Lis pendens and temporary injunctions remain distinct: summary SLP dismissal is not a binding declaration of law.

A non-speaking dismissal of a special leave petition does not amount to a declaration of law and does not trigger merger, so the earlier decision on restraint against alienation pending suit cannot be treated as binding merely on that basis. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act embodies lis pendens and binds a transferee pendente lite to the result of litigation, but it does not make the transfer void or automatically exclude temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. Grant of injunction remains discretionary on the usual tests of prima facie case, irreparable loss, and balance of convenience, and impleadment of a transferee pendente lite depends on the court's assessment rather than any absolute bar.

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Issues: (i) Whether the earlier decision concerning restraint on alienation of immovable property pending suit could be treated as a binding precedent in view of the Supreme Court's summary dismissal of the special leave petition. (ii) Whether Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 curtails the power to grant temporary injunction restraining alienation or creation of third-party interests, and whether a transferee pendente lite is entitled to impleadment as of right.

Issue (i): Whether the earlier decision concerning restraint on alienation of immovable property pending suit could be treated as a binding precedent in view of the Supreme Court's summary dismissal of the special leave petition.

Analysis: A non-speaking dismissal of a special leave petition does not amount to declaration of law and does not attract the doctrine of merger. The earlier decision therefore could still be examined on merits, and its reasoning could not be treated as binding merely because the special leave petition had been dismissed summarily.

Conclusion: The summary dismissal of the special leave petition did not make the earlier decision binding as a declaration of law.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 curtails the power to grant temporary injunction restraining alienation or creation of third-party interests, and whether a transferee pendente lite is entitled to impleadment as of right.

Analysis: Section 52 embodies the doctrine of lis pendens and binds a transferee pendente lite by the result of the litigation, but it does not render such transfer void or illegal. The power to grant temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 remains discretionary and depends on the usual tests of prima facie case, irreparable loss, and balance of convenience. The provision of lis pendens does not fetter that power in all cases. On impleadment, an alienee pendente lite is a representative in interest and may be added where the Court considers it appropriate; the plaintiff is not obliged to implead such transferee, but it cannot be said that impleadment is always barred.

Conclusion: Section 52 does not bar temporary injunction in a proper case, and a transferee pendente lite is not excluded from impleadment as a matter of absolute rule.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to refusal of temporary injunction failed on the facts, while the Court clarified that the earlier view on lis pendens could not override binding Supreme Court principles and that discretionary injunction jurisdiction remains intact.

Ratio Decidendi: The doctrine of lis pendens protects the parties to litigation but does not nullify the Court's discretion to grant temporary injunction where the settled equitable tests are satisfied, and a non-speaking dismissal of an SLP does not constitute a binding declaration of law.

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