Preventive detention cannot ordinarily be imposed on a person already in jail custody without a proximate, rational basis.

Preventive detention under section 3(1)(a) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 requires a present basis for detention, founded on relevant and germane material showing necessity to prevent future prejudicial conduct. The provision ordinarily presupposes freedom of action; where the person is already in jail custody, an order is valid only if the facts show a proximate and rational connection between past conduct and the need for detention after likely release. On the stated facts, the detainee was already in custody when the order was served, and the statutory basis for preventive detention was absent, so the detention was quashed.

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Issues: Whether an order of preventive detention under section 3(1)(a) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 could validly be made and served on a person already in jail custody.

Analysis: The power under section 3(1)(a) rests on the detaining authority being satisfied that detention is necessary to prevent the person from acting prejudicially in future. That satisfaction may not be tested on objective standards as to adequacy or reasonableness of material, but the grounds must be relevant, germane, and capable of supporting the statutory conclusion. The scheme of the provision postulates a present freedom of action, because the order is preventive and proceeds on the premise that, if not detained, the person may act prejudicially. Where the person is already in jail custody, that basis is ordinarily absent unless the facts show a proximate and rational connection between antecedent conduct and the necessity of detention after likely release. On the facts, the petitioner was in jail custody when the order was served, and the necessary statutory basis was missing.

Conclusion: The detention was not justified under section 3(1)(a) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 and was quashed.

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