Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority was justified in condoning the delay in preferring appeals beyond the maximum condonable period under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department's appeals were maintainable after it had implemented the impugned orders by revoking the cancellation of the taxpayers' registrations; and (iii) Whether failure to seek revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 precluded the taxpayers from pursuing an appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority was justified in condoning the delay in preferring appeals beyond the maximum condonable period under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary limitation period for appeal, while Section 107(4) permits condonation only within the further statutorily specified period. A High Court's discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, granted on the facts of a writ proceeding, cannot enlarge the statute-bound jurisdiction of the First Appellate Authority. Equity follows the law and cannot override an express outer limit of limitation.

Conclusion: The question is answered in the negative. The First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the statutory outer limit, and such condonation was ultra vires. This issue favours Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department's appeals were maintainable after it had implemented the impugned orders by revoking the cancellation of the taxpayers' registrations.

Analysis: The Department had implemented the impugned orders, restored the registrations, and thereby enabled the taxpayers to resume business and undertake subsequent transactions. This subsequent development materially altered the position between the parties. No effective relief could be granted through a challenge to orders that had already been acted upon without addressing the consequences of restoration.

Conclusion: The question is answered in the negative. In the circumstances, the Department could not maintain its challenge to the implemented orders. This issue favours the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether failure to seek revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 precluded the taxpayers from pursuing an appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Filing an application for revocation under Rule 23 was not practically available after expiry of the prescribed period because the common portal did not permit such filing. The appellate remedy under Section 107 operates independently, and inability or failure to pursue revocation cannot extinguish the statutory right to challenge cancellation through appeal.

Conclusion: The Department's objection based on Rule 23 is rejected. The taxpayers were not barred from pursuing their statutory appellate remedy. This issue favours the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Although the condonation beyond the statutory limit was legally impermissible, the Department's implementation of the orders and restoration of registrations foreclosed an effective challenge in the present circumstances.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot enlarge its time-condonation jurisdiction beyond an express statutory outer limit by relying on case-specific relief granted by a constitutional court in writ jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether the FAA could condone an appeal filed beyond the outer limit in Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department's appeals remained maintainable after it implemented the FAA's orders by restoring registrations; and (iii) Whether the taxpayers' inability to pursue revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred their appeals.

Issue (i): Whether the FAA could condone an appeal filed beyond the outer limit in Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Sections 107(1) and 107(4) prescribe the appeal period and the maximum further period for which delay may be condoned. The FAA, as a statutory authority, has no inherent or equitable power to enlarge that outer limit. Relief moulded by a High Court in constitutional writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not enlarge the FAA's statutory jurisdiction; equity follows the law.

Conclusion: The FAA could not condone delay beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4); the condonation orders were ultra vires and coram non judice. This issue is decided in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department's appeals remained maintainable after it implemented the FAA's orders by restoring registrations.

Analysis: The Department restored the registrations pursuant to the impugned orders, following which the taxpayers resumed business and discharged statutory liabilities. These subsequent events left no effective or workable relief capable of being granted without unsettling the restored registrations and intervening transactions, rendering the departmental challenge academic.

Conclusion: The Department's appeals were not maintainable because no effective relief remained after implementation of the restoration orders. This issue is decided in favour of Assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the taxpayers' inability to pursue revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred their appeals.

Analysis: Once the prescribed period elapsed, the common portal did not permit filing of applications for revocation under Rule 23. That inability did not extinguish the independent statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Conclusion: Inability to seek revocation under Rule 23 did not bar the taxpayers from pursuing their appeals. This issue is decided in favour of Assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory limitation on the FAA's condonation power was affirmed, but the Department's implementation of the restoration orders meant that the taxpayers' active registrations and ensuing compliance were not unsettled.

Ratio Decidendi: An expressly capped statutory power to condone delay cannot be enlarged through equitable relief granted by a High Court in constitutional writ jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether an amalgamated company may carry forward and set off unutilised Minimum Alternate Tax credit of amalgamating companies under a sanctioned scheme of amalgamation.

Analysis: Section 115JAA permits credit for tax paid under the Minimum Alternate Tax regime. The sanctioned scheme transferred the amalgamating companies' tax rights and claims, including unutilised MAT credit, to the transferee company. Section 115JAA(7) expressly denies the credit only where a private or unlisted public company is converted into a limited liability partnership, without imposing a corresponding restriction on amalgamation. That specific prohibition cannot be extended by implication to an amalgamated company, which succeeds to the tax attributes of the amalgamating companies.

Conclusion: The amalgamated company is entitled to set off the unutilised MAT credit of the amalgamating companies, subject to verification of the quantum and availability of the credit in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone appeals filed beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department could maintain appeals after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the taxpayers' registrations; and (iii) Whether the taxpayers' inability to seek revocation under Rule 23 barred their statutory appeals.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone appeals filed beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary period for appeal and Section 107(4) permits condonation only within the further statutorily specified period. Relief moulded by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction, cannot enlarge the statutory jurisdiction of the First Appellate Authority. Equity follows the law and cannot override an express limitation.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority lacked power to condone delay beyond the statutory outer limit under Section 107(4); this issue is answered in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could maintain appeals after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the taxpayers' registrations.

Analysis: The Department restored the registrations pursuant to the impugned orders, after which the taxpayers resumed business and continued statutory compliance. Annulment at that stage would unsettle the restored registrations and transactions undertaken during the intervening period. The challenges consequently became academic and incapable of affording effective relief.

Conclusion: The Department could not maintain the challenges in the circumstances after implementing the impugned orders; this issue is answered in favour of the taxpayers.

Issue (iii): Whether the taxpayers' inability to seek revocation under Rule 23 barred their statutory appeals.

Analysis: The portal did not permit a revocation application after expiry of the prescribed period. The statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107 operates independently, and inability to invoke the revocation procedure does not extinguish the right to challenge cancellation in appeal.

Conclusion: The inability to seek revocation under Rule 23 did not bar the taxpayers' statutory appeals; this issue is answered in favour of the taxpayers.

Final Conclusion: The restored registrations and their consequential legal effect remain undisturbed, notwithstanding the finding that the First Appellate Authority exceeded its statutory condonation jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot enlarge an express limitation period by relying on equitable considerations or relief granted by a constitutional court under Article 226.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the maximum condonable period prescribed under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department could maintain its appeals after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the taxpayers' registrations; (iii) Whether the inability or failure to seek revocation under Rule 23 precluded the statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the maximum condonable period prescribed under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary period for appeal and Section 107(4) limits the further period for which delay may be condoned. The First Appellate Authority, being a statutory authority, possesses only the statutory jurisdiction conferred upon it. Relief moulded by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot enlarge that jurisdiction. Equity follows the law and cannot override an express statutory limitation.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority could not condone delay beyond the statutory outer limit; the condonation and consequential appellate orders were without jurisdiction and ultra vires. This issue is decided in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could maintain its appeals after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the taxpayers' registrations.

Analysis: The Department restored the registrations pursuant to the impugned orders, enabling the taxpayers to resume business and fulfil their compliance obligations. This subsequent development altered the legal and commercial position, and no effective relief could be granted without unsettling the restored registrations and intervening transactions.

Conclusion: The Department could not maintain the appeals after acting upon the impugned orders; the appeals had become infructuous and no effective relief was available. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the inability or failure to seek revocation under Rule 23 precluded the statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Once the prescribed period had expired, the common portal did not permit an application for revocation under Rule 23. The statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107 is independent and the inability to pursue revocation does not extinguish the right to challenge cancellation in appeal.

Conclusion: The taxpayers were not precluded from pursuing the statutory appellate remedy. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory limit on the First Appellate Authority's power remained enforceable, but the Department's implementation of the restoration orders prevented it from obtaining an effective challenge, and the taxpayers' appellate remedy was not defeated by the lapse of the revocation period.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot condone delay beyond an express outer limit prescribed by the statute, and equitable considerations or constitutional relief granted in another case cannot enlarge that authority's jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether a statutory first charge under Section 48 of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003 and pre-CIRP attachment proceedings conferred secured-creditor status under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 after the Explanation to Section 3(31); (ii) Whether dues under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 constituted secured debt.

Issue (i): Whether a statutory first charge under Section 48 of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003 and pre-CIRP attachment proceedings conferred secured-creditor status under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 after the Explanation to Section 3(31).

Analysis: The Explanation inserted in Section 3(31) clarifies that a security interest exists only where a right in property arises from an agreement or arrangement involving two or more parties, and excludes an interest created merely by operation of law. Being clarificatory, the Explanation applies to pending proceedings. A statutory first charge under the GVAT Act arises solely by operation of law, while attachment proceedings are enforcement measures and do not create consensual security. Such statutory charge therefore cannot be equated with agreement-based security recognised by the Code.

Conclusion: The GVAT dues cannot be ranked as secured debt and must be treated as operational debt.

Issue (ii): Whether dues under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 constituted secured debt.

Analysis: The Central Sales Tax Act does not create a statutory first charge over the corporate debtor's assets. Section 9(2) of that Act does not create a security interest, and the CST component consequently has no basis for secured treatment.

Conclusion: The CST dues cannot be treated as secured debt and must be treated as operational debt.

Final Conclusion: The admitted statutory claim retains its admission but receives only the treatment available to operational creditors under the Code and the approved resolution plan, without secured-creditor waterfall priority.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the clarificatory Explanation to Section 3(31) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, only an agreement-based interest qualifies as a security interest; a statutory charge or attachment arising solely by operation of law cannot confer secured-creditor priority.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the maximum period prescribed under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department could maintain its challenge after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the taxpayers' registrations.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the maximum period prescribed under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary limitation period for an appeal, while Section 107(4) limits the First Appellate Authority's power to condone delay to the further period expressly stipulated. Relief moulded by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the exercise of extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction, cannot enlarge the jurisdiction of a statutory appellate authority. Equity follows the law and cannot override an express statutory limitation.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the statutory outer limit; this issue is decided in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could maintain its challenge after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the taxpayers' registrations.

Analysis: The Department implemented the impugned orders by restoring the registrations, following which the taxpayers resumed business and continued statutory compliance. Annulment at this stage would unsettle the restored registrations and intervening genuine transactions, while yielding no effective relief to the Department. The Department could not challenge the orders after acting upon and giving effect to them.

Conclusion: The Department's challenge was not maintainable and had become infructuous; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Although the statutory limitation restricted the First Appellate Authority's condonation power, the Department's prior implementation of the restoration orders precluded an effective challenge in the circumstances of these cases.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot enlarge its expressly limited power to condone delay by relying on equitable relief granted by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department's appeals were maintainable after it implemented the impugned orders by restoring the registrations; (iii) Whether inability to seek timely revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred the taxpayers from appealing under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary period for appeal, while Section 107(4) permits condonation only within the further period expressly stipulated. A statutory authority has no inherent or equitable power to enlarge that outer limitation. Fact-specific relief granted by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot extend the statutory appellate jurisdiction of the First Appellate Authority.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of Revenue: the First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department's appeals were maintainable after it implemented the impugned orders by restoring the registrations.

Analysis: The Department implemented the impugned orders, restored the registrations, and thereby enabled the taxpayers to resume business and meet statutory obligations. The resulting subsequent developments altered the parties' legal and commercial position. Annulment of the orders after such implementation would yield no effective relief and would unsettle the restored registrations and intervening transactions.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of Assessee: the Department could not maintain appeals seeking to annul orders that it had already implemented, and the appeals had become infructuous.

Issue (iii): Whether inability to seek timely revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred the taxpayers from appealing under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: As the common portal did not permit revocation applications after expiry of the prescribed period, compliance with Rule 23 was not practically available. The statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 remained an independent remedy, and non-utilisation of revocation could not extinguish the right to challenge cancellation in appeal.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of Assessee: inability to invoke Rule 23 did not bar the taxpayers from pursuing the appellate remedy.

Final Conclusion: Although the condonation of delay exceeded the First Appellate Authority's statutory jurisdiction, the Department's implementation of the orders and restoration of registrations prevented any effective reversal in these matters.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot rely on fact-specific relief granted under constitutional jurisdiction to enlarge its expressly limited power to condone delay.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the maximum period allowed by Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department could challenge the appellate orders after implementing them by restoring the taxpayers' registrations; and (iii) Whether failure or inability to seek revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 precluded the taxpayers from pursuing their statutory appeals.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the maximum period allowed by Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes three months for filing an appeal and Section 107(4) permits condonation only for a further one month on sufficient cause. A statutory appellate authority possesses only the jurisdiction conferred by the statute. Relief moulded by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in fact-specific circumstances cannot enlarge that statutory appellate jurisdiction. Equity follows the law and cannot override an express statutory limitation.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the statutory outer limit; such condonation and the consequential appellate orders were coram non judice and ultra vires. This issue is decided in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could challenge the appellate orders after implementing them by restoring the taxpayers' registrations.

Analysis: The Department implemented the appellate orders, restored the registrations, and thereby enabled continuing business operations and compliance. These subsequent developments materially altered the parties' position. In the absence of any reversal or addressing of the consequences of restoration, annulment of the orders would yield no effective or workable relief and would unsettle intervening genuine transactions.

Conclusion: The Department could not maintain its challenge to the implemented appellate orders in the circumstances of these cases. This issue is decided against Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether failure or inability to seek revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 precluded the taxpayers from pursuing their statutory appeals.

Analysis: Once the prescribed period had expired, the common portal did not permit applications for revocation under Rule 23. The revocation mechanism and the appellate remedy under Section 107 operate as alternative statutory remedies; inability or failure to use the former does not extinguish the right to challenge cancellation through the latter.

Conclusion: Failure or inability to invoke Rule 23 did not bar the taxpayers from pursuing their statutory appeals. This issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: The statutory jurisdictional limit governing condonation by the First Appellate Authority remains intact, but the Department's implementation of the restoration orders prevents their retrospective undoing in this batch.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot invoke the extraordinary equitable jurisdiction exercisable by a High Court under Article 226 to extend an expressly capped period of limitation under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department could maintain appeals after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the taxpayers' registrations; (iii) Whether the taxpayers' inability to seek revocation within the period under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred their appeals under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary period for appeal and Section 107(4) limits the further period for which delay may be condoned. The First Appellate Authority, being a statutory authority, could exercise jurisdiction only within those limits. Orders of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, issued in the exercise of extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction on their particular facts, could not enlarge the statutory appellate jurisdiction. Equity follows the law; it cannot override an express statutory limitation. Condonation beyond the prescribed outer limit was ultra vires and coram non judice.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone the delays beyond the statutory outer limit. This issue is decided against the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could maintain appeals after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the taxpayers' registrations.

Analysis: The Department acted upon the impugned orders by restoring the registrations, following which the taxpayers resumed business and discharged their obligations. This material subsequent development left no effective relief capable of being granted in the Department's challenge. The Department's inconsistent conduct engaged the principle that a party cannot approbate and reprobate by implementing an order and subsequently seeking its annulment without addressing the consequences of that implementation.

Conclusion: The Department could not maintain its challenge to the orders after implementing them through restoration of registrations. This issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Issue (iii): Whether the taxpayers' inability to seek revocation within the period under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred their appeals under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The common portal did not permit applications for revocation after expiry of the prescribed period. The remedy of revocation under Section 30 and the appellate remedy under Section 107 operate as independent statutory remedies. The inability to pursue revocation under Rule 23 did not extinguish the right to challenge cancellation through appeal.

Conclusion: Non-compliance with Rule 23 did not bar the taxpayers from pursuing their statutory appeals. This issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: Although the statutory restriction on condonation of delay remains applicable, the restored registrations remain undisturbed because the Department's prior implementation of the impugned orders deprived its challenge of effective relief.

Ratio Decidendi: A revenue authority that has implemented an order restoring registration cannot subsequently pursue a challenge to annul that order where no effective relief can follow from such challenge.

Issues: Whether proceedings under Section 153C could be initiated where the satisfaction note did not link the alleged incriminating material to any particular assessment year.

Analysis: The satisfaction note merely recorded seizure of a hard disk and proposed initiation of proceedings for specified assessment years. It did not record how the seized material related to, or was relevant for, any particular assessment year. Such vague satisfaction was insufficient to assume jurisdiction under Section 153C.

Conclusion: Proceedings under Section 153C were invalid for want of a satisfaction note linking incriminating material to the relevant assessment years; the finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an ex parte GST demand order should be set aside to afford an effective opportunity of hearing where the proprietor's medically supported pregnancy prevented participation in the adjudication and the statutory appeal period had expired.

Analysis: The demand arose from adjudication under the Section 73 framework of the GST enactments. Medical records supported the proprietor's inability to participate during the relevant period due to pregnancy. As the order had been passed ex parte and the appellate remedy under Section 107 was no longer available owing to limitation, an effective opportunity to submit a reply and supporting documents was warranted.

Conclusion: The ex parte demand could not be sustained without affording the petitioner an opportunity to place her reply and relevant material before the adjudicating authority.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay in filing an appeal beyond the outer limit prescribed by Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department could maintain its appeals after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the registrations; (iii) Whether expiry of the period under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred recourse to the appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay in filing an appeal beyond the outer limit prescribed by Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary limitation for an appeal, while Section 107(4) permits condonation only for the further statutorily limited period on sufficient cause. The First Appellate Authority, as a statutory authority, could exercise jurisdiction only within those limits. Orders of a High Court granting relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the particular facts of writ proceedings could not enlarge the Authority's statutory power. Equitable considerations cannot override an express limitation provision.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the outer statutory limit; this issue was decided in favour of Revenue and against the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could maintain its appeals after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the registrations.

Analysis: The Department had acted upon the impugned orders, restored the registrations, and thereby enabled the assessees to resume business and undertake transactions. That implementation was a material subsequent event which crystallised the parties' position. The Department could not seek annulment of the same orders without addressing the consequences of the restoration, and no effective relief could be granted through the appeals.

Conclusion: The Department could not maintain the challenges in the circumstances after implementing the impugned orders; this issue was decided in favour of the assessees.

Issue (iii): Whether expiry of the period under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred recourse to the appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Since the common portal did not permit an application for revocation after expiry of the prescribed period, compliance with Rule 23 was not practically available. The remedy of appeal under Section 107 operated independently, and non-availment of revocation under Rule 23 did not extinguish the right to challenge cancellation through an appeal.

Conclusion: Expiry of the Rule 23 period did not bar the assessees from pursuing the appellate remedy; this issue was decided in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: Although the condonation of delay beyond the statutory limit was declared jurisdictionally impermissible, the restored registrations and the legal position resulting from their implementation were not unsettled.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot extend an expressly prescribed outer limit for condonation of delay by relying on equitable relief granted by a High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department could maintain its challenge after implementing the appellate orders and restoring the registrations; and (iii) Whether failure to pursue revocation under Rule 23(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred the taxpayers from pursuing the statutory appellate remedy.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary limitation for an appeal, while Section 107(4) permits condonation only within the additional period expressly stipulated. A statutory appellate authority has no inherent or equitable power to extend this outer limit. Relief moulded by a High Court in exercise of Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not enlarge the statutory appellate jurisdiction of the First Appellate Authority. Equity follows the law; condonation beyond the legislatively prescribed limit is coram non judice and ultra vires.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the statutory outer limit; this issue is decided in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could maintain its challenge after implementing the appellate orders and restoring the registrations.

Analysis: The Department restored the registrations pursuant to the impugned appellate orders, enabling the taxpayers to continue business and undertake subsequent transactions. This material subsequent development altered the parties' legal and commercial position. Having implemented the orders, the Department could not seek their invalidation without addressing the consequences of restoration, and no effective relief could result from the challenge.

Conclusion: The Department could not maintain its challenge to orders that it had already implemented; this issue is decided in favour of the Assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether failure to pursue revocation under Rule 23(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred the taxpayers from pursuing the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: The common portal did not practically permit an application for revocation after expiry of the prescribed period. The revocation mechanism under Section 30 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the appeal under Section 107 operate as independent statutory remedies. Inability to invoke the former does not extinguish the right to pursue the latter.

Conclusion: The taxpayers were not barred from pursuing the appellate remedy because they had not obtained revocation under Rule 23(1); this issue is decided against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: Although the First Appellate Authority exceeded its statutory jurisdiction in condoning the delay, the Department's prior implementation of the orders and restoration of registrations prevented it from reopening the settled position through these proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot condone delay beyond an express outer limit prescribed by legislation, and equitable relief granted by a constitutional court under Article 226 cannot enlarge that authority's statutory jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay in filing appeals beyond the outer condonable period under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department's appeals remained maintainable after it had implemented the impugned orders and restored the respondents' registrations; and (iii) Whether the taxpayers' inability or failure to pursue revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred their statutory appeals under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay in filing appeals beyond the outer condonable period under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary limitation for an appeal and Section 107(4) permits condonation only within the further period expressly stipulated. The First Appellate Authority, being a statutory authority, possesses no inherent or equitable power to extend that outer limit. Relief granted by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the peculiar facts of a writ proceeding cannot enlarge the statutory appellate jurisdiction. Equity follows the law, and a statutory limitation cannot be overridden through reliance on constitutional-court directions.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the outer statutory limit; this issue is decided in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department's appeals remained maintainable after it had implemented the impugned orders and restored the respondents' registrations.

Analysis: The Department implemented the impugned orders by revoking the registration cancellations, following which the taxpayers resumed business and their registrations remained active. This subsequent development materially altered the parties' legal and commercial position. The Department could not seek annulment of orders whose consequences it had voluntarily implemented, particularly where no effective or workable relief could thereafter be granted without unsettling intervening genuine transactions.

Conclusion: The Department could not maintain its challenge after implementing the impugned orders; this issue is decided against the Revenue and in favour of the assessees.

Issue (iii): Whether the taxpayers' inability or failure to pursue revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred their statutory appeals under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Once the prescribed period had elapsed, the common portal did not permit applications for revocation under Rule 23. The statutory remedy of revocation under Section 30 and the appellate remedy under Section 107 operate independently. Inability to avail revocation therefore did not extinguish or prejudice the taxpayers' right to challenge cancellation through an appeal.

Conclusion: Non-availment of the revocation route did not bar the taxpayers' appeals; this issue is decided against the Revenue and in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: Although the First Appellate Authority's condonation beyond the statutory limit was jurisdictionally defective, the Department's implementation of the resulting restoration of registrations precluded it from unsettling that relief in the circumstances of these matters.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot condone delay beyond an expressly prescribed outer limit by relying on relief moulded by a constitutional court in exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether, under the faceless reassessment framework, a jurisdictional assessing officer could issue a reassessment notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act.

Analysis: The questions raised were governed by a recent decision of the Court which had answered the same questions against the Revenue.

Conclusion: A jurisdictional assessing officer could not sustain issuance of the impugned reassessment notice under the faceless reassessment framework; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether execution of the joint development agreement constituted a taxable transfer under Section 2(47)(ii), (v) and (vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, read with Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, so as to give rise to capital gains for the relevant assessment year.

Analysis: The appeal arose from the same joint development agreement and involved the identical controversy resolved by the binding decision referred to in the order. The findings in that decision on the legal effect of the agreement, the character of possession delivered to the developer, and the applicability of the statutory provisions governing transfer were adopted without fresh examination.

Conclusion: Execution of the joint development agreement did not result in taxable capital gains on the basis adopted in the assessment for the relevant assessment year.

Issues: (i) Whether compulsorily convertible debentures retained the character of debt until actual conversion, making the stipulated interest payment arm's length; (ii) Whether a separate notional-interest adjustment on delayed associated-enterprise receivables was sustainable despite working-capital adjustment and a uniform credit policy towards unrelated customers; (iii) Whether interest on compulsorily convertible debentures was alternatively disallowable as interest not paid on capital borrowed or as non-business expenditure.

Issue (i): Whether compulsorily convertible debentures retained the character of debt until actual conversion, making the stipulated interest payment arm's length.

Analysis: The transfer-pricing analysis required the actual pre-conversion instrument to be tested rather than replaced with an equity transaction merely because conversion was compulsory. The debenture holders had no voting or dividend rights before conversion, the instrument carried contractually stipulated interest, and the rate of 12% fell within the comparable uncontrolled price range of 12% to 14%. No defect in the interest-rate comparables was demonstrated. The prior acceptance of the same arrangement also supported the absence of a reasoned basis for a changed characterisation without any material change in facts or contractual terms.

Conclusion: The compulsorily convertible debentures remained debt until conversion, and the interest payment was at arm's length. The transfer-pricing adjustment on interest is deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a separate notional-interest adjustment on delayed associated-enterprise receivables was sustainable despite working-capital adjustment and a uniform credit policy towards unrelated customers.

Analysis: Although receivables may fall within the statutory ambit of an international transaction, the outstanding amount could not be isolated from the principal transaction where its funding effect had already been addressed through working-capital adjustment. The assessee's adjusted margin exceeded comparable margins, and substantially longer delays from unrelated customers were also allowed without charging interest. The minor delay from the associated enterprise therefore did not establish a separately benchmarkable financing arrangement.

Conclusion: No separate notional-interest adjustment on the delayed receivable was warranted. The adjustment is deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether interest on compulsorily convertible debentures was alternatively disallowable as interest not paid on capital borrowed or as non-business expenditure.

Analysis: The alternate disallowance rested on the same rejected premise that the compulsorily convertible debentures were equity. Once the instrument was recognised as debt until conversion, the interest represented the contractual cost of borrowed funds. There was no finding that the expenditure was fictitious or that the funds were used for a non-business purpose; the absence of services rendered by the lender was immaterial to interest on borrowing.

Conclusion: The interest was deductible as interest on borrowed capital and could not be disallowed as non-business expenditure. The alternate disallowance is deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment must exclude the transfer-pricing additions and the alternate interest disallowance arising from the pre-conversion compulsorily convertible debentures, with consequential computation being made in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the arm's length price of electricity transferred from eligible captive power plants to the non-eligible cement unit for deduction under section 80IA should be determined at the tariff charged by the distribution licensee to that cement unit or at rates derived from supplies by generating companies to State distribution utilities.

Analysis: For a specified domestic transaction, clause (iii) of the Explanation to section 80A(6) requires market value to be determined as the arm's length price under section 92F(ii), namely a price applied in uncontrolled conditions. Under the Comparable Uncontrolled Price method in Rule 10B(1)(a), the rates at which independent generating companies supplied electricity to State distribution utilities could not qualify as uncontrolled comparables because those supplies and tariffs were regulated. The non-eligible cement unit was the appropriate tested party, and its purchase of electricity from the distribution licensee constituted a reliable internal comparable uncontrolled transaction. Differences between the suppliers did not impair comparability between the two purchases by the same consumer. Further, adding a 10% mark-up to an average of comparable prices impermissibly introduced an element of the cost plus method into the Comparable Uncontrolled Price method.

Conclusion: The arm's length price is Rs. 7.35 per unit, being the rate charged by the distribution licensee to the cement unit; the transfer-pricing adjustment is deleted and the deduction claimed under section 80IA is allowable.