Devolution of interest in suit: non-impleadment of successor does not nullify decree, and leave may be sought by any interested person.

In cases of devolution of interest during pendency of a suit, omission to implead the successor-in-interest does not by itself render the decree a nullity. A decree is open to collateral challenge in execution only if it is void for want of inherent jurisdiction or otherwise void ab initio; a merely erroneous or voidable decree cannot be resisted under Section 47 on that basis. The text also states that leave to continue the suit under Order 22 Rule 10 is not confined to the successor alone: the plaintiff or any interested person may seek it, since the provision is enabling and intended to secure effective continuation of the proceeding.

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Issues: (i) Whether a decree passed against the predecessor-in-interest without impleading the successor-in-interest, in a case of devolution of interest during pendency of the suit, is a nullity so as to be unenforceable in execution under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; (ii) Whether, under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, an application for leave to continue the suit must be filed only by the person upon whom interest has devolved.

Issue (i): Whether a decree passed against the predecessor-in-interest without impleading the successor-in-interest, in a case of devolution of interest during pendency of the suit, is a nullity so as to be unenforceable in execution under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: Order 22 Rule 10 deals with devolution of interest during pendency of a suit and permits the suit to continue by or against the person upon whom interest has devolved, but failure to bring such person on record does not make the decree a nullity. The distinction between a decree that is void for want of inherent jurisdiction and a decree that is merely erroneous or voidable is material. A decree can be treated as a nullity in execution only where it is passed without jurisdiction or is otherwise void ab initio; mere omission to implead the transferee or successor, without more, does not render the decree void. Such a grievance may furnish a ground for appropriate substantive proceedings, but not for resisting execution under Section 47 on the footing of nullity.

Conclusion: The decree was not a nullity and the objection to executability under Section 47 could not succeed on that ground.

Issue (ii): Whether, under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, an application for leave to continue the suit must be filed only by the person upon whom interest has devolved.

Analysis: The language of Order 22 Rule 10 does not confine the request for leave to the transferee or successor alone. The provision is enabling, not mandatory in that restricted sense, and the practical responsibility to seek leave may lie with the plaintiff if the devolution is within his knowledge. The successor-in-interest, the plaintiff, or any other interested person may seek leave, because the object is to ensure effective continuation of the suit and proper representation of the devolved interest. Limiting the right to the successor alone would produce unjust and impractical results.

Conclusion: Leave to continue the suit under Order 22 Rule 10 could be sought by the plaintiff or any interested person, and not only by the successor-in-interest.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's order allowing the objection to executability was set aside, and the executing court's order rejecting the objection was restored.

Ratio Decidendi: In cases of devolution of interest during pendency of a suit, omission to implead the successor does not by itself render the decree a nullity; a decree is open to collateral attack in execution only when it is void for want of jurisdiction or otherwise void ab initio, and an application for leave under Order 22 Rule 10 may be made by the plaintiff or any interested person, not exclusively by the successor-in-interest.

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