Broad audit power under Section 20 requires meaningful consultation, ministerial advice, and real public-interest justification.

Article 149 and Section 20 of the Comptroller and Auditor General Act were construed broadly to cover bodies beyond Article 12 State entities, including private bodies or authorities. The Administrator under Section 20(1) was required to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, not eo nomine. Section 20(3) also required a meaningful prior opportunity to make representations against a concrete audit proposal, after consultation on the terms. Where an electricity regulatory statute already vested tariff and account oversight in the regulator, a proposed audit aimed at tariff support was not expedient in public interest and the audit direction was unsustainable.

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Issues: (i) Whether the expression "body or authority" in Article 149 of the Constitution of India and Section 20 of the Comptroller and Auditor Generals' (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971 is confined to bodies answerable as "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India; (ii) whether the decision under Section 20(1) to request audit is to be taken by the Administrator acting eo nomine or on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers; (iii) whether the affected body was given the reasonable opportunity contemplated by Section 20(3); and (iv) whether audit under Section 20(1) was expedient in public interest in view of the existing electricity regulatory framework.

Issue (i): Whether the expression "body or authority" in Article 149 of the Constitution of India and Section 20 of the Comptroller and Auditor Generals' (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971 is confined to bodies answerable as "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: Article 149 extends the Comptroller and Auditor General's domain beyond the Union and the States to "any other authority or body" as may be prescribed by Parliament. The statutory scheme in Sections 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20 uses the same phrase without limiting it to Article 12 entities. A restrictive reading would render parts of the statute ineffective and would be inconsistent with the constitutional role of the office as a safeguard over public finance in evolving forms of governance, including public-private partnerships.

Conclusion: The expression is of wide amplitude and includes private bodies or authorities; the distribution companies fell within it.

Issue (ii): Whether the decision under Section 20(1) to request audit is to be taken by the Administrator acting eo nomine or on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.

Analysis: The power under Section 20(1) is exercised in relation to an entity within the domain of the elected government of the National Capital Territory, and the language of the provision contemplates action by the concerned Government in agreement with the Comptroller and Auditor General. The statutory setting did not place this function in the category of powers to be exercised personally and independently by the Administrator.

Conclusion: The Administrator was required to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.

Issue (iii): Whether the affected body was given the reasonable opportunity contemplated by Section 20(3).

Analysis: Section 20(3) requires a reasonable opportunity to make representations with regard to the proposal for audit. A meaningful proposal necessarily includes the reason for the proposed audit and the terms and conditions settled after consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor General. Here, the opportunity was granted before such consultation and before any agreed terms were disclosed, so the representation was not against a concrete proposal.

Conclusion: The opportunity given was not reasonable within the meaning of Section 20(3).

Issue (iv): Whether audit under Section 20(1) was expedient in public interest in view of the existing electricity regulatory framework.

Analysis: The electricity statutes and the regulatory licences vested tariff determination, scrutiny of accounts, control over expenditure and related regulatory powers in the Electricity Regulatory Commission. The proposed audit was directed essentially to assist tariff determination, but tariff fixation lay exclusively within the regulatory domain. In that setting, a Comptroller and Auditor General audit would be a futile exercise and would not advance any legally cognisable public interest.

Conclusion: The audit was not expedient in public interest.

Final Conclusion: The impugned direction for audit was unsustainable and was set aside, while the petitions filed by the distribution companies were allowed and the public interest litigation was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 20 of the Comptroller and Auditor Generals' (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971, a request for audit must rest on a meaningful prior consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor General, disclosure of the concrete proposal and its basis, and a public-interest justification that is not displaced by a special statutory regulatory regime already vested with the relevant supervisory function.

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