of statutory interest rate - Notification No.49/2000 - Notification No.113/2002 - HELD THAT:- We are of the view that the lower authorities did not consider the amended Notification No.113/2002 which was very much available as on the date of passing the Order-in-Original and hence, charging of interest at 24% is clearly without the authority of law. The same shall however, can only be 18% as prescribed in the later notification.

Insofar as interest on 4% SAD is concerned, the same is unsustainable in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of M/s. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. (Automotive Sector) [2022 (10) TMI 212 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] held that Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act is an independent Section providing for levy of CVD and SAD and the power to levy interest on such CVD/SAD has not been provided under the said provision, and hence, levy and collection of interest on CVD and SAD is not sustainable.

Resultantly, the impugned order cannot sustain which we hereby set aside and allow the Appeal with consequential benefits, if any, as per law.

Lapse of show cause notice for failure to adjudicate within prescribed period - retroactive application of procedural amendment - recovery of duties u/s 28 - re-assessment and self-assessment u/s 17 - admissibility of electronic records and compliance with Section 138C - penalty and confiscation for mis-declaration / fraud - availing wrongly benefit of Notification No. 46/2011-Cus dt. 01.06.2011 issued under Preferential Trade Agreement between the Governments of Member States of the ASEAN and the Republic of India by way of mis-declaring the country of origin -

Difference Of Opinion -two separate orders passed by two learned Members of the original Division Bench, has been placed before me to give my opinion as a Third Member. - Whether, these appeals should be allowed following the decision of Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in case of M/s Prabhat Fertilizers & Chemical Works [2020 (2) TMI 1443 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT] as held by Hon’ble Member (Judicial);

Whether the show cause notices issued on 07.10.2016 and adjudicated on 28.05.2019 shall stand vacated in terms of the explanation 4 to Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 or not?

Third Member : Hon’ble Mr. S. S. Garg, Member (Judicial) - HELD THAT:- The Member (Judicial) has relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of M/s Prabhat Fertilizers & Chemical Works [2020 (2) TMI 1443 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT] whereby the Hon’ble High Court quashed the show cause notice on the ground of non-adjudication within one year from 29.03.2018. Not satisfying with the decision of the Hon’ble High Court, the Department filed review petition CM No. 6352 of 2020 seeking recalling of the order dated 18.12.2019 on the ground of amended Explanation 4 of Section 28 of the Act. It is to be noted that the Hon’ble High Court, vide its order dated 27.07.2020, dismissed the review petition filed by the Department and clarified that amendment of Section 28(9) of the Act is not retrospective but retroactive and as per principles of retroactive, show cause notice issued prior to 29.03.2018 shall be deemed to be issued on 29.03.2018 and the Adjudicating Authority is bound to adjudicate the show cause notice within one year from 29.03.2018.

In the present case, show cause notice was issued on 07.10.2016 and as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble High Court in M/s Prabhat Fertilizers & Chemical Works (supra)‘s case, the said show cause notice should have been adjudicated by 29.03.2019, whereas the Adjudicating Authority adjudicated the said show cause notice on 28.05.2019, which is beyond the time as prescribed by the Hon’ble High Court.

The Member (Technical) has not considered the order dated 27.07.2020 of Hon’ble High Court passed in review petition in the case of M/s Prabhat Fertilizers & Chemical Works (supra) subsequent to amendment of Explanation 4.

Department challenged both the orders of the Hon’ble High Court, i.e. order passed in CWP and order passed in CM, before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court [2025 (2) TMI 642 - SC ORDER] vide its order dated has dismissed the SLP of the Department.

Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, I am of the considered opinion that the present case is squarely covered by the decision of Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of M/s Prabhat Fertilizers & Chemical Works; accordingly, by following the ratio of the above said decision, no hesitation but to hold that the view taken by the Member (Judicial) on the basis of the decision of Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of M/s Prabhat Fertilizers & Chemical Works (supra) is justified in law, therefore, affirm the same view. The view taken by the Member (Technical) is not in accordance with law as discussed above.

MAJORITY ORDER - In view of the Majority Decision, the appeals stand allowed.

PER: ASHOK JINDAL, Member (Judicial) [As held correct by Third Member] - HELD THAT:- As per the amended explanation to the explanation 4 to Section 28, the Revenue wants to save the show cause notices issued prior to 28.03.2018 to say that these show cause notices have no binding of explanation 4 to Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962, but the Hon’ble High Court has explained that “we are not holding that the explanation 4 to Section 28 of the Act is not retrospective but same is retroactive” which means all the show cause notices issued prior to 28.03.2018, are to be adjudicated within one year from 28.03.2018.

Admittedly, in the case in hand, the show cause notices issued prior to 28.03.2018 and the same have not been adjudicated within one year and no time limit for adjudication has been extended. Therefore, in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble High Court in the case of M/s Prabhat Fertilizers & Chemical Works [2020 (2) TMI 1443 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT], we hold that the impugned show cause notices stand vacated, therefore, the impugned order deserves to be set aside.

Classification of imported goods - Vitamin E 50% Feed Grade - Vitamin B2 80% Feed Grade - Vitamin C 35% Feed Grade - classifiable under CTH 2309 or under CTH 2936? - HELD THAT:- Hon’ble Supreme Court in its recent judgment in COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (IMPORT) Vs M/S WELKIN FOODS [2026 (1) TMI 348 - SUPREME COURT], had an occasion to examine the use of the ‘common parlance’ or ‘trade parlance’ test to interpret the meaning of words in the statutes and the consideration of ‘end use’ as a factor for determining classification. It also examined the role of Harmonised System Nomenclature (HSN), which comprises more than 5,000 commodity groups and is utilised by over 200 countries as a foundation for their Customs tariff in classification of goods and ensuring uniformity in customs procedures. The Apex Court held that [2026 (1) TMI 348 - SUPREME COURT]

It’s the appellants case that the imported goods are exclusively sold to animal feed traders, manufacturers, poultry rearers, and premix producers and as per the ‘Common Parlance Test’ or ‘Trade Parlance Test’, the impugned goods are classified as Animal Feed Supplements - Heading 23.09 deals with preparation of a kind used in animal feeding and Chapter 29.36 deals with provitamins and vitamins, natural or reproduced by synthesis, derivatives thereof used primarily as vitamins and intermixtures etc. Hence end use is a factor in the classification of the impugned goods and the tariff heading itself explicitly contains a reference to use or adaptation.

As stated by the Apex Court in WELKIN FOODS [2026 (1) TMI 348 - SUPREME COURT], the First Schedule of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, outlines the principles that govern the classification of goods under the schedule and are commonly referred to as the General Rules for Interpretation (GRI). GRI 1 is the fundamental rule for effectively navigating the Customs Tariff and the HSN. Hence only in the event that the goods cannot be classified solely on the basis of GIR 1, and if the headings and legal notes do not otherwise require, the remaining Rules 2 to 6 may then be applied in sequential order. Rule 1 of the GIR provides that the classification of goods shall be determined according to the terms of the headings of the tariff and any relative Section notes or Chapter notes.

Since, Chapter 23 also covers “Concentrates for compound animal feed”, it covers products other than that which are ready to use by animals. It is not disputed by revenue that the goods are chemicals which can be used, in the preparation of animal feed. A better understanding of the scope of the Heading could be had by examining the HSN Notes for the Heading. However, this can be done in restrictive circumstances as stated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in WELKIN FOODS. Para 38 of the judgment, which is reproduced above, states that if the headings/entries in the First Schedule to the Act of 1985 are different from the headings/entries in the HSN or if they are not fully aligned, reliance cannot be placed upon the HSN for the purpose of classifying those goods under the Act of 1985.

It is also found that a Coordinate Bench of this Tribunal in the case of B.V. Bio Corp Private Limited, Venkateshwara B.V. Bio Corp Private Limited (Formerly B.V. Bio Corp Private Limited) Versus Commissioner of Customs (NS-I) Maharashtra [2024 (4) TMI 1173 - CESTAT MUMBAI], examined the classification of various imported goods which contained vitamins and pro-vitamins at varying percentages varying from 2.7% to 100%. In that case although Test Reports were available the reports did not conclusively state whether the goods were ‘separate chemically defined organic compounds’ for classification under Chapter 29 or whether these are ‘preparations of a kind used in animal feeding’ for classification under Chapter 23.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.V. Bio Corp. Pvt. Ltd. Vs Commissioner [2024 (4) TMI 1173 - CESTAT MUMBAI], affirmed the Order of the Tribunal and held that the impugned goods, being animal feed preparations, had been rightly classified under Tariff Item 2309 9090 in light of the guidance provided under Circular No. 188/22/96-CX, dated 26-03-1996.

Appeal disposed off.

Liability for short-levied customs duty arising from CHA's substitution and misappropriation - Deemed payment by tender of demand draft - Liability of Customs House Agent as importer - Bona fide payment - Wilful suppression for penalty - Misappropriation by clearing agent - Consequence of forged or fake Bills of Entry - MODVAT/central excise credit claim - Supervision of bonded procedures - HELD THAT:- We find that Bangalore Bench of Tribunal dealt with an identical set of facts in the case of Hetero Drugs Ltd. Vs Commissioner of Customs (Airport) Chennai [2003 (12) TMI 190 - CESTAT, BANGALORE].

The claim of the 1st Appellant that it had given Demand Drafts for payment of Customs duty to their CHA in the name of “Collector of Customs A/c Vera Laboratories” remains uncontroverted and hence, when payment is apparently made by the Importer/1st Appellant by giving Demand Drafts to their CHA for a bonafide reason of them to not having any deposit account in their own name, the allegation as to the intention to evade duty perhaps may not be correct. We say so because in response to the SCN, the State Bank of Hyderabad, Industrial Branch, Hyderabad had issued a certificate to the effect that they had issued a Demand Draft for Rs.31,86,154/- favouring the “Collector of Customs, Madras A/c. Vera Laboratories Ltd., Hyderabad” at their service branch, which document is also placed at page 118 of the Appeal Memo before us along with a copy of bank payment voucher dated 20.05.1995 raised by the 1st Appellant in the name of “Collector of Customs, Madras”.

The above facts also find indirectly accepted by the Adjudicating Authority himself when we peruse the impugned order wherein also there is a doubt expressed by the Commissioner as “It is now clear that the CHA has substituted the imported bonded drugs. The deposits in the Deposit Account of M/s.Far Port International were utilized for clearance of goods in respect of other importers/clients of M/s.Far Port International. The CHA has received the amounts towards customs duty from the importers in the form of drafts drawn in favour of The CHA has fraudulently withdrawn the amounts from these accounts and have utilized for his own use.”

Thus, we find that the issue in the case on hand stands squarely covered by the ratio in the above decisions / orders and hence, the demand raised in the impugned order does not survive.

The Tribunal allowed the appeals, setting aside the demand of duty and the penalties imposed on the appellants, on the view that the importers had bona fide tendered payment by demand drafts and the culpability for non-payment lay with the CHA whose misconduct cannot attract duty or penalty on the importers.

Oppression and mismanagement - exit option - remand for fresh consideration - reasoned order on merits - revival of interim order

Remand for fresh consideration - reasoned order on merits - exit option - Validity of the NCLAT's remand to the NCLT on the ground that the NCLT had not decided the case on merits before directing an exit option. - HELD THAT: - The Supreme Court concurred with the NCLAT's conclusion that the NCLT had not applied its mind to the merits before issuing directions implementing an exit option to buy out the petitioners' shares. The Court held that it is incumbent on the NCLT to consider all aspects and pass a reasoned order on the merits in accordance with law; in that circumstance a remand to the NCLT for fresh consideration was justified. Consequently the appeal challenging the NCLAT's remand was dismissed. [Paras 6, 7]

Remand by the NCLAT upheld; appeal dismissed.

Revival of interim order - oppression and mismanagement - Whether the interim order dated 06.04.2018, which ceased on 05.03.2019, was revived by the remand. - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that a substantial period had elapsed since the interim order ceased to operate and material changes had occurred thereafter. If those changes give rise to fresh causes of action, the aggrieved party may pursue appropriate remedies in accordance with law; the court cannot "turn back the clock" to reinstate the prior position as on the date of the interim order. Therefore the question of reviving the interim order after the long lapse did not arise and no revival was directed. [Paras 13, 14]

Appeal disposed of; interim order not revived.

Final Conclusion: The NCLAT's remand to the NCLT for a reasoned decision on the merits was upheld and the related appeal dismissed; the prayer for revival of the earlier interim order was rejected and the appeal in that respect disposed of.

Seeking direction to transfer Rs. 84 crores alongwith accrued interest lying in deposit with the Registry of this Court to the Settlement Account under the Scheme of Arrangement - HELD THAT:- It is found that in the proceedings before the NCLT, the pendency of the present writ petition bearing Criminal Writ Petition No. 2187 of 2015 was divulged along with other pending proceedings and the response of the EOW was also sought while passing the order dated 28.11.2025 by the NCLT. In paragraph 44 of the said order, the NCLT specifically recorded that the EOW as well as the Competent Authority under the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 had supported the scheme although they had certain reservations about pending matters before this Court and the Supreme Court.

The sanction of the aforesaid Scheme of Arrangement would not, in any manner, override orders passed by any Court, Tribunal or Authority and that, the same shall happen in accordance with orders that may be passed by such Court, Tribunal or Authority on an application filed in terms of the Scheme - this application is one such application filed in pursuance of the Scheme of Arrangement that appears to have been approved by the NCLT, taking into consideration the interest of all the stakeholders.

Having perused the Scheme of Arrangement and the order dated 28.11.2025 passed by the NCLT approving the same, it is found that allowing this application would be in the interest of justice and in furtherance of settlement of the outstanding claims of the creditors / investors.

The application and writ petition stands disposed off.

Violation of principles of natural justice - denial of opportunity of being heard - the impugned order restricted oral arguments and directed filing of short written notes - HELD THAT:- The impugned order records more than one hour was given to the learned counsel for the appellant to represent his case and during this period he was repeatedly requested to be brief and concise in his arguments, but he insisted on reading the entire pleading which the Ld. NCLT refused to allow and directed him to file a short note within three days alongwith supporting judgements covering his point of argument which shall be considered while deciding the matter. These facts do not show no hearing was ever given to the appellant for representing his case. The law only requires a reasonable and fair opportunity to be given to the parties to represent their cases and admittedly the Ld. NCLT has power to regulate its own procedure.

Admittedly in the present case, the appellant was given an oral hearing for an hour and further was requested to file his notes of submissions, hence it cannot be said fair opportunity to represent was not given, thus the NCLAT is not inclined to interfere in the impugned order. However, the Ld. NCLT is requested to consider and decide the pending applications, if any, alongwith the main Company Petition, since it had heard both the parties on such applications too on 31.10.2025.

The appeal stands disposed of.

Oppression and mismanagement - rectification of Register of Members - petition dismissed on the ground of being barred by limitation - failure to correctly apply Section 17 of the Limitation Act which postpones the commencement of the limitation period until the fraud is discovered - HELD THAT:- The NCLAT is not inclined to accept the submission made by the learned senior counsel for appellant that they came to know about the alleged fraud only on 12.12.2018. The appellant themselves have admitted in year 1998 the shares certificates were acquired by Respondent No.3 and in 2006 the appellants came to know the Respondent No.2 was seeking to transfer R1 company to a third party. Further in 2010 the appellant lodged a complaint qua illegal transfer of shares and rather admitted that Respondent No.2, Mr. Anil Kumar wrote a letter dated 21.03.2000 to the Income Tax Department inter alia calling upon it to lift the attachment order on Mr. Roshan Lal shares and to transfer those shares in his name. This fact came to the knowledge of the appellant in the year 2011 itself as stated in the appeal. Thus, since 2006 the appellants were aware of the fact the shares are either transferred or in process of further being transferred but came forward to challenge such transfer only in 2019 alleging that they came to know of shares certificate in the name of Respondent No.3 only in the year 2018 itself.

A bare perusal of the Section 17 would clarify the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, had discovered it. Now admittedly, the appellants have been taking action qua illegal transfer of shares since the year 2011 but never came forward before the appropriate forum viz the Company Law Board or Ld. NCLT for rectification of the register of members till 2019.

In P Radha Bai and others Vs P Ashok Kumar and Another [2018 (11) TMI 1529 - SUPREME COURT] the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held Section 17 does not encompass all kinds of frauds and mistakes and it only encompasses those fraudulent conduct or act of concealment of documents which have the effect of suppressing the knowledge entitling a party to pursue its legal remedy. Once a party becomes aware of the antecedent facts necessary to pursue a legal proceedings, the limitation period commences.

Thus where the appellants were aware of transfer as far as back in 2006 and lastly in the year 2011, can’t now allege the limitation would start on receipt of a letter dated 12.12.2018 of Respondent No.8 - there are no illegality in the impugned order - appeal dismissed.

Condonation of delay u/s 62 - limitation in filing appeals - Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process - maintainability of appeal where CIRP has been initiated and proper party not on record - intervention and third-party applications in disposed matters - approval of resolution plan in Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process - offer of refund by Successful Resolution Applicant - HELD THAT:- Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 [“the Code”], prescribes that the condonable delay is a maximum of 15 days beyond the stipulated limitation period of 45 days.

Therefore, this appeal, on the face of it, is hopelessly barred by time and is liable to be rejected on this short ground. - Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.

Maintainability of appeal where CIRP has been initiated and proper party not on record - HELD THAT:- Till date, no steps have been taken by the Interim Resolution Professional/Resolution Professional of Jaiprakash Associates Limited to come on record, by amending the cause title of this appeal. The appeal, filed in the name of the erstwhile management of Jaiprakash Associates Limited, therefore, cannot be considered on merits at this stage and is, accordingly, dismissed on this short ground.

Approval of resolution plan in Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process - offer of refund by Successful Resolution Applicant - Effect of the Successful Resolution Applicant's offer to refund on pending appeals and claims - whether or not they had made claims during the CIRP - HELD THAT:- The SRA was asked to make a public announcement to this effect indicating the cut-off date so that all affected home buyers were put on notice as to what was required of them. This Court also made it clear that no further extension of time would be granted and observed that it was for the home buyers to remain vigilant about the steps to be taken by them.

While so, several applications for intervention and/or for directions have been filed in the disposed of Civil Appeal, pertaining to Ayush Agarwal and Stic Synthetics Pvt. Ltd. Such applications are liable to be rejected, as applications filed by third parties in a disposed of matter are not maintainable. More so, when the applicants therein failed to take appropriate steps to safeguard their own interest within the time prescribed by law and in terms of the timelines in the orders of this Court. The applications are, accordingly, dismissed.

Therefore, dismissal of the appeals/applications would not adversely affect any such appellant/applicant, who would come within the scope and timeline of the aforestated offer made by the SRA and would not preclude the SRA from making such refunds.

We make it clear that all such home buyers, who submitted their claims after 10.10.2024 but before 05.12.2025, would be entitled only to the refund of the monies paid by them, be it above or below 80% of the demand amount, but they would not be entitled to stake a claim for allotment of a flat/unit at this late stage.

All other pending applications shall also stand dismissed.

Jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) of the IBC - finality and sanctity of an approved resolution plan - limits of residuary jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority - notion that title to intellectual property cannot be declared so as to modify an approved plan - requirement of specific pleading and RP-initiated proceedings for avoidance under Sections 43 and 45 of the IBC - principles of natural justice in avoidance/neutralisation proceedings

Jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) of the IBC - finality and sanctity of an approved resolution plan - limits of residuary jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority - notion that title to intellectual property cannot be declared so as to modify an approved plan - Whether the Adjudicating Authority could adjudicate and declare title to the trademark "Gloster" while approving the resolution plan - HELD THAT: - The Court held that, on the facts of this case, the Adjudicating Authority lacked jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) to declare title to the trademark in favour of the Successful Resolution Applicant. The approved plan, as placed before the Adjudicating Authority, expressly recorded rival claims and the SRA's belief/understanding that the assignment might be mala fide; the SRA therefore accepted the corporate debtor subject to those competing claims. Once a resolution plan is approved it is binding and its terms govern the rights conferred on the SRA; the Adjudicating Authority cannot, in adjudicating an application under Section 60(5), grant rights or make declarations that amount to a modification or augmentation of the approved plan. Reliance was placed on this Court's precedents (including SREI Multiple Asset and others) emphasising the required nexus between the dispute and the insolvency process and cautioning against use of Section 60(5)(c) to usurp fora competent to decide title or public-law rights. Applying those principles to the record here, where the plan recognised competing claims and no RP-initiated avoidance proceedings had been prosecuted, the Adjudicating Authority could not validly declare that the trademark was an asset of the corporate debtor or vest title in the SRA; that declaration was accordingly set aside. [Paras 37, 38, 50]

The Adjudicating Authority could not, in approving the resolution plan and on the facts of this case, declare title in the trademark "Gloster" in favour of the SRA; that part of the NCLT order is set aside.

Requirement of specific pleading and RP-initiated proceedings for avoidance under Sections 43 and 45 of the IBC - principles of natural justice in avoidance/neutralisation proceedings - Whether the NCLT could, while adjudicating GCL's application and the plan approval, proceed to neutralise the assignment by invoking Sections 43 and 45 of the IBC without an RP application and without requisite pleaded material - HELD THAT: - The Court rejected the NCLT's approach of treating the assignment as avoidable under Sections 43 and 45 in the summary exercise attendant on approval of the plan. Avoidance proceedings under those provisions require rigorous scrutiny, specific material and appropriate pleadings; ordinarily such relief is to be pursued by the Resolution Professional (or under Section 47 by entitled parties) with proper notice to the affected party. Here no application was filed by the RP, the requisite specific pleading and material were absent, and the Adjudicating Authority's findings in paras impugned were reached without affording the necessary contest and notice; such findings were held to be perverse, contrary to natural justice and untenable. The Court therefore set aside the NCLT's reliance on Sections 43 and 45 to neutralise the assignment in the course of deciding GCL's application and plan approval. [Paras 42, 46, 49]

The NCLT's findings that the assignment was avoidable under Sections 43 and 45 (and that it could be neutralised in the present proceedings) are unsustainable; those findings are set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are disposed of by setting aside the NCLT's declaration that the trademark "Gloster" was an asset of the corporate debtor and by holding that the NCLT erred in invoking avoidance provisions without requisite RP-initiated proceedings and specific pleaded material; the observations do not preclude any other court or competent authority from adjudicating the title dispute on its merits in appropriate proceedings.

Bid rigging and abuse of dominant position - violation of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 - allegations of cartelisation under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3)(a) and 3(3)(b) - HELD THAT:- The relevant product market as provided by the Appellant is “Use of Crystalline Durability Admixture (CDA) in Heavy Infrastructure Projects (HIPs)”. The CCI has agreed with this delineation of the product market in the impugned order. However Relevant geographic market as submitted by the Appellant is Maharashtra. The CCI has, however, delineated the whole of India as the relevant geographic market. Appellant in the Information filed has not even alleged, let alone support the contention that CDA is used only in Maharashtra. Therefore, the delineation of the relevant geographic market as Maharashtra is without any basis and has, hence, it is found that it has been correctly rejected by the Commission.

The Appellant has not challenged the delineation of the relevant geographic market as the whole of India, rather it has submitted that the MSRDC is dominant in the whole of India. The Appellant has relied upon a list of road projects named as expressways and has stated that the requirement of CDA was very high in the Mumbai-Pune Expressway - the meagre data provided by the Appellant gives no basis to conclude that MSRDC’s requirement was so high that it could be treated as a dominant enterprise in the whole of India, especially when it was doing one road project.

MSRDC is not a consumer of CDA but is a consumer of construction services and MSRDC has only fixed eligibility conditions for purchase of CDA by contractors. The Appellant states that the condition of IRC accreditation by MSRDC was unfair and discriminatory. This contention deserves to be rejected outright. As correctly held by the Commission, mere prescription of IRC accreditation as an eligibility criterion by MSRDC does not, by itself, amount to unfairness or discrimination under the Act - there are no infirmity in the conclusions of the Commission that MSRDC is not dominant in the relevant market and in the absence of dominance, the question of abuse of dominance under Section 4 does not arise.

It is not found the conduct of Respondent No.2 – MSRDC which is found to be a non-dominant enterprise and therefore, there is no requirement for a reference by the Commission to another statutory authority. We do not find any infirmity in such a conclusion and the Commission could not have recommended to other such statutory authorities under Section 21A as it had not found any anti-competitive conduct by MSRDC as was found to be not a dominant enterprise under Competition Act, 2002 - there are no infirmity in the order of the Commission that the Commission has no jurisdiction over the unfair and discriminatory conduct of a non-dominant enterprise. The Appellant is always free to approach other statutory authorities for appropriate relief as per the applicable laws.

Commission in its ordinary meeting could have sought a reply from the opposite party which in itself does not mean that the Commission found a prime facie case, for if the Commission had found a prima-facie case, it would have proceeded further in the matter. Furthermore, the Commission has power to conduct preliminary conference under Regulation No. 17 of the Competition Commission of India General Regulations, 2009 to invite the Information provider or any other person to form an opinion as to whether a prime facie case exists. No person can be condemned unheard. However, since the proceedings were closed, the non- receipt of reply was of no consequence, as the order has been passed on the basis of the material on record, which showed no prima facie case - there are no procedural lapse on the part of the Commission.

The Commission was correct in its approach and decision in not directing for investigation by the DG before arriving at a decision to form a prima facie opinion. Further it is concluded that R4 has not entered into an agreement with R5 and R6 regarding provision of the product called CDA to R2 and limiting its supply, and there are no violation of Section 3(1) r/w Section 3(3) (a) and Section 3(3) (b) of the Act. It is also concluded that prescribing IRC accreditation by R2 as a condition for inclusion in the IVL does not violate provisions of Section 4(2)(a)(i) and 4(2)(c) of the Act.

There are no infirmity in the orders of the Commission and accordingly the Appeal is dismissed.

Levy of service tax - declared service under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994 or not - penal interest collected by the Bank - consideration for tolerating an act or not - taxability of liquidated damages/notice period pay recovered from employees - levy of service tax on CSR expenditure as sponsorship service or not - invocation of extended period of limitation - sustainability of interest and penalties.

Taxability of penal interest - HELD THAT:- For Section 66E(e) to apply, there must exist a conscious, positive and pre-agreed obligation to tolerate an act, refrain from an act, or to do an act, where such toleration itself is the object of the contract - In the case of Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. v. CCE, [2017 (8) TMI 1114 - CESTAT CHENNAI] involving one of the present Appellants itself, this Tribunal had occasion to examine an identical issue, namely the taxability of penal interest recovered by a banking company under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994 - the Chennai Bench categorically held that penal interest recovered by banks on delayed payment of EMIs is compensatory in nature and does not constitute consideration for “tolerating an act” and therefore does not amount to a taxable service. It was further held that the provisions of Section 66E(e) are not attracted in such circumstances.

The penal interest collected by the Appellants is not liable to service tax.

Taxability of liquidated damages / notice pay - HELD THAT:- The recovery of notice period pay arises exclusively out of the employer–employee relationship, when an employee resigns without serving the stipulated notice period. Such recovery is compensatory in nature and does not involve any activity carried out by the employer for the employee for consideration - Madras High Court, in the case of GE T&D India Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, [2020 (1) TMI 1096 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] HC has ruled that notice period pay recovered from an employee is not exigible to service tax.

The liquidated damages / notice period pay recovered by Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. is not liable to service tax under Section 66E(e) of Finance Act 1994.

Taxability of CSR expenditure under sponsorship service - HELD THAT:- The essence of sponsorship service under the statute is not confined merely to formal advertising contracts but extends to any arrangement where consideration flows for promotion of the sponsor’s brand, name or logo. Therefore, references made by the adjudicating authority to advertisement or promotional benefits are only explanatory and incidental to establish the nature of sponsorship and do not amount to introduction of a new case beyond the SCN - In several instances, the appellants have merely asserted that the amounts paid were in the nature of donations or CSR contributions, without furnishing any documentary evidence explaining: the nature of the event, the nexus between the event and the appellant bank, the absence of brand visibility or logo display, and why such payments should be treated as donations. In the absence of such evidence, the mere nomenclature of “donation” cannot alter the true character of the transaction.

The impugned orders do not travel beyond the scope of the SCN, and the findings of the adjudicating authority are not vitiated on this ground - In the absence of the documentary substantiation, there are no reason to interfere with the factual findings of the adjudicating authority. Mere assertions that the payments were towards CSR, without supporting evidence, cannot be accepted, particularly when the records indicate use of logo, brand name, or other promotional features - the demand confirmed under the impugned orders, to the extent it pertains to sponsorship involving promotional benefits, is legal and proper, and the same is upheld.

Invocation of extended period - HELD THAT:- The appellants’ omission to disclose sponsorship services in ST-3 returns, coupled with non-payment of tax under reverse charge, constitutes suppression of material facts with intent to evade payment of service tax. The plea that the issue involves interpretation or that amounts were reflected in books of accounts does not absolve the appellants from their statutory obligation of disclosure - the conditions stipulated under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 stand satisfied in respect of the demand relating to sponsorship services - the invocation of the extended period of limitation for sponsorship services is legal and proper.

Sustainability of interest and penalties - Whether the demands of interest under Section 75 and penalties under Sections 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 are sustainable? - HELD THAT:- It is a settled position of law that once suppression with intent to evade tax is established and the extended period is rightly invoked, penalty under Section 78 follows as a natural consequence. The penalty under Section 78 is attracted not merely by non-payment of tax, but by the presence of the statutory ingredients contemplated therein - Penalty under Section 77 is also imposable for failure to comply with statutory obligations, including correct filing of returns and proper disclosure of taxable services.

Appeals partly allowed and partly dismissed.

Business Support Services / Support Service of Business or Commerce - Characterisation of transaction as sale of goods - Prohibition on simultaneous levy of service tax and excise duty - precedential weight of tribunal decisions - Whether the Appellant has rendered ‘Business Support Services’ to cement companies as defined u/s 65(104c), by way of providing infrastructure related services such as supply of water for sprinkling, lighting of operational areas, electricity for operation of extraction systems, provision of land for construction of storage silos and parking of vehicles, use and maintenance of internal roads, infrastructure for extraction or collection of dry fly ash, deployment of personnel for gate passes and security. - HELD THAT:- he issue involved in the present case is no more res integra and has been settled by the Tribunal in favour of the assessee in the cases cited supra. In this regard, we may refer to the decision of the Tribunal in the case of M/s Mettur Thermal Power Station vs. CCE & ST, Salem [2014 (12) TMI 594 - CESTAT CHENNAI], wherein identical issue was involved and Chennai Bench of the Tribunal held that demand of service tax under ‘Support Service of Business or Commerce’ is not sustainable.

We also find that the said decision of the Tribunal was subsequently followed in the case of Tamil Nadu Generation And Distribution Corporation Limited [2023 (10) TMI 56 - CESTAT CHENNAI], wherein also the demand of service tax was set aside.

Thus, we are of the considered view that the impugned orders are not sustainable in law and are liable to be set aside and we do so by allowing both the appeals of the Appellant with consequential relief, if any, as per law.

Liability of co-owners to pay service tax individually after availing the slab exemption or are collectively liable to pay service tax after pooling the entire consideration received as rent - the co-owners of an undivided commercial property given out on lease would collectively constitute an “association or body of individuals” (from 01.07.2012) or “association of persons” (from 01.07.2012)? - HELD THAT:- It is found that the period of demand spans over the pre and post negative period. Briefly put, prior to the negative list era Sub-Clause (zzzz) of Section 65(105) of Finance Act, 1994, defined the taxable service of ‘Renting of Immovable Property service’ to mean any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any other person, in relation to renting of immovable property for use in the course of furtherance of business or commerce. Since the term ‘person’ was not defined in the Finance act, the definition of “person” as found in Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, was adopted for legal purposes.

Joint ownership or co-ownership of property plays a critical role in defining how property is held, managed, and transferred between multiple individuals in India. It can arise in various social contexts, such as inheritance, purchase of property by more than one person say husband and wife, or as part of family arrangements or with a view to resolving disputes etc. These peculiar arrangements are generally made in the social context of maintaining peace and security of the family, entails rights, responsibilities, and individual interests of each co-owner in the property, and tax laws must be interpreted in this context.

Once a person owns property on his own strength then his act of renting out the property has to be due to his self-interest and not for the collective or common interest of the co-owners, unless there is something to suggest otherwise.

Thus, the individual appellants are entitled to be assessed separately for Service Tax in respect of their respective shares of rental income from the property.

Thus, the appellants, as co-owners, cannot be regarded as an association of persons for the purpose of joint assessment of their total rental income under Service Tax. Each appellant is entitled to individual assessment and may avail the applicable slab exemption on an individual basis - the impugned orders are set aside and appeals are allowed.

Levy of service tax on cash calls / capital contributions in joint ventures - Characterisation of contributions by co-venturers as consideration for taxable service - Joint venture / partnership law principles - Public-Private Partnership - Operator and non-operator under Production Sharing Contract - Explanation 3(a) to Section 66B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 - Proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 - Circular No.179/5/2014ST - HELD THAT:- Since both the sides agree that the issue is covered, we would like to refer to the decision of this Tribunal in the case of Marmugao Port Trust Vs. CC & ST, Goa [2016 (11) TMI 520 - CESTAT MUMBAI], where the Bench considered the concept of Public-Private Partnership, which was held to be in the nature of Joint Venture where two parties got together to carry out a specific economic venture on a revenue sharing model. The Bench noticed that such arrangements are common nowadays, not only in the port sector but also in various other sectors such as road construction, airport construction, oil and gas exploration where the Government has exclusive privilege of conducting businesses. In all such models, the public entity brings in the resource over which it has the exclusive right, whether land, water front or the right to exploit the said land and water front, and the private entities brings in the required resources either capital or technical expertise necessary for commercial exploitation of the resource belonging to the Government.

It is apparent that the appellant had placed bids through joint venture arrangements with different parties. On acceptance of joint-bid by the Government, the parties to Joint Bidding Agreement [JBA] enter into PSC. On perusal of the Joint Operating Agreement and Production Sharing Contract, it is apparent that one of the Member of UJB is appointed as ‘Operator’, who is responsible for all kinds of activities related to the allotted block.

In this case, the appellant has been appointed as the ‘Operator’ and is incurring expenses in relation to manpower drilling work arranging for facilities for exploration activities etc. and in lieu thereof, the appellant raises cash calls on non-operators. Such cash calls received as share of expenses cannot be subjected to service tax, in view of the decisions referred above. The appellant incurs various expenses on exploration or development of the petroleum asset (i.e. the oil fields or gas fields) or for production of oil and/or gas. If the exploration and development operations fructify into a discovery of commercial fields, production of oil happens. Otherwise, the Block is to be relinquished and the contribution towards exploration and development operations become a sunk cost which is a loss incurred by the participants in proportion to their PI. Thus, the exploration and development costs are nothing but investments in anticipation of future production from the oil field (which is contingent upon the successful discovery of oil and/or gas deposits).

Thus, the impugned order is liable to be quashed. The appeal is accordingly allowed, with consequential benefits, if any.

Legality of quasi-judicial proceedings and principles of natural justice (service of show cause notice and proof of delivery) - Indiscriminate issuance of show cause notices and departmental verification of ITR-TDS reconciliation (CBIC instructions dated 26.10.2021) - Maintainability of appeals vis-à-vis threshold under second proviso to Section 35B(1) - Extended period assessment and recoverability of duty - Penalties and interest under the Finance Act, 1994 - Service of notices u/s 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as made applicable by Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 - HELD THAT:- Appellant had claimed before the authorities below that they had not been served with the SCN and it is also a fact that there is no ‘proof of delivery’ of the SCN having been served on the appellant in terms of Section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as made applicable to matters of service tax under Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994.

In my considered view that due process of quasi-judicial proceedings in observing the principles of natural justice had not been followed in the present case. Further, the instruction of CBIC dated 26.10.2021 had not been followed diligently by the service tax authorities as required, and rather such instructions have been violated in the present case, as neither there was proper verification of the facts nor there was any attempt to check indiscriminate issue of SCNs, as two notices have been issued to the very same appellant, that too on the same day. The above situation also indicates that there was no attempt by any senior/supervisory officials to devise any mechanism to monitor or address such indiscriminate issue of SCNs.

Appellant has fulfilled all the requirements for discharge of service tax liability as determined in the ex-parte adjudication proceedings.

There are no strong grounds to hold that the appellants did not pay service tax in respect of the differential amount identified by the Department for the period 2014-2015, had proper opportunity to explain their case was given by the authorities below and as instructed by CBIC circular, if the departmental authorities would have conducted verification of facts during adjudication process. Therefore, do not find any merits in the impugned order of the learned Commissioner (Appeals) in upholding the order of the original authority for confirmation of adjudged demands including imposition of penalties on the appellant and in rejecting the appeal filed by the appellant. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to set aside as it does not stand the scrutiny of law.

In the result, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal filed by the appellants is allowed on the basis of their voluntary payment of differential service tax amount into the account of Government exchequer

Refund claim u/s 11B - Service tax demand - burden of proof - doctrine of unjust enrichment - demand along with interest holding that in terms of Rule 6(3) - mistake as service tax into the credit of the Central Government - Whether the demand confirmed for nonpayment of service tax, consequent to the appellant adjusting in terms of Rule 6(3) of Service Tax Rules, 1994, the service tax paid by the appellant by oversight under a mistaken notion of law, against the appellant’s subsequent service tax liability; instead of filing a claim for refund u/s 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as made applicable to Finance Act by virtue of Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994; is tenable. - HELD THAT:- Since, the manufacturer is claiming the refund and also because the act of passing on the burden of duty is within his possession and exclusive knowledge, it is entirely for him to establish by letting the evidence that he has not passed on the duty to third party. In fact, the Central Excise Act itself under Section 12B mandates a statutory presumption that the incidence of duty has been passed on to the buyer.

In light of the categorical finding of the Honourable Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgement in Mafatlal Industries case [1996 (12) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT] that all claims for refund (excepting those which arise as a result of declaration of unconstitutionality of a provision whereunder the levy was created) have to be preferred and adjudicated only under the provisions of the respective enactment, this Tribunal, as a creature of statute is well aware of its jurisdiction.

Thus, this Tribunal has no hesitation to hold that the appellant’s contentions to the contrary as to the inapplicability of Section 11B in the instant case, is wholly untenable and cannot be countenanced.

Undisputedly, the Appellant is a manufacturer of motorcycles mopeds etc and is also registered as a service provider for providing various services, such as Consulting Engineer, Market Research Agency, Management Consultant, Architect and Online Information & Database Access and Retrieval. In this connection, it is also pertinent to notice that as per the provisions of Rule 3(1) of the Service Tax Credit Rules 2002, as amended by Notification No.5/2003-ST dated 14-052003, applicable for the relevant period, the appellant as a service provider was entitled to avail input credit on the input services received and further such unutilized credit was also allowed to be transitioned and utilized in the subsequent Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 too.

It is settled position in law that there is no room for intendment in taxation and that a taxing statute has to be given the strict interpretation that it lends itself to.

Appellant has arrogated to itself the authority to determine that the levy was non-existent. This tribunal is of the firm opinion that in the light of the analysis made above, such a recourse to suo motu adjustment was impermissible for the following reasons. First, the payment so made by the appellant to the credit of the Central Government by oversight under a mistaken notion of the law, is thereafter considered Government Revenue until a competent authority determines otherwise. Second, the correct and proper procedure has been prescribed in the statute and it involves applying for a refund through the prescribed statutory mechanism under Section 11B as made applicable to the Finance Act, 1994 by Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994, during which proceedings the competent authority would then make such determination. Third, the payment so made by the appellant also attracts the statutory presumption under Section 12B as made applicable to the Finance Act, 1994 by Section 83 of the Finance Act ibid, namely that the incidence of service tax has been passed on to the buyer/service recipient, Fourth, the right to a refund is also contingent on proving that the burden of tax was not passed on to the end customer/anyone else, but has been in fact borne by the claimant, as has been emphatically laid down in the Mafatlal Industries case reproduced extensively above; which burden in the instant case, the appellant has failed to prove and Last, any condonation of such adjustment on equitable or discretionary considerations would tantamount to according this Tribunal’s imprimatur to an action opposed to the statutory provisions. This effectively translates to bestowing an undeserved legitimacy to such circumventions as those which precisely the law seeks to prevent. Misplaced sympathy is a largesse that this Tribunal can ill afford.

Hence, the suo motu adjustment undertaken by the appellant having resulted in short payment of the appellant’s subsequent service tax liability, has therefore been correctly demanded by the original authority, and the appeal preferred by the appellant against the same, has also been rightly turned down vide the impugned order.

Thus, this Tribunal is of the considered view that the Order in Appeal passed by the Appellate Authority warrants no interference.

Appeal being devoid of merits, is hence dismissed.

Rejection of refund - Discretion to refuse admission of appeal below monetary threshold - Appellate Tribunal procedure and powers in hearing appeals - interpretation of Section 86(7) of the Finance Act, 1994 - second proviso to Section 35B(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - HELD THAT:- It is required to be brought on record that appeal provisions and disposals in Excise matters are bifurcated through two different sub-Sections namely Section 35B and Section 35C while in Service Tax matters appeal provisions are incorporated in Section 86 of the Finance Act and its entire disposal including hearing of appeal and making orders under this Section means under Section 86 are directed to be governed under the provision contained in Section 35B of the Central Excise Act through Section 86 sub-Section 7.

There is a requirement of hearing of the said appeal at the admission stage to justify its continuance and such hearing for making orders under Section 186 of the Finance Act, 1994 has to follow the procedure enumerated under Section 35B and 35C of the Central Excise Act, since sub-Section 7 to Section 186 of the Finance Act, 1994 dictates to follow the same procedure as the Tribunal exercises and follows in hearing appeals and making orders under the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Therefore, in exercise of the discretionary power that is vested on the Tribunal apparently for the purpose of minimising appeals of low value, the present appeal is not accepted for hearing. Consequently, it is dismissed at the admission stage on monetary ground as admission is refused.

Commercial Training or Coaching - Taxability of educational services - Exclusion for curriculum essential to a university degree - Recognition / affiliation of educational institutes - CESTAT KOLKATA - Section 65(105)(zzc) of the Finance Act, 1994 - Notification No. 10/2003-ST - Notification No. 34/2012-ST - CBEC Circular No. 107/01/2009-ST - HELD THAT:- It is not disputed by the Revenue while filing the appeal that the course has designed under University of Kalyani has a prior approval of AICTE in respect of Management courses which is mandatory. The examination is conducted and certificates are awarded by the University of Kalyani as laid down in the UGC guideline . In that circumstances, the Adjudicating Authority has rightly dropped the demand against the Respondent and for the rest of the demand for which the Respondent was providing additional courses the demand has been confirmed.

In that circumstances we do not find any infirmity with the impugned order. The same is upheld and the appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.

Condonation of delay - Extended period of limitation - suppression of facts- substantial question of law - admission of appeal - manufacturing under Rule 16(2) - HELD THAT:- Instead of entering the controversy as to whether the delay in this case should be construed as 63 days or 428 days, we have proceeded on the premise that the delay is 428 days. Still, upon perusal of delay condonation application and the supplementary affidavit, we are satisfied that sufficient cause has been made out for condoning this delay.

Merely because the revenue claims to have discovered that the assessee’s claim had a nexus with galvanisation and that the galvanisation did not amount to manufacture for the purposes of Rule 16(2), we cannot say that this was a case of suppression. At the highest, this could be a case of an incorrect claim if the revenue’s version is accepted. Assessee had his own version in the matter. However, we do not propose to go into the rival versions because we are not concerned with the determination of this question on the merits.

The finding that there was no suppression established is a pure finding of fact. The same is supported by the material on record and therefore cannot be regarded as some perverse finding of fact. Even the additional question, which is now proposed by filing an interlocutory application, does not allege any perversity in the record of this finding of fact.

Therefore, we are satisfied that this appeal involves no substantial questions of law. Once it is established that the invocation of the extended period of limitation was vulnerable, there was no question of the revenue addressing the matter on the merits. Such merits or demerits, therefore, do not give rise to any substantial questions of law based upon which this appeal is required to be admitted.

Thus, we dismiss this appeal as involving no substantial questions of law.

Refund of central excise duty - mistake of law / discovery of mistake of law - reversal of CENVAT credit - option to avail exemption under Notification No.30/2004-C.E. - finality of proceedings and inability to claim refund on another assessee's decision - maintainability of refund claims - limitation period u/s 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - Rule 11(3) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 - HELD THAT:- In the present case, since the final products are admittedly excisable goods, on which there is a levy of central excise duty payable on its clearance and the reversal/payment of input credit also relates to duty of excise on inputs, there is no case of any levy without authority of law to claim refund by the appellants on the grounds of ‘illegal/unconstitutional levy’ or payment of duty under ‘mistake of law’. Therefore, the various cases cited by the learned Advocate wherein there was no levy of tax is not relevant.

We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that no claim for refund of central excise duty is permissible except under and in accordance with Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Further, where the levy of duty itself is considered as ‘unconstitutional’ implying that such amount was paid without reference to any provisions of the Act of 1944, and therefore in such cases alone the time limit prescribed under Section 11B would not apply.

In all other cases, the refund application is required to be filed within the prescribed time limit of one year from the relevant date in terms of Section 11B ibid. Even in the case of ‘discovery of mistake of law’, the person claiming the refund has to succeed in his own case of litigation before the Tribunal/Courts in order to be eligible for refund of duty or tax paid by him; and such person cannot claim on the basis of order or decision given in favour of some other person.

Therefore, we are of the considered view that the refund claimed by the appellants citing the orders passed by the Tribunal in the case of Suryalaxshmi Cotton Mills [2016 (12) TMI 78 - CESTAT MUMBAI] cannot stand for scrutiny of law.

Thus, we are of the considered view that the impugned order dated 23.09.2018 is proper to the extent it had denied refund of Central Excise duty claimed by the appellants beyond the prescribed time limit under Section 11B of the Act of 1944. Therefore, the impugned order dated 23.09.2018 does not require any interference and the appeal filed by the appellants is liable to be dismissed.

In the result, the impugned order is upheld and the appeal filed by the appellants is dismissed.

Refund under area-based exemption scheme - speaking order - principles of natural justice - value addition norm - remand for de novo decision - Notification No. 56/2002-CE - Notification No. 01/2010-CE -HELD THAT:- We fail to understand the logic of the impugned order. Though, we understand that the original authority has no role to play decision by the Commissioner, it can in no way be a reason for not issuing a speaking order, which is clear violation of principles of natural justice. We find that the order in original having been issued in contravention of the principles of natural justice, should have been set aside by the Commissioner and the issue must have been remanded to the original authority for a fresh consideration following principles of natural justice.

We find that it was for the original authority to examine the issue with available records and issue a speaking order. The appellate authority cannot supplement what has not been done by the original authority remanded the matter to him for de novo decision with directions to examine as to whether the appellant's unit is located in the areas specified under the first Notification and they satisfy the other conditions, if any, of that notification. Commissioner (Appeals) while accepting that this Bench remanded the matter to Commissioner directing him. Inter alia, to see whether appellants are eligible for the first notification, finds that no request of the appellant to consider the refund under the first notification is not on record.

However, the period under consideration before this Bench in the previous order was concerning the period after 2011 only. Therefore, the issue pending before Commissioner has a bearing on the impugned proceedings. Ideally, the adjudicating authority should have waited for the Commissioner to decide the issue in remand, before rejecting the claim of the appellant. Anyway, it is for the adjudicating Authority, to consider all the issues involved before passing a speaking order after considering the submissions of the appellants and after following the principles of natural justice.

Thus, we set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to original authority, in above terms, with a direction to consider all the submissions of the appellant and to pass a speaking order.

Applicability of Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules to by-product/waste (bagasse) - Non-excisable goods -Characterisation of bagasse as agricultural waste/by-product and absence of 'manufacture' - seeking for change of name and address of the respondent arising on account of change in territorial jurisdiction of the Central Excise authorities after introduction of GST regime vide Notification No.13/2017-C.E. (N.T) - HELD THAT:- We find that the issue of applicability of Rule 6(1) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 to ‘bagasse’ which emerges during the course of manufacture of sugar and molasses, has been settled taking note of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. DSCL Sugar Ltd. [2015 (10) TMI 566 - SUPREME COURT] in favour of the assessee in the aforesaid cases.

Thus, no merits in the impugned order, insofar as it has upheld the order of original authority in confirmation of the adjudged demands and its recovery along with imposition of penalty on the appellants. Accordingly, we are of the considered view that the impugned order is liable to be set aside as the same does not stand the legal scrutiny.

In the result, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed in favour of the appellants.