Arbitral liberty for reconsideration does not restore dealership rights, and writ courts cannot substitute administrative decisions.

A liberty granted in an arbitral award to seek reconsideration did not amount to setting aside termination of a dealership or directing restoration of supply; the award and the order affirming it were limited to that effect. The Corporation's later rejection of the dealer's representation was an independent administrative decision, and in the absence of arbitrariness the High Court could not, in writ jurisdiction, substitute its own view or compel restoration of the dealership. The Division Bench's order was therefore set aside and the Single Judge's dismissal of the writ petition restored.

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Issues: (i) Whether the arbitral award and the order affirming it had set aside the termination of dealership and mandated restoration of supply. (ii) Whether the High Court in writ jurisdiction could direct restoration of dealership and resumption of supply after the Corporation rejected the dealer's representation.

Issue (i): Whether the arbitral award and the order affirming it had set aside the termination of dealership and mandated restoration of supply.

Analysis: The award, read as a whole, recorded that the dealer had committed breaches of the dealership agreement and that stern action was called for. The liberty granted to make a representation for reconsideration did not amount to a positive adjudication setting aside the termination or directing restoration of supply. The order affirming the award had the same limited effect.

Conclusion: The award and the order affirming it did not restore the dealership or require resumption of supply.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court in writ jurisdiction could direct restoration of dealership and resumption of supply after the Corporation rejected the dealer's representation.

Analysis: The Corporation's consideration of the representation was an independent administrative arising after the arbitral proceedings. In the absence of arbitrariness, the High Court could not sit in appeal over that decision or substitute its own view for that of the Corporation. The Division Bench proceeded on an erroneous understanding of the award and exceeded the permissible limits of writ review.

Conclusion: The High Court could not direct restoration of the dealership or resumption of supply in writ jurisdiction.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the Division Bench's order was set aside, and the order of the Single Judge dismissing the writ petition was restored.

Ratio Decidendi: A liberty to seek reconsideration does not amount to a substantive adjudication restoring contractual rights, and a writ court cannot compel restoration of a dealership by substituting its own decision for a reasoned administrative determination.

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