Civil contempt requires wilful disobedience of a subsisting order; procedural correspondence alone cannot justify proceedings.

Civil contempt under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 requires a subsisting order and wilful disobedience, and proceedings cannot be founded on assumption or speculation. The Court found no prima facie material to show that a registry officer, who joined after the impugned stay order was passed, had any role in the alleged non-implementation; his later request for the case number and date was only to facilitate compliance. As wilful disobedience and any intent to obstruct justice were absent, initiation of suo motu contempt proceedings was unsustainable. The order directing registration of contempt proceedings was set aside.

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Issues: Whether initiation of suo motu contempt proceedings against a registry officer was justified in the absence of prima facie material showing wilful disobedience of the court's order.

Analysis: Civil contempt under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 requires a subsisting judgment, order or direction and a wilful breach of it. A contempt proceeding cannot rest on assumption, speculation or inference alone. The facts showed that the impugned stay order was passed years before the appellant joined the registry, and the appellant's later communication seeking the case number and date of the order was a procedural request made to enable compliance. The alleged non-implementation could not, on these facts, be attributed to him, nor could an intention to obstruct justice or shield any officer be inferred. The plea based on Section 18 of the Act did not assist the appellant on the question of jurisdiction to initiate contempt, but the foundational requirement of wilful disobedience was absent.

Conclusion: The initiation of contempt proceedings was unsustainable and the order directing registration of contempt proceedings was set aside.

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