Preventive detention grounds and later particulars: Article 22(5) permits clarification, but not new grounds, for an effective representation.

Preventive detention grounds must be communicated clearly enough to enable an effective representation under Article 22(5); mere vagueness that deprives the detenue of a real opportunity to object would be invalid. Further particulars may be supplied later if they only clarify the same communicated ground and do not introduce a new basis of satisfaction. Applying that principle, the later material in this case was treated as supplementary, not fresh grounds, so the constitutional safeguard was found complied with and the detention was upheld.

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Issues: (i) Whether the grounds communicated for preventive detention were so vague that the detenue could not make an effective representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution; (ii) Whether further particulars could validly be supplied after the original grounds were communicated, without infringing Article 22(5).

Issue (i): Whether the grounds communicated for preventive detention were so vague that the detenue could not make an effective representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution.

Analysis: Article 22(5) requires communication of the grounds on which the detention order has been made and affording the earliest opportunity to make a representation. The grounds are the conclusions on which the detaining authority was satisfied under Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. If the grounds bear a rational connection with the statutory objects and are not shown to be mala fide, their sufficiency as the basis of the authority's satisfaction is not for judicial substitution. The question for judicial scrutiny is whether the communication was so indefinite as to deprive the detenue of a real opportunity to represent against the order. The Court held that the grounds in the present case, when read with the later particulars, did not disclose such infirmity.

Conclusion: The grounds were not held invalid on the ground of vagueness so as to warrant release.

Issue (ii): Whether further particulars could validly be supplied after the original grounds were communicated, without infringing Article 22(5).

Analysis: The constitutional requirement is to communicate the grounds as soon as may be and to afford the earliest opportunity to make a representation. Later communication is not prohibited if it does not introduce a new or additional ground forming a fresh basis of satisfaction, but merely supplies facts or particulars relating to the already communicated grounds. Article 22(6) preserves the authority's privilege not to disclose facts against public interest, and the clause cannot be read as requiring disclosure of every detail at the first instance. On the facts, the later communication only furnished particulars relating to the same ground and did not amount to a new ground.

Conclusion: Supplementary particulars were permissible and did not violate Article 22(5).

Final Conclusion: The detention was upheld and the High Court's release order was set aside because the constitutional safeguards under Article 22 had been complied with on the facts of the case.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Article 22(5), the detaining authority must communicate the operative grounds for detention and may later supply particulars of those grounds, but not new grounds, so long as the detenue still receives an earliest effective opportunity to represent against the order.

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