Government Counsel renewal remains discretionary; courts cannot create a vested right or ignore binding precedent on judicial review.

Renewal and appointment of District Government Counsel remain matters of governmental discretion under the governing criminal procedure and manual framework, subject to fairness, prescribed procedure, and limited judicial review for illegality or arbitrariness. An incumbent counsel has no vested or enforceable right to renewal merely because of prior engagement, so a court cannot treat renewal as an entitlement or substitute its own assessment for the State's decision on suitability and trust. The earlier authoritative ruling on this subject was binding, and a contrary approach could not be sustained. The appeals succeeded, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the State was left free to make fresh appointments in accordance with law.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the State's decisions declining renewal of District Government Counsel and directing reconsideration of their candidature; (ii) whether the earlier authoritative ruling on appointment and renewal of District Government Counsel under the governing legal framework bound the High Court and foreclosed a contrary approach.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the State's decisions declining renewal of District Government Counsel and directing reconsideration of their candidature.

Analysis: Renewal and appointment of District Government Counsel are governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Legal Remembrancer Manual, but the engagement of such counsel remains a professional appointment resting on the Government's satisfaction, trust and confidence. The State is required to act fairly and in conformity with the applicable procedure, yet no incumbent has a vested or enforceable right to renewal merely because of prior engagement. Judicial review is available to correct illegality or arbitrariness, but the court cannot convert renewal into a claim of entitlement or substitute its own view for the executive's discretion where the governing law leaves the choice to the State.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in directing reconsideration of renewal on the premise of any enforceable right in the incumbents. The finding is against the respondents.

Issue (ii): Whether the earlier authoritative ruling on appointment and renewal of District Government Counsel under the governing legal framework bound the High Court and foreclosed a contrary approach.

Analysis: The rule of binding precedent and stare decisis requires a Division Bench to follow the law declared by a larger Bench. The authoritative three-Judge ruling on the nature of engagement, the extent of governmental discretion, and the limits of judicial review in matters of District Government Counsel governed the field. In such circumstances, a later court could not adopt a contrary approach by treating renewal as the primary point of consideration or by curtailing the State's discretion to assess suitability and trustworthiness for fresh appointments. Consistency and certainty in the law required adherence to the settled principle.

Conclusion: The earlier authoritative ruling bound the High Court, and the contrary view taken in the impugned judgment could not be sustained. The finding is in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the State was left free to make fresh appointments expeditiously in accordance with the governing law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the governing statutory framework leaves appointment or renewal of Government counsel to the State's discretion, the incumbent has no enforceable right to renewal, and courts must adhere to binding precedent while exercising only limited judicial review over arbitrariness or illegality.

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