Issues: Whether the application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, filed on 17.11.2022, was within limitation.

Analysis: The disclosed date of default was 02.12.2018 and the ordinary three-year limitation period would have expired on 02.12.2021. The period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 stood excluded under the Supreme Court's COVID-19 limitation directions. As the unexpired balance period falling within the exclusion period was 626 days, which exceeded the minimum 90-day period available from 01.03.2022, that longer balance period was available from 01.03.2022. The limitation consequently expired on 17.11.2023. The calculation confined to a 90-day extension did not give effect to the longer balance period.

Conclusion: The Section 9 application filed on 17.11.2022 was within limitation.

Issues: Whether liquidation by sale of the corporate debtor as a going concern commenced on the date of the liquidation order that incorporated the committee of creditors' recommendation and expressly directed such sale, notwithstanding that no auction notice had been issued or asset sale process document finalised before the subsequent regulatory amendment.

Analysis: Section 5(17) fixes the liquidation commencement date as the date on which liquidation proceedings commence under Section 33. A recommendation under Regulation 39C, when placed before the Adjudicating Authority and incorporated into the liquidation order, becomes part of the judicially directed mode of liquidation. The saving clause in the amendment regulations operates prospectively and cannot displace rights and obligations crystallised under the earlier regulatory framework. Neither the Code nor the Liquidation Regulations make issuance of an auction notice or finalisation of an asset sale process document the legal point at which a going-concern sale commences. Constitution of the stakeholders' consultation committee, consideration of assets and liabilities, reserve price, marketing strategy, auction process and draft sale notice were all steps in one continuing process. The restraint against issuing an auction notice could not be used to prejudice the Liquidator, and the ninety-day period for endeavouring the sale was directory and capable of extension.

Conclusion: The going-concern sale commenced on 21.02.2024 with the liquidation order. The subsequent omission of the going-concern-sale provisions did not govern that process, which remained subject to the regulatory framework in force on the liquidation commencement date.

Issues: (i) Whether amounts withdrawn from the bankrupt's bank account after commencement of bankruptcy, including proceeds of sold jewellery, formed part of the bankruptcy estate or were excluded assets; (ii) Whether refusal to recall the ex parte order directing return of the withdrawn amount was justified.

Issue (i): Whether amounts withdrawn from the bankrupt's bank account after commencement of bankruptcy, including proceeds of sold jewellery, formed part of the bankruptcy estate or were excluded assets.

Analysis: The bankruptcy estate vested in the Bankruptcy Trustee by operation of law from the commencement date, irrespective of the bankrupt's knowledge. A bank-account balance constituted estate property. The exclusions under Section 155(2) read with Section 79(14) were exhaustive. The protection for personal ornaments was confined to qualifying unencumbered ornaments within the prescribed monetary limit and did not extend to their sale proceeds credited to a bank account. The jewellery proceeds exceeded that limit, and no qualifying ornaments existed on the commencement date.

Conclusion: The withdrawals were dealings with bankruptcy-estate property, and the jewellery sale proceeds were not excluded assets; the direction to return the withdrawn amount was valid.

Issue (ii): Whether refusal to recall the ex parte order directing return of the withdrawn amount was justified.

Analysis: Recall of an ex parte order is not available as of right. The asserted inability to make submissions due to connectivity issues was unsupported, and no prejudice was established despite adequate opportunity to respond to the underlying application.

Conclusion: Refusal to recall the ex parte order was justified.

Final Conclusion: The bankruptcy estate remained vested in the Bankruptcy Trustee, and the statutory exclusion for specified personal ornaments could not be extended to their sale proceeds held in a bank account.

Ratio Decidendi: Upon commencement of bankruptcy, property standing to the bankrupt's credit vests in the Bankruptcy Trustee by operation of law, and a statutory exclusion for specified assets cannot be enlarged to cover their sale proceeds.

Issues: (i) Whether construction for individual purchasers and landowners before 01.07.2010 was taxable. (ii) Whether construction for an educational institution was a works contract service primarily for commerce or industry. (iii) Whether the remaining post-01.07.2010 construction and separately contracted site formation activities were taxable. (iv) How the surviving works-contract services were to be valued and whether the composition option was available. (v) Whether the extended limitation period, interest and penalties were sustainable. (vi) Whether rejection of the Section 74 rectification application foreclosed valuation relief in appeal.

Issue (i): Whether construction for individual purchasers and landowners before 01.07.2010 was taxable.

Analysis: The Explanation deeming construction intended for sale to be a taxable service was introduced with effect from 01.07.2010 and operated prospectively. Transfer of property in goods in the construction contracts did not independently create a taxable construction or works-contract service for the earlier period. The contemporaneous departmental clarifications supported the pre-amendment position for developer construction and landowner-share construction completed before that date.

Conclusion: Construction for individual purchasers and landowners before 01.07.2010 was not taxable. The related demand was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether construction for an educational institution was a works contract service primarily for commerce or industry.

Analysis: The statutory requirement was that the building be primarily for commerce or industry. Characterising education as an industry under a different enactment, or relying on the charging of fees, did not establish that requirement. No independent finding established that the educational building was intended primarily for commercial or industrial use.

Conclusion: Construction for the educational institution was not taxable as a works contract service primarily for commerce or industry. The related demand was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the remaining post-01.07.2010 construction and separately contracted site formation activities were taxable.

Analysis: Residential construction for prospective buyers after 01.07.2010 was taxable where the statutory conditions were met. The construction of a complex and a godown involved transfer of goods and was not shown to be wholly outside the applicable taxable entries. The separately recorded site-development receipts were not established to be part of construction and were correctly classifiable as site formation service.

Conclusion: The post-01.07.2010 residential construction, remaining construction activities and separately contracted site formation activity were taxable, subject to period-specific valuation and statutory conditions. This finding is in favour of Revenue.

Issue (iv): How the surviving works-contract services were to be valued and whether the composition option was available.

Analysis: Rule 2A required determination of the service element of a works contract after excluding the value attributable to goods. The composition option under Rule 3(3) depended on whether service tax had been paid before the option was exercised, not merely on the earlier receipt of consideration. Its availability required contract-wise verification of returns, challans and payment records. The applicable valuation provisions, abatements and retrospective amendment to Rule 2A had to be applied activity-wise and period-wise; denial of composition could not justify taxation of gross receipts including the value of goods.

Conclusion: The composition option must be determined contract-wise by applying the prior-payment requirement, and the surviving works-contract demand must be recomputed on the legally applicable taxable service portion. This is in favour of the assessee to that extent.

Issue (v): Whether the extended limitation period, interest and penalties were sustainable.

Analysis: The extended period required wilful suppression or misstatement with intent to evade. Registration, earlier return filing, disclosed construction activities, and the interpretational and valuation disputes did not establish deliberate concealment. Interest could arise only on tax ultimately and lawfully determined. The absence of the ingredients for the extended period also removed the basis for penalty for suppression, while any independent return-filing penalty required separate reconsideration, including reasonable cause.

Conclusion: The extended period and penalty for suppression were unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee. Interest and any independent return-filing penalty require consequential determination under the applicable law.

Issue (vi): Whether rejection of the Section 74 rectification application foreclosed valuation relief in appeal.

Analysis: Rectification cannot substitute for an appeal in respect of debatable matters, but rejection of a rectification request does not validate an incorrect valuation. The appellate jurisdiction independently permits correction of the tax demand according to the applicable valuation provisions, while the composition option remains subject to its statutory conditions.

Conclusion: Rejection of the Section 74 application did not foreclose valuation relief in appeal. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The non-taxable pre-01.07.2010 residential and landowner-share construction and the educational construction are excluded; any remaining liability must be confined to the normal period and quantified under the applicable period-specific valuation framework.

Ratio Decidendi: Service-tax liability for construction activities must be determined under the charging and valuation provisions applicable to the relevant statutory period, and a later expansion of taxability cannot be applied retrospectively.

Issues: (i) Whether the amounts paid towards short-paid education cess, secondary and higher education cess, and applicable interest were liable to appropriation; and (ii) Whether penalties imposed for the alleged payment defaults were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the amounts paid towards short-paid education cess, secondary and higher education cess, and applicable interest were liable to appropriation.

Analysis: The demand concerned short-paid cesses and statutory interest under the central excise regime. The evidence on record established that the entire cess liability and applicable interest had been paid.

Conclusion: The amounts paid towards the cesses and interest were validly appropriated.

Issue (ii): Whether penalties imposed for the alleged payment defaults were sustainable.

Analysis: The applicable ratio in the assessee's earlier matter had treated the restrictive consequences flowing from Rule 8(3A) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 as unsustainable, following decisions declaring that provision ultra vires. In view of that ratio and the discharge of the entire liability with interest, penal consequences did not survive.

Conclusion: The penalties were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The cess and interest liabilities stand satisfied through appropriation, and no penal liability remains.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty founded on the restrictive default-payment regime under Rule 8(3A) cannot survive where that regime has been held ultra vires and the substantive liability with applicable interest has been discharged.

Issues: (i) Whether alleged clandestine manufacture and clearance, by treating traded spare parts and components as manufactured goods, was proved; (ii) Whether SSI exemption was available for actual manufacturing clearances during the relevant financial years; (iii) Whether the extended period of limitation was validly invoked; (iv) Whether the penalties under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and Rules 26 and 27 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether alleged clandestine manufacture and clearance, by treating traded spare parts and components as manufactured goods, was proved.

Analysis: A charge of clandestine manufacture requires cogent, affirmative and corroborated evidence of manufacture and unaccounted clearance. The limited vendor investigation, supplier registrations, payments through account-payee cheques, and vendor confirmations did not establish that documented purchases were fictitious. A transporter's statement not tested in accordance with Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944 could not be treated as substantive evidence. The logo on components, disparity between trading and equipment turnover, and absence of buyer orders specifically requiring manufacture were insufficient without evidence of excess raw materials, power consumption, labour, production capacity, transportation or sale proceeds.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: clandestine manufacture and clearance were not proved, and the entire trading turnover could not be treated as manufactured goods.

Issue (ii): Whether SSI exemption was available for actual manufacturing clearances during the relevant financial years.

Analysis: The Chartered Accountant's certificate, separating manufacturing and trading values, was accepted in the absence of material discrediting it. Manufacturing clearances for 2010-11 to 2012-13 were below the prescribed threshold under Notification No. 08/2003-C.E. dated 01.03.2003. Manufacturing clearances for 2013-14 and 2014-15 exceeded that threshold, although eligibility for exemption up to the prescribed limit for those years followed because the preceding-year clearances had not crossed the relevant threshold. The claimed payment of duty on the actual manufacturing clearances for 2013-14 and 2014-15 required verification.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: SSI exemption is available for 2010-11 to 2012-13 and up to the eligible limit for 2013-14 and 2014-15; verification of duty payment for the actual manufacturing clearances of the latter two years is remitted for limited verification.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended period of limitation was validly invoked.

Analysis: The Department had prior knowledge of the dual manufacturing and trading activities through an earlier notice on substantially the same factual basis and through periodical disclosures. Those circumstances negated suppression of facts with intent to evade duty.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: invocation of the extended period of limitation was not sustainable.

Issue (iv): Whether the penalties under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and Rules 26 and 27 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 were sustainable.

Analysis: Penalty for deliberate evasion and personal penalty of a director required a legally established foundation of clandestine manufacture and conscious involvement, which was absent. The separate contravention concerning non-maintenance of prescribed records was independent of the principal clandestine-removal demand and remained unrebutted.

Conclusion: Partly in favour of the assessee: the penalties under Section 11AC and Rule 26 were set aside, while the penalty under Rule 27 for non-maintenance of records was sustained.

Final Conclusion: The excise liability cannot be enlarged by recharacterising documented trading transactions as manufacture; it is confined to any verified liability arising from actual manufacturing clearances, while the independent record-keeping contravention remains enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: A charge of clandestine manufacture and clearance must be proved by cogent, affirmative and corroborated evidence; suspicion, unverified investigative statements and inferential circumstances cannot substitute such proof.

Issues: Whether disallowance of input tax credit on account of mismatch could be sustained without full disclosure of mismatch particulars and adequate opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The show-cause notice did not fully furnish the mismatch details necessary for the appellant to respond. The mismatch chart was produced only subsequently and had not been available before the adjudicating authority. Further, sufficient opportunity of personal hearing was not afforded in the first appellate proceedings. These deficiencies constituted a gross breach of the principles of natural justice at both stages.

Conclusion: The input tax credit claim requires fresh adjudication after supplying mismatch particulars and granting sufficient opportunity to explain the case.

Issues: (i) Whether 2304.029 MTs of the disputed goods was Crude Palm Oil eligible for the concessional rate under Serial No. 57 of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs; (ii) Whether the loading time log, ship's ullage report, e-mail correspondence, statements and laboratory reports could be relied upon; (iii) Whether classification of the disputed goods under Customs Tariff Item 1511 9090 was sustainable; (iv) Whether the appropriate Basic Customs Duty rate for Customs Tariff Item 1511 9090 had been correctly applied; (v) Whether invocation of the extended period under Section 28(4) was sustainable; (vi) Whether confiscation and redemption fine were sustainable; (vii) Whether penalties under Sections 114A and 114AA were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether 2304.029 MTs of the disputed goods was Crude Palm Oil eligible for the concessional rate under Serial No. 57 of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs.

Analysis: Contemporaneous tank-wise loading records identified the disputed quantity as RBD Palmolein, while the balance cargo was separately identified as Crude Palm Oil. The laboratory reports, despite variations across samples, corroborated the presence of two categories of palm oil. Food-safety specifications were relevant only as corroborative material and did not govern customs classification. Deletion of acid-value and carotenoid parameters from the exemption notification did not dispense with the threshold requirement that the imported goods answer the description of Crude Palm Oil. Under the strict construction of exemption notifications, the claimant bore the burden of establishing such eligibility.

Conclusion: Against the assessee: the disputed quantity was not Crude Palm Oil and was ineligible for the concessional rate.

Issue (ii): Whether the loading time log, ship's ullage report, e-mail correspondence, statements and laboratory reports could be relied upon.

Analysis: The loading records were prepared during vessel-loading operations, contained tank-wise particulars, and were consistent with the contemporaneous e-mail correspondence. Their authenticity was not materially discredited, and the e-mail was acknowledged by its recipient. The documents and laboratory reports formed a consistent body of corroborative evidence satisfying the standard of preponderance of probabilities. A procedural deficiency in certification did not, on these facts, negate the admissibility of electronic evidence whose authenticity was not genuinely in dispute.

Conclusion: Against the assessee: the documentary, electronic and laboratory evidence was reliable and could be relied upon.

Issue (iii): Whether classification of the disputed goods under Customs Tariff Item 1511 9090 was sustainable.

Analysis: Classification had to be determined by the identity and condition of the goods at the time of importation. The finding that the goods became neither Crude Palm Oil nor RBD Palmolein because of alleged mixing during discharge could not support classification. Nevertheless, the contemporaneous evidence established that the goods were RBD Palmolein at import, falling within the tariff entry for palm oil and its fractions other than Crude Palm Oil.

Conclusion: Against the assessee: classification under Customs Tariff Item 1511 9090 was upheld on the basis that the goods were RBD Palmolein at the time of importation.

Issue (iv): Whether the appropriate Basic Customs Duty rate for Customs Tariff Item 1511 9090 had been correctly applied.

Analysis: The applicable duty rate depended on the tariff and notification in force on the date of import. The record did not contain a complete verification of the competing rate notifications, making recalculation necessary without reopening the concluded findings on description, classification, or exemption eligibility.

Conclusion: The applicable duty rate and consequential differential duty were remitted for limited verification and recomputation.

Issue (v): Whether invocation of the extended period under Section 28(4) was sustainable.

Analysis: The bills of entry described the entire cargo as Crude Palm Oil notwithstanding contemporaneous shipping records identifying the disputed quantity as RBD Palmolein. This material misdeclaration enabled availment of a lower concessional duty and was not merely a debatable classification choice on disclosed facts.

Conclusion: Against the assessee: invocation of the extended period was sustained, with interest consequential upon the recomputed differential duty.

Issue (vi): Whether confiscation and redemption fine were sustainable.

Analysis: The incorrect description was material to classification, exemption eligibility and duty assessment, supporting confiscation for misdeclaration and breach of the conditions of the claimed concession. As the goods were not prohibited and the contravention concerned description, classification and duty, proportionality of redemption fine required reduction of the amount.

Conclusion: Confiscation was sustained against the assessee; redemption fine was reduced to Rs. 1,00,00,000 in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vii): Whether penalties under Sections 114A and 114AA were sustainable.

Analysis: The misdescription caused short-payment of duty, attracting penalty under Section 114A, but its quantum had to correspond with the duty finally recomputed. A separate penalty under Section 114AA required identification of a distinct knowing or intentional false declaration or document beyond the import declaration already forming the basis of the duty demand and Section 114A penalty. No such distinct document or conduct was identified.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 114A was sustained against the assessee only to the extent of the recomputed differential duty, while the separate penalty under Section 114AA was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The findings on the nature of the goods, their tariff classification, denial of the concession, extended-period demand and confiscation remain closed; only the applicable duty rate and consequential monetary liability require limited recomputation, with the fine and penalties adjusted as directed.

Ratio Decidendi: Eligibility for a concession restricted to Crude Palm Oil requires the importer to establish that the goods answered that description at importation, and classification must rest on the goods' identity at that time rather than any post-import mixing or dilution.

Issues: Validity of the ex parte cancellation of GST registration.

Analysis: The cancellation order contained no reasons and was passed ex parte. Such an unreasoned cancellation warranted writ intervention under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was quashed and set aside, with fifteen days granted for filing pending returns and depositing outstanding dues.

Issues: Whether an ex parte adjudication under the GST law could be sustained where, after cancellation of registration, the show-cause notice was uploaded only on the Common Portal despite binding instructions requiring physical service.

Analysis: The registration had been cancelled substantially before the show-cause notice was issued. Portal-only service after cancellation could leave the noticee unaware of the proceedings, since the noticee may neither be able nor required to access the portal thereafter. The binding departmental circular requiring physical service in such circumstances was applicable, and the absence of such service resulted in the adjudication proceeding remaining ex parte without effective opportunity of response.

Conclusion: The portal-only service was insufficient in the circumstances; the ex parte adjudication was set aside and the matter was required to be decided afresh after allowing a reply, any necessary request for documents or cross-examination, and adequate advance notice of personal hearing.

Issues: Whether the departmental appeal was maintainable despite the prescribed monetary limit for departmental appeals.

Analysis: Section 120(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorises monetary-limit instructions regulating departmental appeals. The applicable circular fixed a threshold of Rs. 20,00,000 before GSTAT, subject to specified exceptions. As the dispute concerned only penalty, the disputed penalty of Rs. 3,14,226 was the relevant amount and fell below that threshold. The Revenue bore the burden of specifically pleading and establishing an applicable exception. Authorisation under Section 112(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 to institute an application did not, by itself, establish an exception or dispense with compliance with the binding monetary-limit policy. No material established any specified exception or a recorded case-specific opinion of the Commissioner under the residual exception.

Conclusion: The departmental appeal was not maintainable and could not be admitted for adjudication on merits.

Issues: Whether the tax and penalty demand under Section 74, based on the allegation that the registered firm was bogus or non-existent, was sustainable.

Analysis: A demand of tax and penalty under Section 74 requires proof of the alleged tax evasion. The registered taxable person had a GSTIN, an identifiable business premises, and had filed GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B for the relevant period. Revenue failed to establish that the firm was non-existent or that it had evaded tax; the absence of goods at the premises during verification did not substantiate the allegation.

Conclusion: The tax and penalty demand was unsustainable.

Issues: Whether a departmental appeal involving a disputed amount below the prescribed monetary limit may be admitted on the basis of Commissioner authorisation without proof of a recognised exception.

Analysis: Section 120(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorised the monetary-limit policy governing departmental litigation. The applicable circular fixed a threshold of Rs. 20,00,000 for appeals before GSTAT, subject to specified exceptions. Applying the prescribed method, the relevant disputed amount was Rs. 16,23,766, below the threshold. The monetary-limit instructions were binding on the Department. Sections 112(3) and 112(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permit a Commissioner-authorised application, but such authorisation does not dispense with the monetary-limit policy. No recognised exception, including a case-specific recorded opinion under the residual exception, was pleaded or established.

Conclusion: A departmental appeal below the prescribed monetary threshold is not maintainable unless a recognised exception is specifically established; a general Commissioner authorisation is insufficient.

Issues: Whether GST is leviable on assignment, for consideration, of leasehold rights in land and building allotted by an industrial development corporation to a third-party assignee.

Analysis: Assignment and transfer of leasehold rights in a plot of land and building constitute transfer of benefits arising from immovable property. The binding jurisdictional precedent establishes that such a transaction falls outside the scope of taxable supply under Section 7(1)(a), Clause 5(b) of Schedule II and Clause 5 of Schedule III, and is consequently not chargeable under Section 9 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. That precedent remained binding, there being no stay or recall of it.

Conclusion: GST is not leviable on the assignment of the leasehold rights in question; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the statutory appeal barred the writ petition despite the alleged breach of natural justice; and (ii) Whether the assessment was vitiated by inadequate time to respond and non-consideration of the assessee's timely submitted reply and documents.

Issue (i): Whether the statutory appeal barred the writ petition despite the alleged breach of natural justice.

Analysis: Although the assessment order was appealable, the writ petition had been entertained on the allegation of violation of natural justice and interim protection had been granted. The asserted procedural illegality therefore warranted examination notwithstanding the alternative statutory remedy.

Conclusion: The availability of a statutory appeal did not bar the writ petition in the circumstances.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment was vitiated by inadequate time to respond and non-consideration of the assessee's timely submitted reply and documents.

Analysis: Section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires a faceless assessment process consistent with the principles of natural justice. The audi alteram partem rule requires adequate time and a meaningful opportunity to answer a proposed adverse action. The response period of less than three working days for a substantial proposed addition was unreasonable. The reply and supporting documents sent by e-mail before the deadline were acknowledged as forwarded to the Assessment Unit, yet the assessment proceeded on the incorrect premise that there had been no compliance and disregarded those materials.

Conclusion: The assessment was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and was legally unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The assessment must be reconsidered afresh after affording a reasonable hearing and taking into account the reply and documents already furnished.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment entailing civil consequences is vitiated where the assessee is denied adequate opportunity to respond and timely submitted, acknowledged material is disregarded.

Issues: Whether a final assessment made without considering a duly uploaded adjournment request and without affording an effective opportunity to respond to the draft assessment is sustainable.

Analysis: The principles of natural justice require that an assessee receive a meaningful opportunity to place its response before a final assessment is made. The portal records established that the adjournment request was filed within the compliance period and sought time until 25 March 2021, but it was not placed before the Assessing Authority because of a system-related delay in inwarding the request. The final assessment nevertheless proceeded on the incorrect premise that no response had been filed.

Conclusion: A final assessment passed without considering the timely adjournment request and without an effective hearing is unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether the two consignments could be clubbed and classified as a complete motorcycle under Rule 2(a) of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the Import Tariff? (ii) Whether rejection of the declared transaction value and redetermination under the Customs Valuation Rules, 1988 were valid? (iii) Whether duty could be recovered jointly and severally from two persons in respect of the Tuticorin consignment? (iv) Whether confiscation and redemption fine were sustainable? (v) Whether penalties under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable? (vi) Whether non-compliance with Section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962 permitted statements recorded under Section 108 to be used as substantive proof? (vii) Whether Directorate of Revenue Intelligence officers had jurisdiction to issue the notice under Section 28 and record statements under Section 108? (viii) Whether the Common Adjudicating Authority could lawfully club the clearances for assessment?

Issue (i): Whether the two consignments could be clubbed and classified as a complete motorcycle under Rule 2(a) of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the Import Tariff?

Analysis: Rule 2(a) ordinarily requires classification according to the goods as presented for clearance. That rule does not protect a contrived division of a single composite import intended to circumvent duty or import restrictions. The two consignments arrived four days apart from the same overseas supplier; one contained the engine and chassis while the other contained substantially all remaining parts. Matching manufacturer markings, physical examination, joint expert inspection, and the foreign registration plate established that the consignments jointly comprised one previously registered motorcycle. These objective facts independently established anti-circumvention and the true composite character of the import.

Conclusion: The consignments were properly clubbed and classified as a complete motorcycle under CTH 8711 50 00. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether rejection of the declared transaction value and redetermination under the Customs Valuation Rules, 1988 were valid?

Analysis: The declared values related to assorted motorcycle spare parts, whereas the goods actually imported were dismantled components of one complete previously registered motorcycle. The declared price therefore could not represent the transaction value of the goods as actually imported. In the absence of reliable data for identical or similar goods and of material for deductive or computed valuation, residual valuation under Rule 8 was supported by the expert valuation reports based on physical examination.

Conclusion: Rejection of the declared transaction value, redetermination of value, and consequential differential duty with interest were sustained. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether duty could be recovered jointly and severally from two persons in respect of the Tuticorin consignment?

Analysis: Section 28(1) fastens duty upon the importer, not upon multiple distinct persons through a joint and several demand where the goods were not jointly imported. The substance-over-form inquiry under Section 2(26), supported by the inference available under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, identified the appellant as the owner and real importer of the Tuticorin goods. The trade name used for that consignment did not displace that liability; nor was there a separate corporate veil requiring recognition.

Conclusion: The joint and several recovery direction was set aside, but duty on the Tuticorin consignment remained recoverable from the appellant alone as the real importer. This issue was partly decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether confiscation and redemption fine were sustainable?

Analysis: The expert reports, joint inspection, matching markings, and foreign registration plate provided sufficient circumstantial evidence of misdeclaration and import of a dismantled previously registered motorcycle. The burden thereby shifted to the importer to explain the true nature and value of the goods, which remained unexplained.

Conclusion: Confiscation under Sections 111(d) and 111(m) was sustained. The redemption fines, if redemption remained available, were reduced to Rs. 40,000 for the Chennai goods and Rs. 60,000 for the Tuticorin goods. This issue was decided against the assessee subject to the reduction in fine.

Issue (v): Whether penalties under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable?

Analysis: The coordinated filing of Bills of Entry that described a complete dismantled motorcycle as spare parts, including one consignment entered under a name having no genuine interest in the goods, established knowing use of materially false declarations. Knowledge and intention were inferable from the conduct and objective import evidence.

Conclusion: Penalties under Section 114AA were sustainable, but were reduced to Rs. 50,000 for each import. This issue was decided against the assessee subject to the reduction in penalty.

Issue (vi): Whether non-compliance with Section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962 permitted statements recorded under Section 108 to be used as substantive proof?

Analysis: The principal order distinguished admissibility, evidentiary relevancy, and probative value. A statement under Section 108 remains admissible as a document, but Section 138B governs its use as substantive proof of the truth of its contents. Where the statutory circumstances for dispensing with the maker's evidence are unavailable, the principal order required examination of the maker and a reasoned opinion on admission in the interests of natural justice. No such process was undertaken, and non-retraction could not substitute the prescribed safeguards or establish voluntariness.

Conclusion: The principal order excluded the Section 108 statements as substantive proof; the findings on classification, valuation, confiscation, and penalty remained sustainable on independent physical and documentary evidence.

Issue (vii): Whether Directorate of Revenue Intelligence officers had jurisdiction to issue the notice under Section 28 and record statements under Section 108?

Analysis: The statutory scheme recognises Directorate of Revenue Intelligence officers as proper officers for issuing a notice under Section 28, and competent Customs officers may summon persons and record statements under Section 108.

Conclusion: The jurisdictional challenge to the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence officers was rejected. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (viii): Whether the Common Adjudicating Authority could lawfully club the clearances for assessment?

Analysis: The appointment of a Common Adjudicating Authority under the Customs Act, 1962 and the applicable notification validly enabled a single authority to adjudicate the linked clearances. The authority's jurisdiction was not confined to local territorial limits merely because the consignments cleared through different ports.

Conclusion: The challenge to the authority of the Common Adjudicating Authority was rejected. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Concurring Opinion: The Technical Member agreed with the ultimate outcome and the independently established factual findings, but disagreed that Section 138B invariably required examination-in-chief of every statement-maker in departmental adjudication. In that view, the statutory discretion under Section 138B, natural justice, the absence of a request for cross-examination or demonstrated prejudice, voluntariness, and the preponderance of probabilities govern evidentiary reliance; the Section 108 statements could supplement the independently sufficient objective evidence.

Final Conclusion: The assessment of the combined import as a complete motorcycle, the redetermined duty liability, confiscation, and penal liability were retained, while the joint and several recovery direction was removed and the redemption fines and penalties were reduced.

Ratio Decidendi: Where objective evidence establishes that temporally proximate consignments from a common source were deliberately split but jointly comprise a complete restricted article, customs assessment must follow the true composite transaction rather than its formal division into separate Bills of Entry.

Issues: (i) Whether the first appellate authority could dismiss the appeal without hearing the appellant; (ii) Whether the 21-day delay in filing the first appeal should be condoned; (iii) Whether the first appeal was validly signed and verified for the company; (iv) Whether the appeal was barred for non-payment of an admitted amount or pre-deposit; (v) Whether the Tribunal should decide the merits rather than remit the matter; (vi) Whether interest was payable on differential tax paid through DRC-03 and could be reduced under the cum-tax rule; and (vii) Whether GSTR-3B interest was within the show-cause notice and the amount payable.

Issue (i): Whether the first appellate authority could dismiss the appeal without hearing the appellant.

Analysis: Section 107(8) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 mandates an opportunity of hearing to an appellant without distinguishing threshold objections from merits. Section 107(9) permits adjournments for sufficient cause. The objections concerning delay, authority of the signatory and admitted payment required factual determination and engagement with the appellant's materials; refusal of an adjournment did not dispense with the audi alteram partem requirement.

Conclusion: The dismissal without hearing breached the statutory hearing requirement and principles of natural justice and cannot stand. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the 21-day delay in filing the first appeal should be condoned.

Analysis: Section 107(4) permits condonation of delay up to one further month on sufficient cause. The appeal record contained a verified delay-condonation petition, and neither Section 107 nor Rule 108 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 required a separate application supported by an affidavit. The short delay was attributed to the consultant's illness and the time required to collect documents; the explanation was plausible, uncontroverted and did not disclose lack of bona fides or prejudice to Revenue.

Conclusion: The 21-day delay is condoned. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the first appeal was validly signed and verified for the company.

Analysis: Rule 108(2), read with Rule 26(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, permits a company appeal to be signed by its authorised signatory. The General Manager held a notarised power of attorney authorising him to represent, sign and file tax applications. The company's continued prosecution of the proceeding also established ratification. Any failure to append proof of authority at the first appellate stage was a curable procedural defect, not a jurisdictional bar.

Conclusion: The first appeal was validly signed and verified, and the omission to file authority proof stood cured. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the appeal was barred for non-payment of an admitted amount or pre-deposit.

Analysis: Section 107(6)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 applies only to an amount clearly and unequivocally admitted by the appellant. The interest computation advanced alternatively, expressly on the assumption that liability existed, did not amount to an admission. Section 107(6)(b) requires pre-deposit only on the remaining amount of tax in dispute; the impugned order confirmed interest alone and no tax.

Conclusion: No admitted amount or pre-deposit was payable, and the first appeal was validly filed. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether the Tribunal should decide the merits rather than remit the matter.

Analysis: Section 113(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits confirmation, modification or annulment of the appealed order and makes remand discretionary. The complete record, including the audit material, show-cause notice, reply, reconciliations and invoice-wise computation, was available, both sides addressed the merits, and no further factual inquiry was necessary.

Conclusion: The merits of the first appeal were determined by the Tribunal rather than remitted.

Issue (vi): Whether interest was payable on differential tax paid through DRC-03 and could be reduced under the cum-tax rule.

Analysis: Section 50(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 imposes compensatory interest where tax due remains unpaid. Following the rate change under Notification No. 15/2021-Central Tax (Rate) dated 18.11.2021, the differential tax on the invoiced works-contract supplies became payable from the prescribed due dates. Under Sections 13(2) and 31(5), issuance of invoices for continuous supply fixed the time of supply; retention money and the customer's failure to reimburse the higher tax did not defer it. Rule 35 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 applies only where the supply value is tax-inclusive. The invoices separately stated taxable value and GST, and therefore did not permit cum-tax valuation of the shortfall.

Conclusion: Interest of Rs. 21,96,829 each under CGST and SGST on delayed differential tax is confirmed, and the cum-tax contention is rejected. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (vii): Whether GSTR-3B interest was within the show-cause notice and the amount payable.

Analysis: The show-cause notice specified the GSTR-3B interest figures and the appellant replied to that demand; consequently, the demand was within Section 73(1) and did not violate Section 75(7) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. However, the documented claim for credit of interest already paid with the April 2022 return was not addressed in the original order as required by Section 75(6). The reconciliation was supported by the return and was not controverted by Revenue.

Conclusion: The GSTR-3B interest demand was validly raised, but after credit for interest already paid it is reduced to Rs. 418 under CGST and Rs. 419 under SGST. This issue is partly decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The threshold dismissal was displaced and the merits were adjudicated on the existing record. Interest liability survives on the delayed differential tax, while the GSTR-3B interest liability is recalculated after giving credit for the interest already paid; no tax or penalty liability remains.

Ratio Decidendi: A GST appeal cannot be rejected on objections concerning limitation, authorisation or pre-deposit without affording the appellant the hearing expressly mandated by Section 107(8) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issues: Whether GST is leviable on assignment, for lump-sum consideration, of leasehold rights in land allotted by an industrial development corporation.

Analysis: Under Section 7(1)(a), Clause 5(b) of Schedule II, Clause 5 of Schedule III and Section 9 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, the binding jurisdictional precedent characterises assignment or transfer of leasehold rights in such land as transfer of benefits arising from immovable property, rather than a taxable supply of services. Serial No. 35 of Notification No. 11/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28.06.2017, concerning other miscellaneous services, does not encompass such assignment. The jurisdictional precedent remained binding in the absence of any stay or recall, notwithstanding the stated intention to seek review.

Conclusion: GST is not leviable on the assignment of the leasehold rights in question.