Issues: (i) Whether umbrella panel fabric cut into triangular shape and size is classifiable as made-up textile articles under Heading 6307 or as woven synthetic filament fabric under Heading 5407; (ii) Whether the extended period under Section 28(4) could sustain the differential-duty demand.

Issue (i): Whether umbrella panel fabric cut into triangular shape and size is classifiable as made-up textile articles under Heading 6307 or as woven synthetic filament fabric under Heading 5407.

Analysis: Section Note 7 of Section XI treats articles cut otherwise than into squares or rectangles as "made-up". The imported triangular panels had acquired the essential character and commercial identity of umbrella panels rather than textile fabric. Heading 6307 specifically covers made-up textile articles, whereas Heading 5407 is a general heading for woven fabrics of synthetic filament yarn; the specific heading prevails.

Conclusion: The goods are classifiable under Heading 6307 as made-up textile articles and not under Heading 5407. The finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period under Section 28(4) could sustain the differential-duty demand.

Analysis: The goods' description and classification were fully declared in the Bills of Entry and the assessments were completed without objection. No suppression or misdeclaration was established; consequently, a classification dispute could not justify invocation of the extended period.

Conclusion: The entire demand was barred by limitation. The finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reclassification, differential customs duty, interest and penalty could not be sustained either on classification or limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: Textile fabric cut into non-rectangular panels that acquires the essential character and commercial identity of a finished made-up article is classifiable under the specific heading for made-up textile articles; an extended limitation period requires established suppression or misdeclaration and cannot rest on an openly declared classification dispute.

Issues: Whether penalty could be imposed on a customs broker's G-card holder under Section 112A for alleged involvement in the importation of restricted goods concealed in a consignment.

Analysis: The appellant had returned the import documents without clearing the goods after a mismatch between the declared description and the cargo was noticed, and had intimated Customs of the return. The cash credited to the appellant's account was explained as being used for customs duty, transportation and logistical expenses. The record did not establish that the appellant knew of, abetted, did, or omitted any act rendering the goods liable to confiscation.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 112A was not sustainable and was set aside.

Issues: Whether weld mesh manufactured exclusively as top, bottom, side, door and partition components of poultry battery cages is classifiable as parts of poultry-keeping machinery under CETH 84369100 or as iron and steel structures under CETH 73089090.

Analysis: The goods were manufactured from galvanised iron wire to specified designs and were exclusively used as identifiable components of poultry battery cages. The proposed entry for iron and steel structures covers structural articles of the nature specified therein, whereas the Revenue did not provide convincing material or reasoning showing how the specialised weld-mesh cage components fell within that entry. Reliance on an earlier decision concerning poultry equipment was misplaced, since the subsequent appellate proceedings accepted classification under CETH 84369100.

Conclusion: The declared classification under CETH 84369100 is correct; rejection of that classification and proposed classification under CETH 73089090 are unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether the accused rebutted the statutory presumptions arising from admitted execution of the dishonoured cheque and disproved the legally enforceable debt; (ii) Whether the High Court could, in revisional jurisdiction, reverse concurrent findings of conviction by reappreciating the evidence.

Issue (i): Whether the accused rebutted the statutory presumptions arising from admitted execution of the dishonoured cheque and disproved the legally enforceable debt.

Analysis: Admission of the signature on the cheque attracted the mandatory presumptions of consideration and discharge of debt or liability. The complainant established compliance with the requirements for dishonour of cheque, including timely presentation, demand notice and non-payment. The defence that a blank cheque had been furnished as security for a different loan lacked supporting contemporaneous evidence; the later notice demanding return of the cheque was treated as an afterthought. The complainant's evidence concerning the loan and financial assistance received from others remained credible after cross-examination. Financial incapacity was not established merely from the complainant's monthly income, particularly when evidence showed other investments and financial assistance. The accused had neither replied to the demand notice raising that defence nor adduced cogent material to displace the presumptions.

Conclusion: The accused failed to rebut the presumptions or disprove the legally enforceable debt; the conviction for dishonour of cheque was justified.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court could, in revisional jurisdiction, reverse concurrent findings of conviction by reappreciating the evidence.

Analysis: Revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and is not equivalent to appellate jurisdiction. Concurrent factual findings may be disturbed only where they are perverse, grossly erroneous, based on irrelevant or no material, or result from non-consideration of relevant material or arbitrary exercise of discretion. The High Court substituted its own assessment of the evidence without identifying any such defect in the concurrent findings.

Conclusion: The High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction in reversing the concurrent conviction.

Final Conclusion: The concurrent findings sustaining criminal liability for dishonour of cheque stand restored.

Ratio Decidendi: Once execution of a cheque is admitted, the statutory presumptions of consideration and discharge of liability operate unless displaced by cogent evidence; a revisional court cannot reappreciate evidence to overturn concurrent findings absent perversity or a jurisdictional defect.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration and the consequential appellate order could stand where the cancellation was made without reasons or application of mind and without an effective opportunity to respond.

Analysis: Cancellation of registration adversely affects the right to carry on business and must satisfy the constitutional requirement of non-arbitrariness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The cancellation order did not disclose reasons warranting such action and reflected no application of mind. The petitioner was consequently entitled to submit a reply to the show-cause notice and have its defence considered after an opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The cancellation and appellate orders were unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee, with fresh adjudication to follow after receipt of the petitioner's reply and hearing.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail for alleged fraudulent availment and passing of input tax credit and wrongful export refunds under the Central Goods and Services Tax regime.

Analysis: The alleged offences carry a maximum sentence of five years and are triable by a Magistrate. Investigation had concluded, the complaint had been filed, no charge had been framed, and the trial was unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time. The applicant had remained in custody since 13 February 2026 and had no criminal antecedents. Pre-conviction detention is not punitive; personal liberty, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a speedy trial require release unless exceptional circumstances justify continued custody. No material established a flight risk, likelihood of repetition of offences, intimidation of witnesses, or tampering with documentary and electronic evidence.

Conclusion: The applicant made out a case for release on bail upon appropriate safeguards.

Issues: Whether the accused was entitled to bail pending trial in a case alleging fraudulent availment of input tax credit and allied forgery offences.

Analysis: The period of the alleged incorrect input-tax-credit claims, the delay in lodging the FIR, the suo motu cancellation of GST registration against which an appeal remained pending, and the period of incarceration supported release on bail. The merits of the prosecution case were left untouched.

Conclusion: The accused was entitled to bail pending trial.

Issues: (i) Whether the prohibition on sugar exports under the impugned notification was arbitrary, unconstitutional, or amenable to interference in writ jurisdiction; (ii) Whether pre-existing private export contracts, advance remittances, or allocated export quotas entitled the petitioners to export sugar despite the prohibition.

Issue (i): Whether the prohibition on sugar exports under the impugned notification was arbitrary, unconstitutional, or amenable to interference in writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: The export-policy change from restricted to prohibited was issued under the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 following deliberations concerning a material decline in domestic sugar production, required closing stock, domestic availability, and price stability. The quota-allocation notifications under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the export-policy notification under the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 operated in distinct statutory fields and for distinct purposes. A policy decision founded on public interest is not subject to judicial interference merely because it adversely affects commercial interests, absent arbitrariness, perversity, mala fides, or irrationality. The prohibition operated prospectively and constituted a reasonable restriction in view of the essential nature of sugar and the public-interest objective.

Conclusion: The export prohibition was a valid, non-arbitrary policy decision and did not violate Articles 14 or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India; no writ interference was warranted. The finding is against the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether pre-existing private export contracts, advance remittances, or allocated export quotas entitled the petitioners to export sugar despite the prohibition.

Analysis: Private bilateral contracts and receipt of advance payment could not override the export prohibition. Under the transitional arrangement in the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023, post-restriction exports required an Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit existing before the restriction and its prescribed registration; the petitioners did not meet those requirements. Nor did they establish that their consignments had entered the physical export pipeline through the prescribed conditions or clearance for exportation. Export quotas allocated to sugar mills did not create vested rights in merchant exporters. The plea of promissory estoppel lacked supporting pleadings and material, while legitimate expectation is not an enforceable right capable of preventing a subsequent public-interest policy change. The rejection of the representation in the lead matter was also not challenged.

Conclusion: Pre-existing contracts, advance payments, and quota allocations did not confer an enforceable right to export sugar after the prohibition. The finding is against the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: The public-interest export-control regime prevailed over the petitioners' asserted commercial expectations; the petitioners may deal with retained sugar in the domestic market in accordance with applicable law.

Ratio Decidendi: A valid export-policy restriction adopted in supervening public interest cannot be defeated by private commercial arrangements, advance payments, quota allocations, or unenforceable expectations where the prescribed transitional and export-clearance conditions are not fulfilled.

Issues: (i) Whether an arbitral award-holder's claim, not lodged in the corporate debtor's CIRP and not included in the approved resolution plan, survives and permits continuation of the challenge to the award; (ii) Whether the amount deposited in court as security for stay of enforcement of the award is refundable to the corporate debtor after approval of the resolution plan.

Issue (i): Whether an arbitral award-holder's claim, not lodged in the corporate debtor's CIRP and not included in the approved resolution plan, survives and permits continuation of the challenge to the award.

Analysis: An amount awarded under an arbitral award constitutes a claim and the award-holder is a creditor under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The approved resolution plan binds creditors, while claims not forming part of that plan stand extinguished. The award-holder did not submit its claim to the resolution professional; consequently, its claim was not incorporated in the approved plan. Continuance of the Section 34 challenge could not revive an extinguished claim.

Conclusion: The claim under the arbitral award stood extinguished upon approval of the resolution plan, and the challenge to the award became academic, in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the amount deposited in court as security for stay of enforcement of the award is refundable to the corporate debtor after approval of the resolution plan.

Analysis: A court deposit required as a condition for stay secures the award amount pending adjudication and does not transfer ownership of the money to the award-holder. Release remains subject to the court's control and may be conditioned or modified. Such deposited funds remain assets of the corporate debtor, notwithstanding custody by the court. Since the underlying award claim was extinguished, no unconditional right to the secured deposit remained with the award-holder.

Conclusion: The deposited amount, together with accrued interest, is refundable to the petitioner, in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: Approval of the resolution plan eliminated the unsubmitted award claim and preserved the corporate debtor's entitlement to funds deposited merely as security.

Ratio Decidendi: A claim under an arbitral award that is not submitted and incorporated in an approved resolution plan is extinguished, and money deposited in court solely as security for that award remains an asset of the corporate debtor.

Issues: Whether insolvency proceedings initiated on an operational creditor's application could continue after full settlement of the claim, discharge of the only other creditor's claim, and acknowledgment of a pre-existing dispute.

Analysis: The operational creditor's claim was fully and finally settled and it consented without objection to reversal of the admission order. The record also established that the claim concerning transportation charges had been disputed before issuance of the demand notice, particularly regarding the distance measurements forming the basis of billing. The only claim received during the process, relating to provident-fund dues, had also been paid in full. In these circumstances, there was no subsisting creditor claim requiring continuation of the insolvency process.

Conclusion: The operational creditor's insolvency application could not be sustained, as the debt stood settled and a genuine pre-existing dispute existed before the statutory demand notice.

Issues: (i) Whether units booked after 30.06.2018 could be excluded from the anti-profiteering investigation; (ii) Whether the net profiteered amount was refundable to identified homebuyers or depositable in the Consumer Welfare Fund; (iii) Whether excess benefit passed to some buyers could be set off against liability owed to other buyers; (iv) Whether GST on the inflated base price formed part of the profiteered amount; (v) Whether interest was payable and the date from which it was to be computed; (vi) Whether penalty under Section 171(3A) was applicable.

Issue (i): Whether units booked after 30.06.2018 could be excluded from the anti-profiteering investigation.

Analysis: The ITC benefit is project-specific where construction commenced before GST and continued after its implementation. A post-GST purchaser is entitled to the ITC benefit attributable to post-GST inputs used in construction. Fresh price negotiation or maintenance of average prices, without documented evidence of a commensurate ITC reduction, does not establish that the benefit was passed on.

Conclusion: Post-GST booked units were not excludable; the finding is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the net profiteered amount was refundable to identified homebuyers or depositable in the Consumer Welfare Fund.

Analysis: Deposit in the Consumer Welfare Fund is a residuary measure applicable only where recipients genuinely cannot be identified. Buyer-wise project records identified the 128 eligible homebuyers, and absence of a complaint, current contact details, or transfer of project operations did not render them unidentifiable. The supplier's statutory liability to pass on the benefit survives project transfer.

Conclusion: The net profiteered amount must be returned to the identified homebuyers and cannot be deposited in the Consumer Welfare Fund; the finding is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether excess benefit passed to some buyers could be set off against liability owed to other buyers.

Analysis: The obligation to pass on ITC benefit is owed separately to each recipient. Excess payment to one group of customers cannot discharge the obligation owed to different customers. The statutory framework does not empower recovery of alleged excess benefit from consumers or adjustment of that excess against liabilities due to other recipients.

Conclusion: Set-off of excess benefit passed to 1039 customers against the liability to the remaining 128 customers was refused; the finding is against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether GST on the inflated base price formed part of the profiteered amount.

Analysis: The excess amount paid by a homebuyer includes GST charged on the inflated base price. Even if that tax was remitted to the Government, it was an additional cost borne by the buyer and must be restored to place the buyer in the position that would have prevailed had the ITC benefit been passed on.

Conclusion: Inclusion of GST at 12% in the profiteered amount was upheld; the finding is against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether interest was payable and the date from which it was to be computed.

Analysis: Rule 133(3)(b) validly provides for interest at 18% per annum on the amount not passed on to recipients. Since the project-wide computation did not permit identification of the exact date of collection of excess amount for each square foot, the date of payment of the last instalment by each buyer was adopted as the appropriate starting point.

Conclusion: Interest at 18% per annum is payable from the respective date of the last instalment paid by each eligible homebuyer until refund; the finding is against the assessee.

Issue (vi): Whether penalty under Section 171(3A) was applicable.

Analysis: The entire contravention period ended on 30.10.2019, before Section 171(3A) came into force on 01.01.2020. A penal provision cannot be applied retrospectively to a completed period of contravention.

Conclusion: No penalty under Section 171(3A) is payable; the finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The developer remained liable to return the net unpassed ITC benefit of Rs. 40,99,917 to the 128 identified homebuyers, with interest, while no penal consequence could be imposed for the pre-enforcement contravention period.

Ratio Decidendi: In a transitional real-estate project, ITC benefit must be passed on project-wise to every eligible recipient, and liability owed to one recipient cannot be neutralised by excess benefit given to another.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit on duty-paid inputs procured from units availing exemption under Notification No. 01/2010-CE was admissible before the amendment to Rule 12 effective from 20.01.2014; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of the credit.

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit on duty-paid inputs procured from units availing exemption under Notification No. 01/2010-CE was admissible before the amendment to Rule 12 effective from 20.01.2014.

Analysis: The CENVAT credit scheme requires harmonious reading of its provisions. Credit is available where the input has suffered duty, is used in manufacture of final products or provision of output services, and is received under prescribed documents. As these conditions were undisputedly fulfilled, and the Rules contained no express pre-amendment prohibition against such credit, the later express provision could not be read as restricting credit for the earlier period.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit was admissible before 20.01.2014; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of the credit.

Analysis: The records had been subjected to audits, returns were regularly filed, and refund claims had been processed. Revenue produced no evidence of suppression of facts with intent to evade duty. The dispute also involved interpretation of the CENVAT Credit Rules, in which circumstances the extended period was not invocable.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disputed input credit remains available and the demand is time-barred.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the substantive conditions for CENVAT credit are fulfilled and no express prohibition exists, a subsequent amendment expressly allowing such credit does not itself justify denial for the preceding period; extended limitation requires proof of suppression with intent to evade duty.

Issues: (i) Whether freight incurred for FOR destination sales up to the buyers' premises formed part of the assessable value for central excise duty; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the demand despite prior departmental knowledge of the freight exclusion and conflicting decisions on the place of removal.

Issue (i): Whether freight incurred for FOR destination sales up to the buyers' premises formed part of the assessable value for central excise duty.

Analysis: Under FOR destination sales, delivery occurs at the buyers' premises. Freight and transportation charges incurred up to that place are consequently includible in the assessable value. The merits issue stood covered against the assessee.

Conclusion: Freight up to the buyers' premises was includible in the assessable value; this issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the demand despite prior departmental knowledge of the freight exclusion and conflicting decisions on the place of removal.

Analysis: The earlier notice concerning the same exclusion of freight and cartage had already placed the material facts within the Department's knowledge. Further, conflicting decisions on the place of removal made the assessee's belief regarding non-inclusion of freight reasonably possible. The same known facts could not subsequently constitute suppression, fraud, wilful misstatement, or intent to evade duty. The entire demand was beyond the normal limitation period.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable and the demand was time-barred; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Although freight was liable to be included in assessable value for FOR destination sales, the time-barred demand, interest and penalty could not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the Department already possesses the relevant facts, their repetition in a subsequent notice cannot establish suppression for invoking the extended limitation period; a bona fide view supported by conflicting decisions also negates intent to evade duty.

Issues: (i) Whether an independent Chartered Accountant certifying statutory e-Forms is an officer or officer in default amenable to direct prosecution by the Registrar of Companies; (ii) Whether prosecution under Section 628 read with Section 75 of the Companies Act, 1956 can proceed without specific material showing mens rea, knowledge, or active connivance by the certifying professional; (iii) Whether the complaint filed in 2020 regarding e-Forms and allotments made between 2011 and 2014 was barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether an independent Chartered Accountant certifying statutory e-Forms is an officer or officer in default amenable to direct prosecution by the Registrar of Companies.

Analysis: The statutory definitions of officer and officer in default concern persons involved in corporate governance, management, and internal administration. Section 2(60)(v) of the Companies Act, 2013 excludes a person giving advice to the Board in a professional capacity. An external Chartered Accountant certifying statutory forms is not thereby transformed into an internal corporate officer. However, exclusion from officer status does not create an absolute immunity from prosecution under a provision directed at any person where active criminal complicity is prima facie shown.

Conclusion: An independent professional certifier is not an officer or officer in default merely by certifying statutory e-Forms, though prosecution for a separate offence may lie upon material establishing active criminal complicity.

Issue (ii): Whether prosecution under Section 628 read with Section 75 of the Companies Act, 1956 can proceed without specific material showing mens rea, knowledge, or active connivance by the certifying professional.

Analysis: Section 628 requires a knowingly false material statement or intentional concealment. The complaint attributed falsification, mala fides, and physical filing of the forms to the company director, while alleging only that the professional certified the forms. It contained no foundational allegation or material indicating personal knowledge of falsity, deliberate concealment, or connivance. The primary responsibility for accurate filing rested on the company and its directors under Rule 10 of the Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014.

Conclusion: Prosecution of the certifying professional could not proceed because the complaint disclosed no specific material establishing mens rea, knowledge, or active connivance.

Issue (iii): Whether the complaint filed in 2020 regarding e-Forms and allotments made between 2011 and 2014 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The alleged offence under Section 628 read with Section 75 carried a maximum punishment of two years and was therefore subject to the three-year limitation period under Section 468(2)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The complaint was instituted long after the relevant filings, without an application or sufficient basis for condonation under Section 473 of that Code. The date of filing of the complaint governs computation, and stale prosecution cannot be initiated after expiry of the prescribed period without valid condonation.

Conclusion: The complaint was incurably barred by limitation.

Final Conclusion: The discharge of the surviving independent professional stands sustained for absence of the essential factual basis for criminal liability and for expiry of the statutory limitation period; this determination does not preclude proceedings in accordance with law against the company or its internal management.

Ratio Decidendi: A professional certifier may incur criminal liability for false statutory filings only upon specific material demonstrating knowing falsity or intentional participation, and a prosecution initiated beyond the prescribed limitation period without condonation is legally untenable.

Issues: Whether a director may be prosecuted under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for fraudulent availment of input tax credit by a company without arraigning the company as an accused.

Analysis: Section 137 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is pari materia with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The statutory phrase making persons in charge liable "as well as the company" makes commission of the offence by, and prosecution of, the company a condition precedent for fastening vicarious criminal liability on its director. The alleged wrongful availment of input tax credit was by the company, which alone was the registered person entitled to take input tax credit under Section 16, while the director's alleged role arose solely from his position in the company. The company had not been arraigned in the complaint.

Conclusion: Prosecution of the director in his personal capacity without arraigning the company is not maintainable; the criminal complaint and consequential proceedings cannot continue against him.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy; (ii) Whether reassessment beyond four years and the consequential deemed-dividend addition were valid where all material facts had been disclosed and the assessee was not a registered shareholder of the lender company.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: The alternative-remedy rule admits exceptions where the statutory authority acts contrary to the enactment or settled legal position. The assessment had disregarded binding legal precedent specifically raised in the objections. The prolonged subsistence of interim protection also supported exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable notwithstanding the alternative appellate remedy, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether reassessment beyond four years and the consequential deemed-dividend addition were valid where all material facts had been disclosed and the assessee was not a registered shareholder of the lender company.

Analysis: A completed scrutiny assessment cannot be reopened after four years absent failure to make full and true disclosure of material facts. The shareholding pattern, transactions and lender-company details had been supplied during the original assessment, and no suppression was established. Further, the deemed-dividend provision did not apply because the assessee was not a registered shareholder of the payer company and the common shareholder held only 4.60% in the assessee, below the prescribed threshold.

Conclusion: The reopening and the deemed-dividend addition were invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings and all consequential fiscal demands lack legal foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: Reopening after four years of a completed scrutiny assessment requires failure by the assessee to fully and truly disclose material facts; a loan to a non-registered shareholder cannot be taxed as deemed dividend merely through the statutory fiction.

Issues: Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal must comply with the prescribed timeline for pronouncement of orders after conclusion of hearing.

Analysis: Rule 34 requires an order to be pronounced within 60 days where no pronouncement date is given, with a further period not ordinarily exceeding 30 days only where exceptional and extraordinary circumstances make timely pronouncement impracticable. Releasing matters without pronouncing judgment after they have been argued and reserved repeatedly imposes unjustified litigation hardship. The Tribunal must fix a pronouncement date and adhere to the 60-day period, or at the latest the 90-day outer period in exceptional cases.

Conclusion: The Tribunal was directed to deliver the judgment in the petitioner's pending appeal by 13 August 2026, and all Income Tax Appellate Tribunals were directed to scrupulously comply with Rule 34.