Issues: (i) Whether an Indian-registered vehicle used as a private conveyance and departing under Section 43(1) required a Section 51 export-clearance order for re-import duty exemption; (ii) Whether the petitioner could be required to file an electronic Bill of Entry with an IEC or GSTIN where the portal made such filing impossible.

Issue (i): Whether an Indian-registered vehicle used as a private conveyance and departing under Section 43(1) required a Section 51 export-clearance order for re-import duty exemption.

Analysis: Section 43(1), within the regime for conveyances, exempts private conveyances carrying only passenger luggage from cargo-report and departure-clearance requirements. Section 51 applies to commercial export goods under a distinct regime. The vehicle lawfully departed as a personal conveyance, and its subsequent placement in a maritime container for safe transit did not convert it into commercial cargo. The applicable circular clarifies that reference to Section 51 in the re-import exemption notification cannot deny substantive exemption where that provision was legally inapplicable when the vehicle exited India.

Conclusion: A Section 51 export-clearance order was not required for the vehicle, and the re-import exemption could not be denied for its absence.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner could be required to file an electronic Bill of Entry with an IEC or GSTIN where the portal made such filing impossible.

Analysis: The electronic filing system required an IEC or GSTIN despite the vehicle being a personal Indian-registered asset, rather than a commercial import. The proviso to Section 46 permits presentation of the Bill of Entry in another manner. Requiring compliance with an electronic condition that cannot be fulfilled would offend the principle that law does not compel performance of an impossibility.

Conclusion: The Bill of Entry may be filed without an IEC or GSTIN; if electronic filing cannot be processed, physical papers must be accepted for manual filing and release of the vehicle on the required bond.

Final Conclusion: Re-entry of the Indian personal vehicle is governed by the private-conveyance regime rather than commercial-export formalities, and the statutory filing process must accommodate the substantive re-import entitlement.

Ratio Decidendi: A private Indian conveyance lawfully departing under Section 43(1) cannot be denied re-import exemption for want of a Section 51 export clearance, and impossible electronic filing requirements must yield to an available statutory alternative.

Issues: Whether the ex parte assessment for the tax period 2019-20 should be restored for a fresh response and adjudication.

Analysis: The assessment had been confirmed without a reply to the show-cause notice. The petitioner stated that specified tax amounts had been paid and undertook to deposit 50% of the outstanding IGST and cess.

Outcome: The matter was remitted for fresh determination upon compliance with the stipulated deposit and reply requirements.

Issues: Whether an opportunity of personal hearing is mandatory before an adverse order is passed under Section 75(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, irrespective of a request for hearing or filing of a reply to the show-cause notice.

Analysis: Section 75(4) contains two independent contingencies separated by the word "or": a hearing must be granted when sought by the person chargeable with tax or penalty, and it must also be granted where the proper officer proposes to pass an adverse order. The latter obligation applies independently of whether the taxable person sought a hearing or filed a reply.

Conclusion: An effective opportunity of personal hearing is mandatory before passing an adverse order under Section 75(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issues: Whether a faceless assessment and consequential demand and penalty proceedings could stand where, despite a specific request, no personal hearing was afforded and the final show-cause notice allowed less than the response period prescribed by the applicable SOP.

Analysis: Section 144B(6)(viii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires a personal hearing where it is specifically requested by the assessee. Paragraph N.1.3 of the SOP requires a minimum seven-day response period to ensure compliance with the principles of natural justice, subject to justified curtailment for limitation. The requested hearing was not granted, and the curtailed response time was not supported by any reason. These defects constituted a breach of natural justice warranting judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The assessment order, demand notice, penalty show-cause notice, and consequential penalty order were invalid and set aside.

Issues: Whether interim protection was warranted against recovery of the refund withheld under Section 245(2) pending adjudication of the writ petition.

Analysis: The refund had already been credited to the petitioner's bank account, while the Department sought direct recovery from the bank on the basis of the Assessing Officer's satisfaction. To balance the equities, the existing fixed deposit was directed to remain intact pending further orders.

Outcome: Amendment to the writ petition was permitted, interim protection against recovery of the refund was granted, and the matter was listed for further hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether the Assistant Commissioner of Customs, SIIB, was a proper officer competent to issue the show-cause notice under the Customs Act; (ii) Whether writ jurisdiction could be invoked at the show-cause-notice stage to determine the effect of the accepted CBI closure report and the factual allegations in the notice.

Issue (i): Whether the Assistant Commissioner of Customs, SIIB, was a proper officer competent to issue the show-cause notice under the Customs Act.

Analysis: Sections 2(34), 28 and 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 govern the identification and competence of the proper officer for issuance of a show-cause notice. The binding Supreme Court position has settled that the concerned SIIB officer was competent to issue such notice.

Conclusion: The Assistant Commissioner, SIIB, was a proper officer competent to issue the show-cause notice; decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether writ jurisdiction could be invoked at the show-cause-notice stage to determine the effect of the accepted CBI closure report and the factual allegations in the notice.

Analysis: Article 226 of the Constitution of India is ordinarily not exercised where an effective statutory process is available, except in recognised exceptional situations. The impact of the closure report upon the notice and the allegations concerning exports, valuation, DEPB credit and transactions require factual determination and evidence before the adjudicating authority. After the jurisdictional challenge failed, no exception justifying writ intervention remained.

Conclusion: Writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked at this stage to adjudicate the evidence-based disputes arising from the show-cause notice; decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The settled proper-officer position and the unresolved factual controversies must be addressed through the statutory adjudicatory process.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the competence of the proper officer is settled and the challenge to a show-cause notice depends on disputed facts requiring evidence, pre-adjudication relief under Article 226 is unavailable.

Issues: Whether a demand for tax, interest and penalty exceeding the amount specified in the show-cause notice is valid under Section 75(7) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 75(7) restricts the amount of tax, interest and penalty in the determination order to the amount specified in the notice and prohibits confirmation on grounds outside the notice. The notice specified a substantially lower aggregate amount than the amount determined in the impugned order.

Conclusion: The demand exceeding the amount specified in the show-cause notice violated Section 75(7) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and could not be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether a bank's Government securities held to maturity constitute stock-in-trade; (ii) Whether the loss on revaluation of such securities is allowable; and (iii) Whether bad debts relating to non-rural advances are fully deductible without adjustment against the provision for bad and doubtful debts.

Issue (i): Whether a bank's Government securities held to maturity constitute stock-in-trade.

Analysis: Government securities held by a bank constitute stock-in-trade notwithstanding that they are held to maturity.

Conclusion: Answered in favour of the assessee: the Government securities constitute stock-in-trade.

Issue (ii): Whether the loss on revaluation of such securities is allowable.

Analysis: Once the securities are stock-in-trade, their valuation must be made at cost or market value, whichever is lower. The resultant diminution on revaluation is therefore allowable.

Conclusion: Answered in favour of the assessee: the revaluation loss is allowable.

Issue (iii): Whether bad debts relating to non-rural advances are fully deductible without adjustment against the provision for bad and doubtful debts.

Analysis: The deduction for actual bad-debt write-offs is distinct from the deduction for provisions concerning rural advances. The proviso limiting write-off deductions operates only to prevent double deduction in respect of rural advances and does not restrict deductions for bad debts arising from non-rural advances.

Conclusion: Answered in favour of the assessee: bad debts relating to non-rural advances are fully deductible without being set off against the provision for bad and doubtful debts.

Final Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to treat its Government securities as stock-in-trade, claim the consequential revaluation loss, and obtain deduction for bad debts from non-rural advances independently of the rural-advance provision.

Outcome: The tax case appeals were disposed of without answering the substantial questions of law, with liberty to revive the appeals if necessary.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings initiated on the basis of an alleged share transaction incorrectly mapped to the assessee's PAN were legally sustainable.

Analysis: The reassessment order under Section 148A(3) and consequential notice under Section 148 rested wholly on information alleging sale of shares by the assessee. The Revenue subsequently admitted that the information had been inadvertently mapped to the assessee's PAN and actually related to another person. The action had been initiated without verification of the assessee's particulars merely because the limitation period was about to expire. Such exercise, founded on admittedly incorrect information relating to a different person, lacked a valid factual basis and amounted to a colourable exercise of power.

Conclusion: The reassessment action against the assessee was held wholly unsustainable in law.

Issues: (i) Whether the second appeals were barred by limitation where the first appellate orders were received on 31.03.2025 and prior service did not comply with the prescribed statutory mode; (ii) Whether the first appeals filed on the next working day after the limitation period expired on a Sunday were maintainable.

Issue (i): Whether the second appeals were barred by limitation where the first appellate orders were received on 31.03.2025 and prior service did not comply with the prescribed statutory mode.

Analysis: Section 37C of the Customs Act requires service through registered post or speed post with acknowledgement due. A Document Identification Number merely authenticates the appellate order and does not establish its electronic upload or service. The material did not establish service in the prescribed manner before 31.03.2025; the information regarding dispatch by speed post did not show that acknowledgement due had been sought. Limitation for the second appeals consequently ran from actual receipt on 31.03.2025, making the filing on 03.06.2025 timely.

Conclusion: The second appeals were within limitation, and the dismissal by the appellate tribunal as time-barred was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the first appeals filed on the next working day after the limitation period expired on a Sunday were maintainable.

Analysis: Where the final day for filing fell on a Sunday, Section 4 of the Limitation Act permitted institution on the immediately succeeding working day. The first appeals filed on 30.05.2022 were therefore within time.

Conclusion: The first appeals were maintainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The demands have not been adjudicated on merits and require determination at the first appellate stage in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute prescribes a particular mode of service, limitation for challenging an appellate order commences only upon service effected in accordance with that mode; a Document Identification Number alone does not establish service.

Issues: Whether land classified as agricultural in revenue records and used for agricultural purposes is excluded from wealth-tax assets under the retrospectively amended definition.

Analysis: Explanation 1(b) to Section 2(ea) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, inserted by the Finance Act, 2013 with retrospective effect from 01.04.1993, extends the exclusion to land classified in revenue records as agricultural land and actually used for agricultural purposes. The agricultural use of the subject land was undisputed, and the relevant assessment year fell within the retrospective operation of the amendment. The earlier basis for denial, namely that construction was not legally impermissible on the land, did not govern the amended definition.

Conclusion: Agricultural land so classified in revenue records and used for agricultural purposes is excluded from the definition of taxable assets for wealth-tax purposes.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings for Assessment Year 2017-18, initiated more than three years after the end of that year, were valid where approval was granted by the Principal Commissioner instead of the authority specified under Section 151(ii).

Analysis: Section 151 prescribes the specified authority according to the elapsed period from the end of the relevant assessment year. Where more than three years have elapsed, approval must be granted by the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner, or Director General, as applicable. The approval dated 28 July 2022 and the consequential notice dated 29 July 2022 were issued after expiry of three years from the end of Assessment Year 2017-18, but approval was obtained from the Principal Commissioner, who was not the competent authority for that period.

Conclusion: The approval was obtained from an incorrect specified authority; consequently, the order under Section 148A(d), the notice under Section 148, and consequential proceedings were invalid and liable to be quashed.

Issues: Whether an adjudicating authority may confirm tax and penalty demands exceeding those proposed in the show-cause notice.

Analysis: Section 75(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 imposes a mandatory restriction against confirming a demand in excess of that proposed in the show-cause notice. The adjudication order confirmed a penalty exceeding the amount proposed in the notice; it was therefore without jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The adjudication order was set aside and the matter remitted for fresh adjudication after affording opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether reassessment after sale of a corporate debtor as a going concern on a clean-slate basis can be founded on its past liabilities; (ii) Whether reopening based on an unverified presumption that interest deduction had been claimed, despite the absence of cessation of liability, is valid; (iii) Whether an order under Section 148A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be sustained on an allegation of bogus purchases not contained in the show cause notice.

Issue (i): Whether reassessment after sale of a corporate debtor as a going concern on a clean-slate basis can be founded on its past liabilities.

Analysis: The corporate debtor was sold as a going concern in liquidation under Regulation 32(e) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016. The sale was on a clean-slate basis, under which prior liabilities and investigations stood extinguished. The settled clean-slate principle precludes imposition of such historical liabilities upon the purchaser.

Conclusion: Reassessment founded on liabilities extinguished through the clean-slate going-concern sale is impermissible.

Issue (ii): Whether reopening based on an unverified presumption that interest deduction had been claimed, despite the absence of cessation of liability, is valid.

Analysis: The proposed application of Section 41(1) and Explanation 1(b) to Section 115JB(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 rested only on the supposition that interest might have been claimed as a deduction. The contemporaneous accounts showed that such interest had not been claimed since the relevant loan became non-performing. The order also recorded that the liability had not ceased, thereby negating the factual premise for treating any amount as income through cessation of liability. The same alleged interest liability had additionally been made the basis of reopenings for earlier assessment years.

Conclusion: The reassessment lacked a lawful factual basis for alleging escapement of income on account of cessation of liability.

Issue (iii): Whether an order under Section 148A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be sustained on an allegation of bogus purchases not contained in the show cause notice.

Analysis: The show cause notice under Section 148A(1) was confined to the alleged cessation of interest liability. The order under Section 148A(3) introduced an unrelated allegation of bogus purchases without prior notice or an opportunity to respond. An order under Section 148A must remain confined to the grounds disclosed in the show cause notice; introduction of a new ground breaches natural justice and demonstrates non-application of mind.

Conclusion: The unnotified allegation of bogus purchases could not sustain the order under Section 148A(3).

Final Conclusion: The reassessment for the relevant assessment year was invalidated by the clean-slate effect of the liquidation sale, the absence of material supporting escapement of income, and the breach of natural justice.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the application for condonation of delay and the appellate order were valid when the application was decided on merits before the scheduled personal hearing.

Analysis: The application sought condonation of delay in filing an application for revocation of cancellation of registration. The show-cause notice fixed a personal hearing on 24.10.2025, but the application was rejected on 21.10.2025. A proceeding for condonation of delay required examination of the justification for delay and could not be converted into an adjudication on the merits of the revocation application. Although the appeal was filed under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, the appellate authority likewise could not decide the merits of the underlying revocation matter in an appeal concerning delay condonation.

Conclusion: The rejection order, appellate order, and show-cause notice were invalid and were quashed, with fresh proceedings to be undertaken in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether adjournment of the resolution-plan approval proceedings pending decision on the request to replace the resolution professional was warranted.

Analysis: The application seeking replacement of the resolution professional, on which the adjournment request rested, had been withdrawn. The pending resolution-plan approval application, approved by the entire Committee of Creditors, was unrelated to that replacement request. The prolonged pendency of the insolvency process, repeated interlocutory applications, an earlier unsuccessful settlement proposal, and the undertaking to cooperate in expeditious hearings supported refusal of a further adjournment.

Conclusion: The refusal of adjournment and the associated costs were sustained. The adverse remarks against counsel were directed not to operate to counsel's prejudice.

Issues: (i) Whether a liquidator may continue an eviction application instituted by the resolution professional after liquidation; (ii) Whether the Adjudicating Authority may direct eviction of occupants from properties of the corporate debtor forming part of the liquidation estate notwithstanding rent-control protections.

Issue (i): Whether a liquidator may continue an eviction application instituted by the resolution professional after liquidation.

Analysis: The substitution of the liquidator in the pending application did not render it infructuous. The substance of the application was recovery and protection of assets of the corporate debtor. The liquidator's powers and duties under Section 35, including custody, control, preservation and realisation of assets, are materially pari materia to the resolution professional's powers relied upon in the original application. Recovery of a liquidation-estate asset is a mandatory statutory duty rather than a discretionary exercise.

Conclusion: The liquidator was entitled, and was statutorily obliged, to continue the pending eviction application after liquidation.

Issue (ii): Whether the Adjudicating Authority may direct eviction of occupants from properties of the corporate debtor forming part of the liquidation estate notwithstanding rent-control protections.

Analysis: The properties were owned by the corporate debtor and consequently vested in the liquidation estate under Sections 36(1) and 36(3)(a). The alleged thirty-year leases were unregistered and therefore could not establish their terms in evidence under Section 49 of the Registration Act. The occupants had not paid rent and were related parties connected with the suspended management, supporting the finding of unauthorized occupation. The recovery of estate assets had a direct and complete nexus with liquidation, bringing the dispute within the Adjudicating Authority's jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c). The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code is a later special insolvency legislation, and its overriding effect under Section 238 prevails over inconsistent rent-control procedure. The constitutional objection did not alter this position because recovery of the liquidation estate is incidental to the insolvency and liquidation framework, not an impermissible adjudication of ordinary landlord-tenant disputes.

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority had jurisdiction to order recovery of the properties for the liquidation estate, and rent-control protections did not bar eviction of the unauthorized occupants in the circumstances.

Final Conclusion: Assets owned by the corporate debtor must be brought under the liquidator's custody and control for their preservation and realisation in liquidation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where property owned by a corporate debtor forms part of the liquidation estate, the liquidator may seek its recovery before the Adjudicating Authority under Section 60(5)(c), and inconsistent rent-control procedure yields to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code where occupation lacks a valid enforceable tenancy.

Issues: Whether detained imported goods could be provisionally released pending adjudication upon appropriate safeguards for recovery of differential duty.

Analysis: Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 permits provisional release on execution of bond, furnishing of security, and fulfilment of conditions adequate to protect revenue. Payment of duty on the declared value, coupled with a bank guarantee for 30% of the differential duty and a personal bond for the remaining 70%, was found sufficient to secure the Revenue's interest. Continued detention until completion of adjudication was therefore unwarranted.

Conclusion: The imported goods shall be provisionally released upon payment of applicable duty on the declared value, furnishing a bank guarantee for 30% of the differential duty, and executing a personal bond for the balance 70%.

Issues: Whether revocation proceedings against a customs broker were initiated within the mandatory 90-day period under Regulation 17(1) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018.

Analysis: Regulation 17(1) requires notice to be issued within 90 days from receipt of an offence report, defined as a summary of investigation and prima facie charges. In the absence of a separate investigation report, the show-cause notices under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962, together with the relied-upon documents, constituted the offence report because they contained the investigation summary and allegations and had been received by the licensing authority. The licensing authority could not postpone commencement of the mandatory limitation period by subsequently calling for documents already annexed to those notices.

Conclusion: The notice under Regulation 17(1) was issued beyond the mandatory 90-day period; consequently, the licensing authority lacked statutory authority to revoke the customs broker licence. The revocation order was set aside and restoration of the licence was directed.