State not immune from injunction breach proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2(3) despite lack of deliberate intent

A State, when validly impleaded as a defendant, is not immune from proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2(3) CPC for disobedience of an injunction; Article 300 of the Constitution does not create any exemption from the consequences of breach, although enforcement may be adapted to the State's character as a public authority. The absence of deliberate intent, and the fact that the prohibited act may be difficult to reverse after publication, do not defeat action for breach because the rule addresses disobedience itself. The injunction's binding force on the State was affirmed and attachment was sustained.

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Issues: (i) Whether the State, when impleaded as a defendant in a maintainable suit, can be proceeded against under Order 39, Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for disobedience of an injunction order; (ii) Whether absence of deliberate intention or the alleged irretraceability of the act prevents action for breach of the injunction.

Issue (i): Whether the State, when impleaded as a defendant in a maintainable suit, can be proceeded against under Order 39, Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for disobedience of an injunction order.

Analysis: Article 300 of the Constitution of India enables the State to sue and be sued in the like cases as the corresponding pre-Constitution governments, and neither the Constitution nor Order 39, Rule 2(3) creates any exemption in favour of the State from consequences of breach of an injunction. The provision is expressed in wide terms and applies to the person guilty of disobedience; where the State is the litigating defendant and the prohibited act is done by the State Government itself, it falls within the scope of the rule. The form of enforcement may differ because the State acts through its officers and civil prison cannot apply, but that does not create immunity from attachment of property or from the jurisdiction of the Court to enforce obedience.

Conclusion: The State is liable to be proceeded against under Order 39, Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issue (ii): Whether absence of deliberate intention or the alleged irretraceability of the act prevents action for breach of the injunction.

Analysis: The rule speaks of disobedience without qualifying it by wilfulness, and the publication of the notification was not treated as an accidental act excused by mistake. The fact that the notification had already been published and may not be retraceable does not undo the breach or deprive the Court of power to deal with the disobedience. The concern of the contempt jurisdiction in this setting is the disregard of the Court's authority, not the practical retrievability of the consequence.

Conclusion: Neither absence of deliberate intent nor irretraceability of the act defeated the proceedings for breach of injunction.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the injunction was binding on the State and its breach attracted the Court's power under Order 39, Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; the order directing attachment was therefore sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A State, when validly sued as a defendant, is subject to the ordinary consequences of disobedience of an injunction and may be proceeded against under Order 39, Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, subject to the limits inherent in its character as a public authority.

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