Rent control eviction needs proven statutory breach, valid allotment basis, and reasonable exercise of power within time

A tenant's entry into premises could not be treated as a contravention of the rent control order unless the foundational facts were proved, including the landlord's duty to intimate vacancy and the absence of a lawful assurance-based entry. Where no allotment order under the relevant clauses existed, the tenant could not be directed to vacate merely because he later ceased to hold an office of profit. The power to require vacation or eviction had to rest on a proper jurisdictional basis and be exercised reasonably within a reasonable time. On the stated facts, prolonged possession, rent acceptance, and delayed complaint made the eviction direction unsustainable.

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Issues: (i) Whether the tenant's original entry into the premises in 1954 could be treated as contravention of Clause 22(2) of the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 in the absence of proof that the landlord had not given the requisite intimation or assurance under Clause 23(2); (ii) whether, in the absence of an allotment order under Clause 23 or Clause 24A, the tenant could be directed to vacate merely because he had later ceased to hold an office of profit, and whether eviction after a long lapse of time could be sustained under Clause 28(1).

Issue (i): Whether the tenant's original entry into the premises in 1954 could be treated as contravention of Clause 22(2) of the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 in the absence of proof that the landlord had not given the requisite intimation or assurance under Clause 23(2).

Analysis: The statutory scheme placed the duty to intimate vacancy on the landlord, while the tenant could lawfully enter on the landlord's assurance that occupation was in accordance with Clause 23(2). The material before the authority did not establish that the landlord had failed to intimate vacancy, that an allotment order had in fact been issued within time, or that the tenant's plea of assurance was false or collusive. The order proceeded without recording findings on these foundational facts and therefore ignored a matter going to the root of liability.

Conclusion: The alleged contravention of Clause 22(2) was not proved, and the finding of unauthorised entry could not be sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether, in the absence of an allotment order under Clause 23 or Clause 24A, the tenant could be directed to vacate merely because he had later ceased to hold an office of profit, and whether eviction after a long lapse of time could be sustained under Clause 28(1).

Analysis: Clause 25 operated only where a person had been allotted the premises under Clause 23 or Clause 24A; the existence of an allotment order was therefore a condition precedent to requiring vacation on cessation of office. In the absence of such allotment, the authority lacked jurisdiction to order eviction on that footing. Further, even where the power under Clause 28(1) existed, it had to be exercised reasonably and within a reasonable time. On the facts, the tenant had remained in possession for decades, rent had been accepted, and the complaint was raised only after an excessive delay by a stranger to the original arrangement. The impugned order suffered from serious infirmities and arbitrary exercise of power.

Conclusion: The eviction direction could not be sustained either under Clause 25 or under Clause 28(1), and the order was liable to be quashed.

Final Conclusion: The orders of the House Allotment Officer and the High Court were set aside, and the landlord's application for eviction was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: A person cannot be evicted for alleged contravention of the rent control order unless the foundational statutory facts are proved and the power to rectify contravention is exercised reasonably, on a proper jurisdictional basis and within a reasonable time.

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