Pendente lite transfer protection under Section 52 is not equivalent to an injunction; lis pendens notice and conditions are only supplementary.

Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act only subordinates a pendente lite transfer to the result of the suit; it does not restrain alienation, make the transfer void, or carry the coercive consequences of an injunction. Registration of a pending suit is similarly only a notice mechanism and cannot replace interim injunctive relief. In applications for temporary injunction against pendente lite transfers, the ordinary tests of prima facie case, irreparable injury, and balance of convenience continue to apply, without any universal requirement to first prove that Section 52 is inadequate. Courts may impose protective conditions, but only as supplements, not substitutes, for injunctions. On conflicting coordinate-Bench decisions, the earlier view prevails unless later explained.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides adequate protection against transfers pendente lite and whether transferees pendente lite can claim impleadment or resist execution as of right; (ii) whether registration of notices of pending suits under Section 18(ee) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 can substitute or provide equivalent protection to an interim injunction; (iii) whether, in applications for temporary injunction restraining transfers pendente lite, the plaintiff must first show that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is inadequate; (iv) whether protective conditions short of injunction can replace an injunction in such matters; and (v) how conflicting decisions of coordinate Benches are to be treated.

Issue (i): Whether Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides adequate protection against transfers pendente lite and whether transferees pendente lite can claim impleadment or resist execution as of right.

Analysis: Section 52 was held to operate only by subordinating a pendente lite transfer to the result of the litigation. It does not restrain alienation, does not render the transfer void or illegal, and does not by itself create the deterrent consequences that follow breach of an injunction. The Court also held that the proposition that transferees pendente lite are never entitled to impleadment as of right was too broad, because the right to be heard depends on the nature of the interest acquired and the governing procedural provisions.

Conclusion: Section 52 does not provide adequate protection by itself, and no blanket rule can exclude impleadment in every case.

Issue (ii): Whether registration of notices of pending suits under Section 18(ee) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 can substitute or provide equivalent protection to an interim injunction.

Analysis: Registration of lis pendens was treated as only an additional safeguard. It may give notice of the pending litigation, but it does not make a transfer illegal, does not prevent creation of equities in favour of transferees, and does not attract the coercive consequences attached to breach of an injunction. The Court therefore held that such registration cannot be treated as a substitute for injunctive relief.

Conclusion: Registration of the pending suit is desirable but cannot replace an injunction or secure greater protection than an injunction.

Issue (iii): Whether, in applications for temporary injunction restraining transfers pendente lite, the plaintiff must first show that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is inadequate.

Analysis: The ordinary tests for temporary injunction remain prima facie case, irreparable injury, and balance of convenience. The presence of Section 52 does not add a new mandatory pre-condition requiring the plaintiff in every case to prove that lis pendens protection is inadequate. The Court may consider the adequacy of Section 52 while exercising discretion, but that consideration cannot be converted into a blanket condition precedent.

Conclusion: No universal requirement exists that the plaintiff must separately prove inadequacy of Section 52 before an injunction can be granted.

Issue (iv): Whether protective conditions short of injunction can replace an injunction in such matters.

Analysis: The Court may impose suitable conditions depending on the facts, including undertakings or disclosure requirements. However, such conditions are only supplementary or incidental. They do not provide the same protection as an injunction and cannot be used as a substitute where injunctive relief is otherwise justified.

Conclusion: Conditions may be imposed, but they cannot replace an injunction where the facts justify restraint.

Issue (v): How conflicting decisions of coordinate Benches are to be treated.

Analysis: The Court held that judicial discipline requires adherence to precedent, and where coordinate Benches of equal strength conflict, the earlier decision prevails unless the later decision has considered and explained it. The later decision does not automatically control merely because it is later in time.

Conclusion: In case of conflict between coordinate Benches, the earlier decision in point of time should be followed unless explained by the later decision.

Final Conclusion: The reference was answered by rejecting the proposition that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act alone gives adequate protection equivalent to an injunction, while affirming the discretionary power of courts to grant injunctions and the governing rule on conflicting coordinate-Bench precedents.

Ratio Decidendi: A transfer pendente lite under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is only subservient to the decree and does not bar alienation, whereas a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 restrains the act itself and carries independent legal consequences; therefore, the two protections are not equivalent.

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