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Automated airline software subscriptions without human intervention fail technical-services characterisation and do not make available underlying tech...
Business support recruitment and training receipts qualify for presumptive business taxation, not professional taxation under technical consultancy ru...
Treaty exemption for foreign permanent-establishment management fees prevailed, while dividend expense disallowance remained limited to an accepted al...
Centralised assessment transfers: participation after requesting centralisation can bar technical jurisdictional challenges, while assessment disputes...
Binding precedent remains operative despite pending challenge, supporting deletion of interest disallowance when debt is converted into preference sha...
Section 119(2)(b) permits condonation of delay in a revised return seeking refund to prevent genuine hardship, subject to the prescribed six-year limit. The competent authority must independently determine whether the refund claim is correct and genuine and whether genuine hardship exists; this power cannot be exercised routinely. A rejection cannot rest on irrelevant considerations or an unreasoned denial of hardship, and recorded reasons cannot be supplemented in court. The sufficient-cause standard for delayed appeals under the Limitation Act does not impose a stand-alone requirement to explain delay under section 119(2)(b). The refusal to condone was quashed and remitted for a fresh reasoned decision, leaving the exemption claim open.
Section 119(2)(b) permits condonation of delay in a revised return seeking refund to prevent genuine hardship, subject to the prescribed six-year limit. The competent authority must independently determine whether the refund claim is correct and genuine and whether genuine hardship exists; this power cannot be exercised routinely. A rejection cannot rest on irrelevant considerations or an unreasoned denial of hardship, and recorded reasons cannot be supplemented in court. The sufficient-cause standard for delayed appeals under the Limitation Act does not impose a stand-alone requirement to explain delay under section 119(2)(b). The refusal to condone was quashed and remitted for a fresh reasoned decision, leaving the exemption claim open.
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