Statutory shrine management powers and extinguishment of customary rights were upheld without triggering compulsory acquisition.

The Act vested shrine administration powers in the Governor in a special statutory capacity, so those functions were exercised personally as ex officio head of the Board and not on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The statutory Board was not a controlled corporation for Article 12 or Article 31(2A) purposes, because the Act regulated secular management without transferring ownership or possession to the State. Section 19, which extinguished the baridars' customary right to offerings and provided a statutory compensation mechanism, was held not to attract Article 31(2) or violate Article 19(1)(f), since the right was regulable by law and was not vested in the State.

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Issues: (i) whether the Governor, under the Act, exercises powers in his official capacity as Governor and not with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers; (ii) whether the Shrine Board is a controlled corporation within the meaning of Article 12 and whether the transfer of management and extinguishment of baridars' rights amounted to acquisition by the State under Article 31(2A); (iii) whether Section 19 of the Act, which extinguishes the rights of baridars and provides for compensation through the statutory mechanism, is unconstitutional.

Issue (i): whether the Governor, under the Act, exercises powers in his official capacity as Governor and not with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.

Analysis: The scheme of the Act vested the powers of nomination, supersession, dissolution, reconstitution, removal, and interim management in the Governor in a special statutory capacity tied to the shrine administration. Those powers were treated as distinct from the ordinary executive business of the State under the Cabinet system. The statutory framework and the nature of the functions showed that the Governor was intended to act personally as the ex officio head of the Board, not as the formal constitutional head acting on ministerial advice.

Conclusion: The Governor exercises the impugned powers under the Act in his official statutory capacity and not with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.

Issue (ii): whether the Shrine Board is a controlled corporation within the meaning of Article 12 and whether the transfer of management and extinguishment of baridars' rights amounted to acquisition by the State under Article 31(2A).

Analysis: The Court held that control, for the purpose of Article 31(2A), must be of such a degree as to amount to virtual ownership by the State. The Act did not transfer ownership of the property or offerings to the State, but only regulated the secular management and governance of the shrine through a statutory board. The Board was therefore not a corporation owned or controlled by the State in the constitutional sense required to attract compulsory acquisition under Article 31(2A).

Conclusion: The Board is not a controlled corporation, and the Act does not effect an acquisition by the State within Article 31(2A).

Issue (iii): whether Section 19 of the Act, which extinguishes the rights of baridars and provides for compensation through the statutory mechanism, is unconstitutional.

Analysis: The right of the baridars to receive offerings was held to be a customary and secular right that could be regulated or abolished by legislation. Since the Act did not vest the extinguished right in the State, and instead merely terminated the customary claim while providing a statutory process for compensation, Article 31(2) was not attracted. The Court further held that the validity of the Act was not undermined by the absence of a direct transfer to the State or a State-controlled corporation.

Conclusion: Section 19 of the Act is not unconstitutional and does not violate Article 19(1)(f) or Article 31(2).

Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme establishing the Shrine Board and extinguishing the baridars' customary claim was upheld, and the appeals were disposed of with directions regarding consideration of compensation claims.

Ratio Decidendi: For Article 31(2A), a law amounts to compulsory acquisition only when it transfers ownership or the right to possession to the State or to a corporation so completely controlled by the State as to be its virtual alter ego; mere extinction of a customary right coupled with regulation of secular management does not satisfy that test.

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