Transfer-pricing treatment of ITeS margins excludes pass-through tax recoveries and separate delayed-receivables interest after working-capital adjust...
Capacity-utilisation adjustments under TNMM can neutralise substantiated COVID-related idle costs where underutilisation materially affects profitabil...
TNMM functional comparability requires excluding rice manufacturers from a pure Basmati rice trader's benchmark and recognising operating export recei...
Working-capital adjustment subsumes delayed-receivable effects in TNMM benchmarking of captive software-development services, avoiding separate notion...
Transfer-pricing comparability requires exclusion of financially illogical super-profit comparables and correction of unsupported annual-report and ma...
Charitable character assessment preserves Section 80G approval despite inclusive spiritual teachings and incidental religious expenditure within the s...
Penalty proceedings for cash-loan acceptance require assessment proceedings and recorded Assessing Officer satisfaction; absent these, the proceedings...
Functional comparability governs software-service benchmarking: dissimilar companies are excluded, while related-party filters, margins and working-ca...
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For an RBI-regulated NBFC, breach of binding prudential norms may constitute conduct prejudicial to the company or public interest when assessed cumulatively with related-party dealings, inadequate compliance controls and governance failures. Regulatory penalties do not necessarily preclude oppression and mismanagement jurisdiction, because regulatory supervision and corporate-protection remedies address distinct concerns. Transactions involving related parties require demonstrable approval, documentation, security and recovery arrangements; retrospective omnibus approval may not validate earlier transactions. Resignations of compliance personnel and removal of independent directors may be relevant indicators of weakened governance safeguards. Administrator-led intervention and temporary board suspension may be proportionate protective measures where no equally effective, less intrusive alternative prevents further prejudice pending fuller inquiry.
For an RBI-regulated NBFC, breach of binding prudential norms may constitute conduct prejudicial to the company or public interest when assessed cumulatively with related-party dealings, inadequate compliance controls and governance failures. Regulatory penalties do not necessarily preclude oppression and mismanagement jurisdiction, because regulatory supervision and corporate-protection remedies address distinct concerns. Transactions involving related parties require demonstrable approval, documentation, security and recovery arrangements; retrospective omnibus approval may not validate earlier transactions. Resignations of compliance personnel and removal of independent directors may be relevant indicators of weakened governance safeguards. Administrator-led intervention and temporary board suspension may be proportionate protective measures where no equally effective, less intrusive alternative prevents further prejudice pending fuller inquiry.
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