1976 (11) TMI 211 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court affirms convictions for misbranding milk; clarifies plea implications and sentencing rules.

The Supreme Court upheld the convictions of a firm and its partners for misbranding buffalo's milk as cow's milk under the Prevention of Food Adulteration ... - Issues Involved:1. Validity of the plea of 'guilty' and its implications.2. Adulteration and misbranding under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.3. Applicability of the proviso (i) to Section 16(1) of the Act.4. Vicarious liability of partners under Section 17 of the Act.5. Adequacy of the Public Analyst's certificate.Detailed Analysis:1. Validity of the Plea of 'Guilty' and Its Implications:The appellants, a firm and its two partners, entered a plea of 'guilty' before the trial court, which was possibly part of a 'plea bargaining' that misfired at the appellate level. The Supreme Court noted that once a person pleads guilty and the court accepts it, there is no room for defences based on business being the mainstay of a large family or other extenuating circumstances. The court emphasized that a factual contention of innocence cannot survive a plea of guilt, and the provision for a minimum sentence must be adhered to.2. Adulteration and Misbranding Under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954:The facts of the case involved the sale of buffalo's milk misbranded as cow's milk, with a fat deficiency of 16.3% and 17.8% added water. The trial court convicted the accused based on their plea of guilt and imposed fines, viewing the offence as a venial deviation. However, the High Court enhanced the punishment to six months' imprisonment plus a fine, citing that the benefit of proviso (i) to Section 16(1) was not applicable, and the minimum sentence set by the statute was obligatory.3. Applicability of the Proviso (i) to Section 16(1) of the Act:The Supreme Court discussed whether the offence fell under the proviso (i) to Section 16(1), which allows for a lesser sentence for certain types of adulteration. The court concluded that the appellants did not qualify for the proviso because their case involved misbranding under Section 2(ix)(c) of the Act, which is not covered by the proviso. The court stated that the judicial jurisdiction to soften the sentence arises only if the offence of adulteration falls exclusively under sub-clause (1) of clause (i) of Section 2 or sub-clause (k) of clause (ix) of that section.4. Vicarious Liability of Partners Under Section 17 of the Act:The court examined the liability of the second accused, who was not present when the misbranded article was sold. Section 17(2) of the Act makes a partner vicariously liable if the offence is committed with their consent, connivance, or due to their neglect. However, there was no evidence of mens rea against the second accused. Section 17(1) applies if the partner is in charge of the business, but the proviso to this section provides immunity if the offence was committed without the partner's knowledge or despite due diligence. The court found that the second accused was entitled to acquittal as there was no proof of knowledge or connivance.5. Adequacy of the Public Analyst's Certificate:The appellants criticized the Public Analyst's certificate as perfunctory. The court acknowledged that a more detailed process of arriving at the conclusion would have been preferable. However, since the plea was 'guilty', the court did not delve further into the adequacy of the certificate.Conclusion:The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal but suggested that the State Government consider exercising clemency to remit the sentence by three months, given the petty nature of the trade, the non-noxious adulteration, and the lack of significant harm. The appeal was dismissed, but the court left room for potential clemency by the State Government.