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Issues: Whether a partner can be convicted under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 when the partnership firm was not made an accused, and whether mere status as a partner or guarantor is sufficient to fasten vicarious criminal liability absent specific averments and proof that the person was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the firm's business.
Analysis: Section 141 creates vicarious liability by deeming fiction, but that fiction operates only when the principal offender, namely the company or firm, has committed the offence and is arraigned or otherwise prosecutable in law. The complaint contained no substantive averment establishing that the appellant was in overall control of the day-to-day business of the firm, and the evidence also did not show that he had issued the cheques or was otherwise responsible for the transaction in a manner attracting Section 141. Mere partnership, or the fact that the appellant stood as a guarantor for the loan, could not substitute for the statutory requirements of being in charge of and responsible for the business, nor could civil liability under partnership or guarantee law be converted into criminal vicarious liability.
Conclusion: The appellant could not be convicted vicariously under Section 141 when the firm was not made an accused and the necessary foundational facts for fastening criminal liability were not established; the conviction was unsustainable and the appellant was entitled to acquittal.