Statutory demand notice dispatch creates presumed service, supporting cheque-dishonour liability where debt discharge remains unproved.

Dispatch of a statutory demand notice by registered post to the accused's correct address raises a presumption of issuance under the General Clauses Act; actual service is not required for cheque-dishonour liability. A denial of receipt after the acknowledgment card is produced must be proved by the accused. The notes further state that the complainant's unrebutted evidence of the loan source, coupled with admitted prior dealings and cheque issuance, supported presumptions of consideration and liability under the Negotiable Instruments Act. As the accused did not prove discharge of liability, the acquittal was described as unsustainable and conviction for cheque dishonour followed.

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Issues: Whether the acquittal for the offence of dishonour of cheque was sustainable where the Magistrate found that the statutory demand notice was not served and questioned the complainant's financial capacity.

Analysis: Production of the postal receipt showing dispatch of the written demand notice to the accused's correct address raises a presumption of issuance under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act; actual service is not a statutory requirement. A comparison of signatures on the cheque and acknowledgment card could not establish non-issuance of notice. Once the acknowledgment card is tendered, a denial of receipt must be proved by the accused, including through evidence of the postman. The complainant's unrebutted evidence explained the source of the loan, while the defence admitted prior financial dealings and issuance of the cheque as security without showing discharge of the liability or explaining the complainant's continued possession of it. The complainant consequently discharged the initial burden and was entitled to the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Conclusion: The acquittal was unsustainable; the accused committed the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and was convicted.

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