Money laundering prosecution remains independent; no committal needed, double jeopardy does not apply, and Section 50 statements may be used.
The Special Court under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act may take cognizance on a complaint without prior committal under Section 209 CrPC, because the Act does not import the committal procedure. Money laundering is treated as an independent offence distinct from the predicate offences, so prosecution is not barred by double jeopardy under Article 20(2) or Section 300 CrPC. Statements recorded during investigation under Section 50 do not attract Article 20(3) protection unless the maker was already an accused and the statement was compelled. The impugned order was therefore sustained.
Issues: (i) Whether a case under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act required committal to the Special Court before cognizance could be taken. (ii) Whether prosecution under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act was barred by double jeopardy for the same underlying factual matrix. (iii) Whether statements recorded during investigation under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act could be used to attract Article 20(3) protection.
Issue (i): Whether a case under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act required committal to the Special Court before cognizance could be taken.
Analysis: Section 44 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act permits the Special Court to take cognizance on a complaint by the authorised authority. The reference to trial by the Special Court does not import the committal procedure under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The expression "without the accused being committed" was read as meaning that cognizance may be taken even without prior committal or production of the accused, not as a mandate to follow committal proceedings.
Conclusion: The objection based on absence of committal was rejected.
Issue (ii): Whether prosecution under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act was barred by double jeopardy for the same underlying factual matrix.
Analysis: The predicate offences under the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act and the offence under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act were treated as distinct. The money laundering offence was held to be an independent offence concerned with dealing with proceeds of crime, and its existence does not depend on the result of the predicate prosecution. Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 apply only where there is a second prosecution for the same offence, which was not the position here.
Conclusion: The plea of double jeopardy was negatived.
Issue (iii): Whether statements recorded during investigation under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act could be used to attract Article 20(3) protection.
Analysis: Protection against self-incrimination was held to arise only when the person stands as an accused at the time of making the statement and the statement is shown to be compelled. A person summoned during investigation under Section 50 is not, by that fact alone, entitled to claim Article 20(3) protection. Voluntary statements recorded at the investigative stage, when the person was not yet an accused, were held not to attract the constitutional bar.
Conclusion: The challenge based on Article 20(3) failed.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was found sustainable, and the writ petition did not merit interference.
Ratio Decidendi: A prosecution for money laundering is independent of the predicate offence, committal is not required before cognizance by the Special Court under the Act, and Article 20 protections against double jeopardy and self-incrimination apply only within their settled constitutional limits.
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AI Drafter ✕
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