Preventive detention requires timely, specific grounds; vague grounds and delayed particulars can invalidate detention.

Preventive detention orders are not invalid merely because the authority repeats earlier grounds, if prior conduct and custody context still justify genuine satisfaction for detention in the interest of public order. However, the grounds must be communicated within a reasonable time and with sufficient specificity to enable an effective representation; highly vague grounds, coupled with inordinate delay in supplying essential particulars, defeat the constitutional safeguard. Additional particulars cannot be used to cure an already defective basis after the detenu's opportunity to object has been impaired. The detention was therefore unsustainable where prompt, specific grounds were not furnished.

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Issues: (i) Whether the detention orders were vitiated because the same grounds were repeated and the authority acted mechanically without genuine satisfaction; (ii) Whether the communication of grounds and particulars was delayed beyond the statutory requirement and whether the grounds furnished were too vague to enable an effective representation.

Issue (i): Whether the detention orders were vitiated because the same grounds were repeated and the authority acted mechanically without genuine satisfaction.

Analysis: The repetition of earlier grounds did not by itself establish absence of application of mind, because the detenus had remained in custody and no fresh activities could arise in the interval. The antecedent conduct of a person is relevant to preventive detention, and prior events may legitimately sustain a fresh order if the authority remains satisfied that detention is necessary for maintenance of public order. Mere repetition of grounds, without more, does not prove mala fides or mechanical exercise of power.

Conclusion: The detention orders were not invalid merely because the same grounds were repeated; the challenge on that basis failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the communication of grounds and particulars was delayed beyond the statutory requirement and whether the grounds furnished were too vague to enable an effective representation.

Analysis: Section 7 required the grounds to be communicated as soon as may be, meaning within a reasonable time depending on the facts. The explanation for the initial delay was accepted, but the original grounds were held to be highly vague. More importantly, the later particulars were supplied after an inordinate delay and, in one matter, after the petition had already been prepared, defeating the right to make a representation at the earliest opportunity. Additional grounds could not be used to strengthen the original order, and the delay in furnishing particulars amounted to a denial of a constitutional safeguard.

Conclusion: The vague grounds and inordinate delay in supplying particulars rendered the detention unlawful, and the petitioners were entitled to release.

Final Conclusion: The petitions succeeded because the detenus were not given prompt, specific grounds sufficient to exercise the constitutional right of representation, and the detention therefore could not be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: In preventive detention, vague grounds may be sustained only if timely particulars are supplied so that the detenu can make an effective representation at the earliest opportunity; unexplained delay in furnishing such particulars infringes the constitutional safeguard and invalidates the detention.

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