Prima facie proof and mere organisational membership were insufficient to bar bail under the special anti-terror law.

Bail under the special anti-terror statute could not be refused unless the case diary or report disclosed reasonable grounds to believe the accusation was prima facie true. On the materials available, there was no prima facie proof that the accused was part of the conspiracy or an assailant, and the statutory embargo on bail did not apply. Mere alleged membership of an organisation, without active and knowing participation in unlawful aims, was insufficient to justify continued custody. Delay in trial was also treated as a relevant factor in favour of liberty, and the respondent was entitled to remain on bail.

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Issues: (i) Whether the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 barred grant of bail on the facts shown; (ii) Whether mere alleged membership of an organisation and the factor of delay in trial justified continued custody.

Issue (i): Whether the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 barred grant of bail on the facts shown.

Analysis: Bail under the special statute depended on whether the case diary or report disclosed reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation was prima facie true. On the materials then available, there was no prima facie proof that the respondent was part of the conspiracy or one of the assailants. The alleged conduct was treated as different from participation in the attack, and the Court noted that the only apparent accusation, if any, was a bailable omission to inform the police. In that situation, the statutory embargo on bail was not attracted.

Conclusion: The embargo under the proviso to Section 43D(5) did not prevent grant of bail, and the finding was in favour of the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether mere alleged membership of an organisation and the factor of delay in trial justified continued custody.

Analysis: The Court held that mere association with an organisation, without evidence of active and knowing participation in its unlawful aims, could not by itself justify criminal liability or denial of bail. It distinguished the cases relied upon by the prosecution because there was no comparable material showing financing, violence, or specific unlawful intent. The Court also treated delay in the completion of trial as a relevant factor in bail, since prolonged incarceration without adjudication may affect the protection of personal liberty.

Conclusion: Mere alleged membership was insufficient to deny bail, and the delay factor supported release; this issue was decided in favour of the respondent.

Final Conclusion: The special-bail conditions were not shown to be satisfied, and the respondent was entitled to remain on bail.

Ratio Decidendi: For bail under a special anti-terror law, an accused cannot be denied release merely on association with an organisation unless there is prima facie material showing active participation or specific intent to further unlawful aims, and delay in trial is a relevant consideration in favour of liberty.

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