Condonation of delay fails where time spent on alternative remedies is not excluded by a specific judicial direction.

Time spent pursuing alternative remedies before the High Court and Supreme Court is not automatically excludible for condonation of delay unless supported by a specific judicial direction or other legally sufficient basis. In the absence of such direction, the appellant must protect the statutory remedy by filing the appeal within limitation. The delay was therefore not condoned, and the appeal was dismissed as time-barred.

---

---

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the appeal, stated to have been caused by pursuing alternative remedies before the High Court and the Supreme Court, was liable to be condoned, and whether the appeal could be entertained despite non-compliance with the statutory requirement for pre-deposit under Section 129-E of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The delay had not been shown to be covered by any specific direction permitting exclusion of the time spent in pursuing the earlier proceedings. The authorities relied upon by the appellants were distinguishable because in those cases condonation had followed express directions. In the absence of any such direction in the present matter, the delay could not be treated as condonable merely because alternative remedies had been pursued. The Tribunal also noted that the appellants ought to have safeguarded their statutory remedy by filing the appeal within time.

Conclusion: The delay was not condoned and the appeal was held to be barred by limitation.

Final Conclusion: The application for condonation failed, resulting in dismissal of the appeal as time-barred.

Ratio Decidendi: Time spent in pursuing alternative remedies is not automatically excludible for condonation of delay unless supported by a specific judicial direction or other legally sufficient basis.

---