Voice sample compulsion and self-incrimination: majority treated it as non-testimonial evidence and inferred magistrate power from statute.

Compelling an accused to provide a voice sample was held by the majority to be non-testimonial physical evidence, so it does not violate Article 20(3) protection against self-incrimination. On the power to authorise collection, the majority read the authority into the statutory scheme of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 and the Code of Criminal Procedure through purposive interpretation, treating voice sampling as within the enlarged concept of measurements and physical examination. The dissent disagreed and said such compulsion requires express legislation. The Bench delivered divided opinions and referred the matter to a larger Bench.

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Issues: (i) Whether compelling an accused to give a voice sample during investigation violates the protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India; (ii) Whether, in the absence of an express provision, a Magistrate can authorize the investigating agency to record the voice sample of an accused.

Issue (i): Whether compelling an accused to give a voice sample during investigation violates the protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The opinions proceeded on the distinction between testimonial compulsion and physical evidence. The majority view treated a voice sample as identification data and not as a statement based on personal knowledge, applying the principle that Article 20(3) protects testimonial acts and not merely physical characteristics used for comparison. The dissent accepted the broader self-incrimination framework but considered that the constitutional issue would not arise if no legal power existed to compel the sample.

Conclusion: The majority held that taking a voice sample does not offend Article 20(3); the dissent did not dispute the constitutional position in principle.

Issue (ii): Whether, in the absence of an express provision, a Magistrate can authorize the investigating agency to record the voice sample of an accused.

Analysis: The majority read the power into the scheme of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920, Section 53 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the investigative framework of the Code, holding that voice sample falls within the enlarged understanding of measurements and physical examination by applying purposive construction and ejusdem generis. The dissent held that neither the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 nor Section 53 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could properly be extended to compel a voice sample, and that such a power must come from legislation.

Conclusion: The majority held that a Magistrate can authorize recording of voice sample by implication under the relevant provisions; the dissent held that no such power exists absent express legislation.

Final Conclusion: The Bench delivered divided opinions on both substantive questions and directed that the matter be placed before a larger Bench for further hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: Voice sample of an accused was treated by the majority as non-testimonial physical evidence capable of being compelled for investigation, and the Magistrate's authority to permit such collection was inferred from the statutory scheme rather than from an express provision.

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