Issues: (i) Whether confiscation of the tea and imposition of a redemption fine were justified; (ii) whether penalties on the owner and transporter were justified.

Issue (i): Whether confiscation of the tea and imposition of a redemption fine were justified.

Analysis: Section 119 of the Customs Act, 1962 concerns confiscation of goods used to conceal confiscable goods. The tea was in the vehicle's rear, while the contraband was recovered from the driver's cabin. The evidence did not establish that the tea was dispatched as a guise for moving the contraband.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessees: the confiscation and redemption fine are set aside. The recovered fine is to be refunded with interest.

Issue (ii): Whether penalties on the owner and transporter were justified.

Analysis: Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 governs penalties relating to goods liable to confiscation. The driver's immediate statement and the call records did not implicate either appellant. The driver had been engaged by the vehicle owner, and defects in transport documents did not provide cohesive evidence of the appellants' involvement. Revenue was required to provide cogent evidence linking them to the alleged perpetrators.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessees: the penalties on both appellants are set aside.

Final Conclusion: The tea and the appellants are relieved of the challenged confiscation, fine and penalties, with refund of the recovered fine and interest.

Ratio Decidendi: Co-transportation of legitimate goods with contraband, without cogent evidence of a connection, is insufficient to establish their use as concealment or justify penalties against their owner or transporter.

Issues: (i) Whether the personal-guarantor insolvency application was barred by limitation; (ii) Whether resignation and subsequent changes to credit arrangements discharged the earlier guarantee by novation; (iii) Whether disputed signatures on later documents warranted rejecting or staying the insolvency application; (iv) Whether non-enforcement of collateral discharged the guarantor.

Issue (i): Whether the personal-guarantor insolvency application was barred by limitation.

Analysis: Section 18 of the Limitation Act provides for a fresh limitation period following a written acknowledgment of subsisting liability made before expiry of the existing period. The borrower's settlement proposals in 2018 and 2021 were made within the respective running periods; rejection of a proposal does not itself negate an acknowledgment. The guarantee made acknowledgments by the borrower or its authorised agent binding on the guarantor. A surety's liability is co-extensive with the principal debtor's unless the contract otherwise provides.

Conclusion: The application was not barred by limitation.

Issue (ii): Whether resignation and subsequent changes to credit arrangements discharged the earlier guarantee by novation.

Analysis: Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act addresses substitution of a contract, while Section 133 addresses discharge of a surety following variation without consent. The admitted continuing guarantee expressly preserved the guarantor's obligations despite variations to the loan or security documents. Resignation from directorship and revised credit facilities did not establish an agreement substituting the earlier guarantee or a release from it.

Conclusion: The earlier guarantee was not discharged by novation.

Issue (iii): Whether disputed signatures on later documents warranted rejecting or staying the insolvency application.

Analysis: The guarantor bore the burden of proving forgery. Absence from the bank's attendance records was not conclusive, and the private forensic report was not accepted as proof. Insolvency proceedings are summary in nature; the admitted earlier guarantees provided an independent basis for establishing debt and default.

Conclusion: The disputed signatures did not warrant rejection or stay of the insolvency application. Their authenticity remains for appropriate proceedings.

Issue (iv): Whether non-enforcement of collateral discharged the guarantor.

Analysis: Sections 134 and 139 of the Indian Contract Act require the relevant conditions for discharge, including release of the principal debtor or impairment of the surety's remedies, to be established. The material did not show that the securities were lost, surrendered or impaired, or that the principal debtor was released.

Conclusion: Non-enforcement of the collateral did not discharge the guarantor.

Final Conclusion: The admitted earlier guarantee remained enforceable, and the challenges did not displace the basis for personal-guarantor insolvency proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: A written acknowledgment of a subsisting debt made within limitation by a borrower extends time against a guarantor where the guarantee makes the borrower's acknowledgment binding on the guarantor.

Issues: Whether a forensic audit of the creditor's records could be directed to ascertain when the corporate debtor's security deposit was appropriated.

Analysis: The creditor gave conflicting dates for appropriation, one before commencement of the insolvency resolution process and the other during the moratorium. The dispute required verification of relevant accounting records and electronic data. The audit was confined to determining the actual date of appropriation.

Conclusion: The limited forensic audit was permissible.

Ratio Decidendi: A limited forensic audit may be directed to verify the date of appropriation of a corporate debtor's security deposit where the creditor gives conflicting dates material to the insolvency process.

Issues: (i) Whether the corporate applicant fraudulently or maliciously initiated insolvency proceedings, warranting recall and a penalty; (ii) whether the initiation of insolvency proceedings was validly authorised; (iii) whether non-joinder of the resolution applicant or approval of its plan by the committee of creditors prevented recall of the insolvency admission order.

Issue (i): Whether the corporate applicant fraudulently or maliciously initiated insolvency proceedings, warranting recall and a penalty.

Analysis: Sections 10 and 65 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 require a truthful disclosure of liabilities and address proceedings initiated fraudulently or maliciously for a purpose other than bona fide insolvency resolution. A recent decree was omitted from the application, and its proximity to the authorising resolution and filing supported an inference of deliberate concealment. A further decree was also omitted. The absence of disclosed recovery steps for a substantial write-off, disputed statutory amounts and doubtful corporate authorisation added to the evidence of improper purpose. A delayed creditor claim could not cure concealment at initiation.

Conclusion: The proceedings were fraudulently and maliciously initiated. Recall of the admission order, termination of the process and the Rs. 5 lakh penalty were upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the initiation of insolvency proceedings was validly authorised.

Analysis: The dispute concerned whether the persons who convened the meeting continued to hold office, not merely a failure to file an appointment form. The record did not establish regularisation of the directors relied upon; one was recorded as having ceased before the meeting. Section 176 of the Companies Act, 2013 did not protect acts performed after the company knew that an appointment had terminated.

Conclusion: The meeting and special resolution authorising initiation were invalid.

Issue (iii): Whether non-joinder of the resolution applicant or approval of its plan by the committee of creditors prevented recall of the insolvency admission order.

Analysis: Under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, a resolution plan becomes binding upon approval by the adjudicating authority. The plan had received committee approval but not adjudicating authority approval. The resolution applicant was fully heard on appeal, leaving no prejudice from its earlier non-joinder. Fraud at initiation affected the authority to continue the process; the proposed revision and party consent arose subsequently.

Conclusion: Neither non-joinder nor committee approval prevented recall. Subsequent consent could not sustain the process or the plan.

Final Conclusion: The corporate debtor remains restored to its pre-insolvency position, and creditors may pursue their claims in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: An insolvency process initiated through fraudulent concealment cannot be sustained by subsequent committee approval of a resolution plan or consent of the parties.

Issues: (i) Whether approval of a resolution plan and partial supply of records discharged the suspended management's duty to cooperate; (ii) Whether costs for non-cooperation could be sustained in proceedings initiated under Section 19(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issue (i): Whether approval of a resolution plan and partial supply of records discharged the suspended management's duty to cooperate.

Analysis: Section 19 imposes a continuing duty to assist and cooperate with the resolution professional. Approval by the committee of creditors is a commercial decision, and resolution may proceed using information obtained from other sources. The assessment of compliance drew on the list of outstanding documents and the finding that the appellant's statements were incorrect.

Conclusion: No. Plan approval and partial disclosure did not discharge the duty to cooperate; non-cooperation was established.

Issue (ii): Whether costs for non-cooperation could be sustained in proceedings initiated under Section 19(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: Section 19(2) enables the resolution professional to seek directions but does not itself provide for costs. Section 60(5) of the Code and Rule 11 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 provide the source of the adjudicating authority's power to impose costs for conduct in proceedings. Section 70 provides for punishment for misconduct during insolvency resolution without displacing that power. An incorrect reference to an enabling provision does not invalidate an order if the power exists under another source of law.

Conclusion: Yes. The costs imposed on the appellant for non-cooperation were sustained.

Final Conclusion: The continuing cooperation obligation remains enforceable through directions and the adjudicating authority's independently sourced power to impose costs.

Ratio Decidendi: A wrong citation of an enabling provision does not invalidate a costs order if the power exercised is otherwise available in law.

Outcome: Delay was condoned and the Special Leave Petition was dismissed. Pending applications were disposed of.

Issues: (i) Whether the clearances of separately constituted units could be clubbed for SSI exemption? (ii) Whether clandestine manufacture and removal were established by electronic records and other evidence? (iii) Whether the personal penalties under Rule 26 were sustainable?

Issue (i): Whether the clearances of separately constituted units could be clubbed for SSI exemption?

Analysis: Notification No. 8/2003-CE governs the exemption based on clearance value. Clubbing requires an assessment of the evidence as a whole to determine whether the units operated as a single manufacturer. Family relationships and shared facilities, marketing or transport are not independently conclusive; financial flow-back is relevant but not indispensable in every case. The alleged inter-unit financial arrangements were not adequately verified, and the production, electricity and brand evidence did not demonstrate that the units lacked independent operations.

Conclusion: The units' clearances could not be clubbed for SSI exemption.

Issue (ii): Whether clandestine manufacture and removal were established by electronic records and other evidence?

Analysis: Section 36B of the Central Excise Act governs the admissibility of electronic printouts. Compliance with its certification requirements and the source, extraction and chain of custody of the data were not established; a signature on the printouts did not cure those deficiencies. The adjudication also did not adequately address the safeguards under Section 9D for reliance on statements. The alleged parallel accounts lacked sufficient independent corroboration of actual manufacture, removal and sale.

Conclusion: Clandestine manufacture and removal were not established, and the associated duty demand and appropriation were unsustainable.

Issue (iii): Whether the personal penalties under Rule 26 were sustainable?

Analysis: Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules requires conduct satisfying the applicable provision. The notice and adjudication did not adequately identify such conduct by either individual; association with the concerns and an unspecified allegation of assistance were insufficient.

Conclusion: The personal penalties were unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: Both duty demands, the related appropriation, interest and penalties were set aside, with consequential relief in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Clubbing the clearances of separately constituted units requires a cumulative evidentiary showing that they operated as a single manufacturer; family ties and shared facilities alone are insufficient.

Issues: (i) Whether credit-linked demands could be sustained despite reversal of proportionate CENVAT credit and failure to verify the amount as directed on remand; (ii) whether the extended limitation period applies to the demand on goods cleared at concessional duty rates; (iii) whether penalties on the manufacturer and its director are sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether credit-linked demands could be sustained despite reversal of proportionate CENVAT credit and failure to verify the amount as directed on remand.

Analysis: Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 gives an option to the assessee, and reversal of proportionate credit is treated as non-availment. The adjudicating authority reapplied Rule 6 without verifying the quantum of reversal as directed, contrary to judicial discipline.

Conclusion: The credit-linked demands cannot be sustained on the basis adopted in the impugned order. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period applies to the demand on goods cleared at concessional duty rates.

Analysis: The assessee regularly filed declarations and returns and was audited. The reasoning excluding the extended period for the classification demand applied equally to the concessional-rate demand.

Conclusion: The extended period does not apply, and the demand is confined to the normal period. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalties on the manufacturer and its director are sustainable.

Analysis: There was no allegation or evidence of mens rea, and the same reasoning applied to the director.

Conclusion: All penalties on the assessee and its director are set aside.

Final Conclusion: Credit reversal is recognised, surviving demands are confined to the normal period with cum-duty benefit, and no penalties remain.

Ratio Decidendi: Reversal of proportionate CENVAT credit is treated as non-availment of that credit.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner should be granted anticipatory bail; (ii) whether the tax-department reporting directions were appropriate in the bail proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner should be granted anticipatory bail.

Analysis: The allegations arose from an advance for a property purchase and dishonoured cheques. On a prima facie assessment, the transaction appeared commercial and the criminal proceedings appeared to be a strong-arm tactic. No proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act or civil recovery proceedings had been brought to the Court's notice.

Conclusion: Anticipatory bail was granted in favour of the petitioner, subject to conditions.

Issue (ii): Whether the tax-department reporting directions were appropriate in the bail proceedings.

Analysis: Bail proceedings concern the accused's culpability. Tax authorities have mechanisms to address evasion, and a court deciding bail should not assume an adversarial role against the accused absent apparent and compelling circumstances.

Conclusion: The tax-department reporting directions were inappropriate in the bail proceedings.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner received protection from arrest on conditions; the underlying criminal allegations remain to be determined.

Issues: (i) Whether denial of a personal hearing before an adverse tax demand breached Section 75(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and was cured in first appeal; (ii) Whether the alleged excess input tax credit could be sustained on the existing record without verification of returns, books of account, and reconciliation.

Issue (i): Whether denial of a personal hearing before an adverse tax demand breached Section 75(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and was cured in first appeal.

Analysis: Section 75(4) mandates an opportunity of personal hearing where an adverse decision is contemplated. Receipt of notices and submission of a written reply do not substitute this separate statutory right. The first appellate order adopted the departmental figures without independently addressing the GSTR-9C, books of account, or return reconciliation; it therefore did not cure the breach of principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: Denial of a personal hearing breached Section 75(4) and was not cured in first appeal. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the alleged excess input tax credit could be sustained on the existing record without verification of returns, books of account, and reconciliation.

Analysis: The finding of excess credit proceeded on an unverified assumption that reverse-charge credit of Rs. 5,24,259 was included in Table 4(A)(5) of GSTR-3B. The relevant monthly returns had not been verified, the comparison with GSTR-9 disclosed a different mismatch, the alleged admission of excess credit was unsupported by the record, and the books and reconciliation explaining a possible error in GSTR-9 were not examined. Section 155 places the burden of proving input tax credit on the claimant, requiring production and verification of books, invoices, returns, and relevant reverse-charge records. Section 44 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 80 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules do not provide for online alteration of a filed annual return; a bona fide error in the return consequently required factual verification rather than outright rejection. Section 113(1) authorises fresh adjudication after additional evidence is considered.

Conclusion: The existing finding of excess input tax credit and the consequential demand were unsustainable; whether any excess credit was actually availed was left undecided for fresh adjudication. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The orders sustaining the disputed tax, interest, and penalty were annulled, and the original authority must determine the matter afresh within the confines of the show-cause notice after granting a meaningful hearing and verifying the relevant records.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an adverse GST demand rests on a contested mismatch between returns, the taxpayer must receive a mandatory personal hearing and a meaningful opportunity to establish input tax credit through underlying records; a return mismatch alone cannot sustain the demand.

Issues: (i) Whether a penalty under section 129(1) can be sustained where the show-cause notice does not specify the provisions of the Act or Rules alleged to have been contravened; (ii) Whether penalty under section 129(1) is leviable on goods sent for job work when the job-work e-way bill was generated after interception.

Issue (i): Whether a penalty under section 129(1) can be sustained where the show-cause notice does not specify the provisions of the Act or Rules alleged to have been contravened.

Analysis: Section 129(1) applies only where goods are transported or stored in transit in contravention of identified provisions of the Act or Rules. The show-cause notice merely alleged failure to produce documents for unloading at a different location, without identifying any statutory provision or rule contravened. The original order subsequently relied upon provisions relating to job work, tax invoices and transport documents that were absent from the notice. A notice must define the scope of adjudication and afford a meaningful opportunity to answer the precise allegations; an unstated statutory breach cannot subsequently be used to sustain the demand.

Conclusion: Penalty under section 129(1) could not be imposed without specifying the contravened statutory provisions or rules in the show-cause notice, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under section 129(1) is leviable on goods sent for job work when the job-work e-way bill was generated after interception.

Analysis: The contemporaneous documents and the findings in the original order established that the goods were sent for job work, and their authenticity was not disputed. Section 143(1) permits a principal to send inputs or capital goods to a job worker without payment of tax. A delay in generating the job-work e-way bill could not alter the accepted nature of the transaction into a taxable supply. Since no tax was payable on goods sent for job work, the tax-linked penalty under section 129(1) was not leviable.

Conclusion: No penalty under section 129(1) was leviable on the goods sent for job work, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The tax and penalty proceedings lacked valid statutory notice and were independently unsustainable because the goods were moved without tax for job work.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty under section 129(1) requires a properly particularised statutory contravention and tax payable on the goods; it cannot rest on an unspecified breach where the goods are established to have been moved without payment of tax for job work.

Issues: (i) Whether the claim of Rs. 84,500 as carried-forward input tax credit in TRAN-1 was admissible where the June 2017 Kerala VAT return disclosed NIL closing credit; (ii) Whether VAT paid on a truck chassis and engine purchased in June 2017, which became commercially usable after 1 July 2017, could be claimed as transitional credit through TRAN-1 despite non-filing of Form 25/Form 25B and non-reflection of the credit in Part E of the VAT return.

Issue (i): Whether the claim of Rs. 84,500 as carried-forward input tax credit in TRAN-1 was admissible where the June 2017 Kerala VAT return disclosed NIL closing credit.

Analysis: Section 140 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits transition of eligible credit available under the existing law. The June 2017 VAT return recorded NIL balance VAT credit, and no basis was furnished to establish the claimed balance of Rs. 84,500.

Conclusion: The claim of Rs. 84,500 was not admissible and its rejection was sustained, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether VAT paid on a truck chassis and engine purchased in June 2017, which became commercially usable after 1 July 2017, could be claimed as transitional credit through TRAN-1 despite non-filing of Form 25/Form 25B and non-reflection of the credit in Part E of the VAT return.

Analysis: Section 11(2) of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act and Rule 13(1B) of the Kerala Value Added Tax Rules governed credit on capital goods. The vehicle was not commercially usable during the VAT regime because body-building work remained incomplete. The prescribed period for the Form 25 application ran from commercial use rather than purchase. By the time the vehicle was ready for use, GST had commenced and TRAN-1 was the prescribed mechanism for transition. The invoice and purchase disclosures established substantive eligibility under both the erstwhile VAT regime and the GST regime; failure to obtain Form 25B before 30 June 2017 was a procedural impediment that did not extinguish that entitlement.

Conclusion: The question was answered in the affirmative: transitional credit of Rs. 1,75,916.79 on the truck chassis and engine was admissible, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Transitional credit remains available for eligible capital goods whose commercial use arose after the GST transition, while a claimed carry-forward balance unsupported by the final VAT return is unavailable.

Ratio Decidendi: A procedural Form 25/Form 25B requirement cannot defeat otherwise admissible transitional input tax credit on capital goods where commercial use arose after transition to GST and substantive eligibility is established.

Issues: Whether the differential Cess demand based solely on an erroneous GSTR-1 entry was sustainable despite consistent taxable value, CGST and SGST declarations and payment of Cess in GSTR-3B.

Analysis: The Cess demand rested on the higher amount entered in GSTR-1 for January 2019. The taxable value and the CGST and SGST liabilities declared in GSTR-1 corresponded with those in GSTR-3B and were undisputed. The Cess amount shown in GSTR-1 did not correspond with the taxable value or the CGST and SGST amounts, whereas the Cess liability of Rs. 2,56,350 was declared and paid through input tax credit in GSTR-3B. There was no evidence of suppressed outward supply, suppressed taxable value, or short payment of CGST or SGST. A bare discrepancy arising from an apparent clerical entry, without supporting evidence of actual short payment, could not sustain the Cess demand.

Conclusion: The differential Cess demand, with consequential interest and penalty, was unsustainable; the erroneous GSTR-1 Cess entry was treated as a clerical mistake.

Issues: Whether transportation of rubber latex from an agriculturist to a registered taxable person's premises, accompanied by a delivery challan containing an incorrect unrelated GSTIN, qualified for exemption from the e-way bill requirement.

Analysis: Notification No. 3/2018-State Tax exempts intra-State movement of rubber latex from an agriculturist's premises to the registered business place of a taxable person, irrespective of value, where the goods are accompanied by a delivery challan prescribed under Rule 55 of the Kerala State Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017. The material established that the supplier was an agriculturist, the goods originated from the rubber estate, and the transport was accompanied by a proper delivery challan. The GSTIN stated in the challan belonged to an unrelated person, with no material showing any connection between that person and the transaction; the entry was therefore a genuine and condonable clerical error.

Conclusion: The e-way bill exemption was available for the movement of rubber latex, and the incorrect GSTIN entry in the delivery challan was condoned as a clerical error.

Issues: Whether the input tax credit mismatch between FORM GSTR-3B and FORM GSTR-2A for FY 2017-18, pending in appeal, required fresh examination under Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST dated 27.12.2022.

Analysis: Paragraph 6 of the Circular applies its instructions to FY 2017-18 and 2018-19 matters where adjudication or appellate proceedings remain pending. The dispute related to FY 2017-18, and additional supplier-return records were available for verification. Both sides agreed to fresh consideration under the Circular while observing principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The input tax credit mismatch dispute falls within the Circular and requires fresh consideration on the additional evidence in accordance with principles of natural justice.

Issues: Whether the input tax credit discrepancy between FORM GSTR-3B and FORM GSTR-2A for FY 2017-18, resulting from incorrect supplier reporting, was required to be evaluated under Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST dated 27.12.2022.

Analysis: Paragraph 6 of the Circular applies its instructions to pending adjudication or appellate proceedings concerning FY 2017-18 and FY 2018-19. The dispute concerned FY 2017-18 and remained pending when the Circular was issued. Since the Circular post-dated the original adjudication and first appellate orders, the documentary evidence relevant to the claimed input tax credit had not been assessed under its prescribed framework.

Conclusion: The claimed input tax credit must be evaluated under Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST dated 27.12.2022 on the basis of the relevant documentary evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether GST proceedings against a deceased sole proprietor whose business had discontinued could be sustained without notice to the legal heir and determination of the inherited estate under Section 93(1)(b); and (ii) Whether input tax credit was allowable where suppliers had paid GST but had mistakenly reported invoices as B2C instead of B2B, resulting in a GSTR-2A mismatch.

Issue (i): Whether GST proceedings against a deceased sole proprietor whose business had discontinued could be sustained without notice to the legal heir and determination of the inherited estate under Section 93(1)(b).

Analysis: Section 93(1)(b) confines the liability of a legal representative, where the deceased proprietor's business has discontinued, to payment from the inherited estate and only to the extent that estate can meet the charge. The business had ceased, registration had been cancelled, and no notice or proceedings had been addressed to the legal heir. No inquiry had identified an inherited estate against which the demand could be enforced. The statutory basis for recovery was therefore not established.

Conclusion: The proceedings and the appellate order were without jurisdiction and void for non-compliance with Section 93(1)(b), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether input tax credit was allowable where suppliers had paid GST but had mistakenly reported invoices as B2C instead of B2B, resulting in a GSTR-2A mismatch.

Analysis: Supplier certificates established that GST on the relevant invoices had been paid and that the GSTR-2A mismatch resulted from erroneous B2C reporting in suppliers' returns. This evidence was not rebutted, and there was no basis to disbelieve the genuineness of the purchases or the payment of tax by suppliers.

Conclusion: The input tax credit was allowable despite the GSTR-2A mismatch, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: In a discontinued proprietorship, post-death GST liability can be pursued only against the legal representative through the inherited estate, and a reconciliable reporting error does not defeat otherwise valid input tax credit where supplier tax payment is established.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a deceased proprietor's business has discontinued, Section 93(1)(b) permits recovery only through proceedings directed to the legal representative and limited to the inherited estate; proceedings without those statutory steps lack jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant could be treated as an importer and subjected to a joint-and-several customs-duty demand; (ii) Whether penalties under Sections 112(a) and 114AA were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant could be treated as an importer and subjected to a joint-and-several customs-duty demand.

Analysis: Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 does not permit collective recovery of customs duty from several persons without identifying the person statutorily liable as importer. The bills of entry were filed and duty was discharged by the importing entity. The appellant's association was confined to being a director of entities involved in high-seas sales of certain consignments. The uncorroborated and retracted reference to a person described as "Raju Bhai" did not establish that the appellant procured the licences, filed the bills of entry, owned the goods, or otherwise acted as importer.

Conclusion: The appellant was not the importer, and the joint-and-several duty demand against him was set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether penalties under Sections 112(a) and 114AA were sustainable.

Analysis: No material established that the appellant dealt with the imported goods, filed or supplied documents for the bills of entry, or used an advance licence for their clearance. The licences were valid when the goods were imported, and the alleged licence transaction was not linked to the impugned imports.

Conclusion: The statutory ingredients for penalties were not established, and the penalties were set aside.

Final Conclusion: Customs-duty liability and penal consequences could not be imposed on a person who was not proved to be the importer or to have participated in the impugned import transactions.

Ratio Decidendi: Customs duty under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 can be recovered only from the identified statutory importer and cannot be imposed jointly and severally on a high-seas seller or director absent evidence establishing that person as the importer.

Issues: Whether personal penalty for dealing with smuggled goods is sustainable when the assessee's possession or control of the premises and conscious involvement with the seized goods are not established.

Analysis: Section 112(b)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 requires cogent evidence establishing the assessee's culpable connection with the goods. The alleged tenancy and control of the bamboo shed were unsupported by rent records, payment evidence, official records, or other objective material. The statements connecting the assessee with the shed and goods lacked independent corroboration, while the contemporaneous panchnama did not identify the assessee as the owner or occupier of the shed. Proximity of a separate business premises could not establish possession or conscious knowledge of the goods. Suspicion or inferred association with the premises could not substitute proof required for personal penal liability.

Conclusion: The ingredients for penalty under Section 112(b)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 were not established; the personal penalty was set aside.