Writ interference with Competition Commission show-cause notices is premature where jurisdictional objections can be raised in inquiry and appeal.

Writ petitions challenging Competition Commission show-cause notices at the preliminary inquiry stage were held premature because the Commission could determine the jurisdictional facts itself. The dispute whether the alleged conduct concerning film exhibition and release fell within section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002, or was protected by section 3(5), was treated as a mixed question of law and fact for the statutory inquiry. Mere issuance of notice after the Director General's report did not amount to a final decision, and the availability of statutory appeal against any adverse final order weighed against extraordinary writ interference. The petitioners were left free to raise all objections before the Commission.

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Issues: Whether writ petitions under Article 226 challenging show-cause notices issued under the Competition Act, 2002 were maintainable at the stage of preliminary inquiry, and whether the Competition Commission lacked jurisdiction in view of the Copyright Act, 1957.

Analysis: The petitions assailed notices issued under section 26(8) of the Competition Act, 2002 on the footing that disputes concerning exhibition and release of films were governed exclusively by the Copyright Act, 1957 and, therefore, the Competition Commission had no authority to proceed. The Court held that the Commission is competent to determine the existence of jurisdictional facts and that the issue whether the alleged conduct falls within section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002, or is saved by section 3(5), is a mixed question of law and fact to be decided by the Commission in the pending inquiry. The Court further held that mere issuance of a show-cause notice, at a stage when the Commission had only called for objections after receipt of the Director General's report, did not amount to a final determination or a pre-judgment of the matter. Since an appellate forum under the Competition Act, 2002 was available against any adverse final order, and since no exceptional case for interference at the notice stage was made out, the writ petitions were not fit for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The challenge to the show-cause notices was rejected as premature, and the petitioners were left free to raise all contentions, including jurisdictional objections, before the Competition Commission.

Final Conclusion: The petitions failed at the threshold and the Commission was permitted to proceed with the inquiry in accordance with law, with all rival contentions kept open before the statutory forum.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ court will ordinarily not interfere with a show-cause notice under a statutory regulatory scheme when the authority is competent to decide jurisdictional facts and the objection can be urged in the pending inquiry and in the statutory appeal.

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