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Issues: (i) Whether dismissal of a special leave petition at the threshold results in merger of the impugned order with the Supreme Court order and bars review by the High Court; (ii) Whether a speaking or non-speaking order dismissing special leave attracts merger, res judicata, or a binding declaration of law.
Issue (i): Whether dismissal of a special leave petition at the threshold results in merger of the impugned order with the Supreme Court order and bars review by the High Court.
Analysis: The jurisdiction under article 136 is divided into two stages: consideration of special leave and, only upon grant of leave, the appellate stage. Until leave is granted, the Supreme Court is not exercising appellate jurisdiction. A mere refusal of special leave leaves the impugned order operative between the parties, but it does not substitute the Supreme Court order in place of the order under challenge. Since no appeal comes into existence before leave is granted, the High Court's review power remains available if otherwise permissible under law.
Conclusion: Dismissal of the special leave petition did not cause merger, and the High Court could entertain review.
Issue (ii): Whether a speaking or non-speaking order dismissing special leave attracts merger, res judicata, or a binding declaration of law.
Analysis: A non-speaking refusal of special leave decides only that the case is not fit for grant of leave and does not declare law under article 141 or operate as res judicata on the merits. If reasons are given while refusing leave, the reasons may bind the parties and subordinate courts as a declaration of law or by judicial discipline, but the order still remains one refusing leave and does not result in merger. Merger arises only when leave is granted and the matter is disposed of in appellate jurisdiction, whether by reversal, modification, or affirmance.
Conclusion: Refusal of special leave, whether speaking or non-speaking, does not result in merger; only the stated legal principle in a speaking order may bind under article 141 or judicial discipline.
Final Conclusion: The High Court's review jurisdiction was not extinguished by the earlier dismissal of special leave, and the appeal challenging maintainability failed.
Ratio Decidendi: Merger arises only when the superior court exercises appellate jurisdiction after leave is granted; refusal of special leave, even with reasons, does not merge the impugned order, though reasons in a speaking refusal may bind as law declared or by judicial discipline.