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Issues: (i) Whether compelling an accused person to give specimen handwriting, signature, or finger, palm or foot impressions amounts to compelling him to be a witness against himself under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. (ii) Whether mere police custody by itself constitutes compulsion within Article 20(3). (iii) Whether information given by an accused person in police custody and proved under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is hit by Article 20(3).
Issue (i): Whether compelling an accused person to give specimen handwriting, signature, or finger, palm or foot impressions amounts to compelling him to be a witness against himself under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: The constitutional protection against self-incrimination was held to extend to testimonial compulsion, but not to the taking of physical characteristics or material evidence. Giving specimen handwriting, signatures, or impressions does not amount to conveying personal knowledge about relevant facts; such acts are only materials for comparison and are not, by themselves, incriminatory testimony. The Court also distinguished such evidence from compelled statements or documentary disclosures containing the accused's own knowledge.
Conclusion: Compelling an accused person to give specimen handwriting, signature, or impressions does not violate Article 20(3).
Issue (ii): Whether mere police custody by itself constitutes compulsion within Article 20(3).
Analysis: Compulsion was held to mean duress or coercion in the legal sense, and not merely the fact of custody or the asking of a question by a police officer. Police custody may be a relevant circumstance, but it does not create an automatic presumption of compulsion. Whether compulsion existed is a question of fact depending on the surrounding circumstances.
Conclusion: Mere police custody does not by itself amount to compulsion under Article 20(3).
Issue (iii): Whether information given by an accused person in police custody and proved under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is hit by Article 20(3).
Analysis: Section 27 was held not to be unconstitutional on its face. Information leading to discovery may amount to evidence, but Article 20(3) is attracted only where the information was obtained by compulsion. Since compulsion is not inherent in the receipt of information from a person in custody, the admissibility of such evidence depends on whether the accused was in fact compelled to give it.
Conclusion: Section 27 is not invalid under Article 20(3) in every case, and information obtained without compulsion is admissible.
Final Conclusion: The constitutional questions were answered in favour of admissibility of specimen handwriting, impressions, and discovery evidence unless actual compulsion is proved, and the appeals were directed to proceed on the merits in light of those principles.
Ratio Decidendi: Article 20(3) prohibits compelled testimonial self-incrimination, but not the compelled taking of physical characteristics or other material evidence that does not, by itself, disclose incriminatory personal knowledge.