Statutory notice and hearing are essential before gold confiscation; breach of procedure defeats the seizure and any good-faith defence.

Confiscation under the Gold (Control) Act could not be sustained against a claimant who was not given statutory notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The court explained that civil jurisdiction is not ordinarily excluded where the statutory process is not followed or fundamental procedural safeguards are breached, but the civil court may only examine legality of the process and not sit in appeal on the merits. Because notice was required to the owner or person concerned, notice only to the possessor was insufficient where ownership was disputed. The general good-faith protection also failed because action taken in breach of the statutory notice requirement cannot be treated as protected conduct.

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Issues: (i) whether the civil suit was barred by the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 and the Code of Civil Procedure; (ii) whether confiscation of the seized gold could be sustained without notice and opportunity to the plaintiff under the Gold (Control) Act, 1968; (iii) whether the protection for acts done in good faith applied.

Issue (i): whether the civil suit was barred by the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 and the Code of Civil Procedure.

Analysis: The Act provides a complete mechanism for adjudication, confiscation, appeal and challenge, and the civil court cannot ordinarily substitute its own decision for that of the statutory authority. At the same time, civil jurisdiction is not excluded where the statutory procedure is not followed or the authority acts contrary to fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

Conclusion: The suit was not barred in the circumstances disclosed, though the civil court could only test legality of the statutory process and not re-appreciate the merits as an appellate authority.

Issue (ii): whether confiscation of the seized gold could be sustained without notice and opportunity to the plaintiff under the Gold (Control) Act, 1968.

Analysis: Section 79 requires notice to the owner or other person concerned and a reasonable opportunity to represent before confiscation. Where ownership was disputed and the plaintiff claimed the gold as her property, notice only to the person from whose possession the gold was seized was insufficient. The statutory presumption under Section 99 could not justify confiscation against a person who was not afforded an opportunity to contest ownership, and such action offended both the statute and natural justice.

Conclusion: Confiscation without notice to the plaintiff was invalid and could not be sustained.

Issue (iii): whether the protection for acts done in good faith applied.

Analysis: Protection under Section 108 is unavailable where the action itself contravenes the express requirement of Section 79. Conduct in violation of the statute cannot be treated as action taken in good faith for the purposes of the protective provision.

Conclusion: The statutory protection did not apply.

Final Conclusion: The confiscation proceeding could not bind the plaintiff without statutory notice and opportunity, and the seized gold was to be dealt with afresh in accordance with law after notice to her.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a confiscation statute requires notice and hearing to the owner or person concerned, confiscation made without affording such opportunity is invalid and cannot be saved by a general protection clause.

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