Court Invalidates Customs Notice, Deems Traffic Department Certificate Requirement Unlawful

The court found the public notice issued by the Collector of Customs to be invalid and without legal authority. It determined that the act of granting entry inwards by the Customs Officer is administrative, not quasi-judicial. The requirement for a certificate from the Traffic Department of the Kandla Port Trust was deemed unlawful. Customs duty was directed to be assessed based on the rate applicable on the date when entry inwards should have been granted. The petition was allowed, declaring the vessel wrongly denied entry, and directing assessment and duty recovery at the rate in force on that date.

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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the public notice issued by the Collector of Customs.
2. Nature of the function of granting entry inwards by the Customs Officer.
3. Legality of the requirement for a certificate from the Traffic Department of the Kandla Port Trust.
4. Determination of the applicable rate of customs duty based on the date of entry inwards.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the public notice issued by the Collector of Customs:
The petitioners contended that the public notice issued by the Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Rajkot, on 20-2-1990, was beyond his authority and ultra vires Section 31 of the Customs Act. They argued that the Collector had no power to issue such a public notice, and it interfered with the statutory function of granting entry inwards, thus affecting the rate of customs duty. The court found that the Collector lacked the authority to impose additional conditions not contemplated by the Act, and the public notice was therefore invalid and without any authority of law.

2. Nature of the function of granting entry inwards by the Customs Officer:
The petitioners argued that granting entry inwards is a quasi-judicial function, and the discretion of a quasi-judicial authority cannot be fettered by administrative instructions. However, the court concluded that the act of granting entry inwards is purely administrative. The Customs Officer does not decide any right or liability but merely checks the cargo and satisfies himself about its correctness. Therefore, the contention that passing an order for entry inwards is a quasi-judicial function was rejected.

3. Legality of the requirement for a certificate from the Traffic Department of the Kandla Port Trust:
The court examined whether the Collector had the power to require a certificate from the Traffic Department of the Kandla Port Trust as a condition for granting entry inwards. It was found that neither the Customs Act nor the Rules provided for such a certificate. The court held that the Collector had no authority to impose this condition, and it was inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The requirement of obtaining a certificate from an outside authority (Traffic Department) was deemed invalid and without any legal basis.

4. Determination of the applicable rate of customs duty based on the date of entry inwards:
The petitioners argued that they should be liable to pay customs duty at the rate applicable on 19-3-1990, as all boarding formalities were completed on that date, and the vessel was ready to discharge cargo. The court found that but for the unauthorized requirement of the certificate from the Traffic Department, the entry inwards would have been granted on 19-3-1990. Consequently, the petitioners' liability for customs duty should be determined based on the rate applicable on 19-3-1990. The court directed the respondents to assess the petitioners' goods and recover customs duty at the rate in force on 19-3-1990.

Conclusion:
The petition was allowed, and it was declared that the vessel "Bow Falcon" was wrongly denied entry inwards on 19-3-1990. The respondents were directed to proceed on the basis that the vessel was granted entry inwards on 19-3-1990 and to assess the petitioners' goods and recover customs duty at the rate in force on that date. The operation and implementation of the judgment were stayed for ten weeks to allow the respondents to approach the Supreme Court.

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