Mandatory prosecution authorisation under food law cannot be enlarged by rule-based sub-delegation beyond the statute.

Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 permits prosecution only by the Central or State Government, by a person authorised by them by general or special order, or with written consent, and the restriction operates mandatorily. Rule 3 of the Punjab Rules and the related notification could not enlarge that statutory scheme by allowing the Food (Health) Authority to empower a Food Inspector to institute prosecutions. The Act also does not permit further sub-delegation of prosecution-authorising power, so any reading of the rule that allowed such sub-delegation would be inconsistent with the parent Act. The ratio is that subordinate legislation cannot override a statutory prohibition on who may initiate prosecution.

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Issues: (i) Whether Rule 3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958 and the notification issued under it were valid insofar as they authorised the Food (Health) Authority to confer power on the Food Inspector to institute prosecutions under Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. (ii) Whether the Food (Health) Authority, after being authorised under Section 20(1), could further sub-delegate that power to the Food Inspector.

Issue (i): Whether Rule 3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958 and the notification issued under it were valid insofar as they authorised the Food (Health) Authority to confer power on the Food Inspector to institute prosecutions under Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

Analysis: Section 20(1) permits prosecution only by the Central Government or State Government, by a person authorised by them by general or special order, or with written consent of any of those authorities. The provision is couched in negative language and therefore operates mandatorily. Rules made under Section 24(2)(e) cannot override Section 20(1), and any delegated power under the Rules must remain subject to the statute. A rule framed to facilitate delegation cannot enlarge the statutory scheme by permitting what the Act does not contemplate.

Conclusion: The rule and the notification could not validly authorise institution of prosecution by the Food Inspector in the manner attempted, and the purported delegation was invalid to that extent.

Issue (ii): Whether the Food (Health) Authority, after being authorised under Section 20(1), could further sub-delegate that power to the Food Inspector.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of Section 20(1) does not contemplate further delegation by the person authorised to institute prosecutions. Such a person may give written consent where the statute permits, but may not pass on the power to authorise prosecution to another authority. The maxim delegatus non potest delegare applies unless the legislature clearly authorises sub-delegation, which it did not do here. Rule 3, if read as permitting such sub-delegation, would be inconsistent with the parent Act and must yield to it.

Conclusion: The Food (Health) Authority had no power to sub-delegate prosecution-authorising power to the Food Inspector; the complaint was incompetent.

Final Conclusion: The complaint and the consequential orders could not be sustained because prosecution had not been instituted by a duly authorised authority under the Act. The appellant succeeded and the impugned orders were set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute uses mandatory negative language to restrict institution of prosecution to specified authorities or persons authorised by them, subordinate legislation cannot enlarge that power by permitting sub-delegation beyond the statutory scheme.

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