Uncorroborated confession and passive banned-organisation membership were insufficient to sustain conviction under anti-terror law.

An uncorroborated confession to a police officer was treated as unsafe as the sole basis for conviction, even where such a confession may be admissible under the TADA framework. The Court also held that mere passive membership of a banned organisation is not enough for criminal liability under Section 3(5) unless there is proof of violence, incitement to violence, or conduct intended to create public disorder. The provision was read down to avoid conflict with Articles 19 and 21. On the facts, there was no evidence of active participation, so the conviction was unsustainable and the appellant was entitled to release.

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Issues: (i) Whether the alleged confessional statement made before the police officer could, in the absence of corroboration, safely form the basis of conviction; (ii) Whether mere membership of a banned organisation, without proof of active participation, violence, or incitement, could sustain conviction under Section 3(5) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.

Issue (i): Whether the alleged confessional statement made before the police officer could, in the absence of corroboration, safely form the basis of conviction.

Analysis: Confession to a police officer is inadmissible under the general law of evidence, though admissible in cases under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. Even then, a confession is a weak form of evidence and courts must exercise caution, particularly where the prosecution case rests mainly on such a statement without supporting material. In the absence of corroborative evidence, it is unsafe to convict solely on an alleged extra-judicial confession made to the police.

Conclusion: The confessional statement could not be treated as the sole basis for conviction.

Issue (ii): Whether mere membership of a banned organisation, without proof of active participation, violence, or incitement, could sustain conviction under Section 3(5) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.

Analysis: Mere membership of a banned organisation cannot, by itself, be criminalised unless the member resorts to violence, incites violence, or engages in conduct intended to create public disorder by violent means. A literal reading of the provision would trench upon Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, and therefore the provision must be read down consistently with constitutional guarantees. On the facts, there was no proof that the appellant was an active member or that he had engaged in violence or incitement.

Conclusion: Conviction under Section 3(5) was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was entitled to release in accordance with the earlier bail order.

Ratio Decidendi: A conviction cannot safely rest solely on an uncorroborated confession to a police officer, and mere passive membership of a banned organisation does not attract criminal liability unless accompanied by violence, incitement to violence, or conduct creating public disorder.

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