Purposive reading of compulsory licence law: unreasonable broadcast terms can amount to refusal, and later applications may still be entertained.

Section 31 of the Copyright Act was construed purposively as a balancing provision between copyright owners' exclusive rights and public access to works. A refusal to grant broadcast rights can include an unreasonable demand for licence terms, not only an outright denial, so the Copyright Board may examine whether the refusal was unjustified and grant a compulsory licence on suitable terms. Section 31(2) was treated as confined to clause (a) and not as barring successive applications in broadcast cases where a fresh cause of action arises.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether the Copyright Board had jurisdiction under Section 31(1)(b) of the Copyright Act, 1957 to grant a compulsory licence for broadcast of a work already available to the public through radio broadcast. (ii) Whether Section 31(2) confined the grant of compulsory licence to only one complainant so as to exclude successive or multiple applications.

Issue (i): Whether the Copyright Board had jurisdiction under Section 31(1)(b) of the Copyright Act, 1957 to grant a compulsory licence for broadcast of a work already available to the public through radio broadcast.

Analysis: Section 31 was construed as a balancing provision between the copyright owner's exclusive rights and the public interest in access to works. The words "refused to allow communication to the public by broadcast" were held to include a refusal in substance, including an unreasonable demand for licence terms, and not merely an outright denial. Clause (b) was treated as operating in the field of broadcast, distinct from clause (a), and the availability of the repertoire through other broadcasters did not by itself defeat the Board's jurisdiction. The Board was therefore competent to examine whether the refusal was unreasonable and, if so, to grant a compulsory licence on suitable terms.

Conclusion: The Copyright Board had jurisdiction under Section 31(1)(b), and the question was answered in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 31(2) confined the grant of compulsory licence to only one complainant so as to exclude successive or multiple applications.

Analysis: Section 31(2) was held to be directed to cases falling under clause (a) of Section 31(1), not clause (b). A literal reading that would permanently bar later applicants would defeat the object of the provision and produce an anomalous result. The provision was therefore read down purposively so that repeated applications could be entertained where a fresh cause of action arose, particularly in the broadcast context.

Conclusion: Section 31(2) did not bar more than one application in broadcast cases, and the issue was answered in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed, the impugned order of the Board was set aside, and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration on merits after giving the parties adequate opportunity to adduce evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 31 of the Copyright Act, 1957 must be construed purposively as a balancing provision, and a refusal to grant broadcast rights on unreasonable terms can amount to refusal within Section 31(1)(b); Section 31(2) is confined to clause (a) and does not restrict later applications in broadcast cases.

---